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                                 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The organizational machinery of modern Western societies has been able to stabilize a high 
degree of complexity within these societies. Despite recurring crisis trends it has been possible 
to keep tensions induced by the operation of complicated social structures below a threshold 
level, with certain spheres of activity operating with an increasing degree of autonomy and 
efficiency accompanied by permanent changes, whilst on a general social level proving capable 
of integration and coordination - at least up till now. 
 
This more or less harmonious social reduction has been especially characteristic of the modern 
Western societies in the years following the Second World War. The majority of the various 
smoothly-running mechanisms were formed in the "model countries" over several hundred 
years, like for instance the machinery of parliamentary government which has bene capable of 
implementing an establishment based on social consensus in England since the late 17th century 
and subsequently spreading to all the countries of the Western world. Over the centuries it 
underwent gradual refinement, until, around the mid 20th century - it had become adapted to 
providing relatively steady workings in the State power ready for renewal in these societies, and 
at the same time to expressing the political aritculation prevalent in the masses. Similarly, 
mention could be made of the development of mechanisms ensuring the autonomy, efficiency 
and regeneration within science, law and economy over several hundred years and their gradual 
 propagation. 
 
Certain social mechanisms or structural solutions providing flexibility and efficiency have 
spread beyond the boundaries of Western countries to Eastern Europe, and in the past few 
decades to South American and Asian countries. However, these modern structures can still be 
studied in their clearest form primarily in the West European societies and other quasi-Western 
societies in North America or Australia which were based on the same model. 
 
For all present-day societies which have achieved a certain level of industrialization, 
urbanization and mass education and thus created the basis of political consciousness in the 
populace the vexing question arises, how it is possible to maintain political statility while 
allowing the populace to express its political thinking and making politics follow any shift in the 
political thinking of the populace without inducing an explosion. How is it possible to run the 
university training scheme in such a way that it should be able to follow and incorporate the new 
scientific achievements, etc.? 
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In certain Far Eastern countries they have managed to develop the structures of economic 
rationality successfully, but above a certain level of development the lack of political structures 
based on social accord questions any development achieved so far, as shown by the recent 
political events in South Korea.  
 
The problem of modernization has been especially pressing in the East European Socialist 
countries in the past few decades. The laying down of the foundations of industrialization, mass 
education and urbanization has been accompanied by a complete destruction of autonomy and 
its replacement by centralized state government. At a certain phase of social development this 
situation led to an impasse. The centralized Stalinist state power, operating to achieve pre-set 
targets, was able to produce quick results in the elementary process of modernization, but when 
a degree of complexity had been achieved, the very machinery which was crushed by the 
Stalinist logic of modernization in order to rush industrialization became indispensable, i.e. an 
autonomous economic rationality, state government structures based on social accord, an 
autonomous jurisdiction, as well as a technically correct and legally regulated public 
administration. 
 
I have taken the fundamental principles of the following discussion predominantly from Niklas 
Luhmann's theory. However, I have made a few important corrections and some fundamental 
theoretical decisions contrary to these arrived at by him. In this I have been helped by the 
rethinking of some of Talcott Parsons' social categories, Richard Munch's interpenetration 
theory which recycled Parsons' social theory, accentuating it in a very special manner, Jurgen 
Habermas' communicative activity theory which criticised Parsons and Luhmann with its 
approach to "the lifeworld", as well as by some starting points of Georg Lukacs, who examined 
some complex structures well above the level of everyday life on the basis of his former 
reading. This fundamental theoretical experience has been completed by the inclusion of 
theoretical investigations concentrated on the various social subsystems. In the course of writing 
my previous studies I tried to merge those aspects arrived at in empirical research of the political 
system, the legal system and the scientific-university sphere which proved suitable for 
generalization from the point of view of social theory with my general theoretical experience. In 
many cases this has made it possible for me either to refute the general theoretical conceptions 
or starting points confronting them with the facts of reality, or to confirm, and thus, accept them. 
 
From among the rather empirical and specifically worded partial theories I have gained the 
greatest momentum initially from Merton's school of the sociology of science. I first came 
across Merton's writings on the sociology of science and the works of Hagstrom, Glaser, Storer, 
Diane Crane, Joseph Ben-David, etc. most often when doing research on the internal 
connections between the university sphere and science, and when I raised the conclusions to a 
level of higher abstraction I came to query Luhmann's starting point in the respect of the 
delimitation of the subsystems of society, which I had applied quite naturally at several points. 
 
It was after this that I became aware of the situation whereby if I accept the differentiation of the 
subsystems of society taking place in the course of evolution, I still have to face the problem of 
separating these subsystems along their professional components, or of delimiting the 
communications of lay people in a broader context. 
 
Before I became engaged in the empirical investigations of the sociology of science, I had not 
raised this question, and nor had most theories accepting functional differentiation. In the case 
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of Parsons this is understandable as he did not handle specific empirical social subsystems but 
those of an analytical character. Luhmann, who had rejected the analytical approach to the 
systems in principle, was to face this problem, and in the case of the legal system he indicated 
why he did not consider it sufficient to mark off the social subsystems according to professional 
components. However, he failed to work it out on a general theoretical level with respect to all 
the subsystems of society. 
 
Even the indication of the problem is exeptional in Luhmann's writings and lacking clear-cut 
explicit statements the analysts who had taken the differentiation into social subsystems as a 
starting point failed to detect this problem. As there is no explicit wording available, most 
scientists following Luhmann unwittingly seem to have concentrated on the professional 
structures and their demarcation in the areas of science, law, politics, art, etc., while accepting 
the functional differentiation of the social subsystems as clearly conceivable facts of modern 
life. The small number of sentences hidden in Luhmann's works on law fail to make it evident 
that he thinks quite differently. 
 
Whilst investigating science it became clear to me that even in principle the classification of 
social subsystems should be reduced to professional components. Initially this seemed an 
innocent correction in relation to Luhmann's theory,but this line of thought having been 
consistently followed through, a theoretical framework emerged which in many ways resembled 
the theoretical structure of Jurgen Habermas. Logically, if we reduce the individual social 
subsystems to their professional structures a new area, so far unthematized, appears: everyday 
life or "the lifeworld", where the dominant conditions are more diffuse, more emotional and 
more particular than those of professional communications, which represent a specific attitude, 
an orientation to more universal standards and freedom from emotions has been excluded from 
the professional systems until now. In the wake of this correction social evolution may not 
simply be taken as the functional differentiation of the social subsystems from one another, but 
as their emergence from the diffuse everyday life as systems of professional institutions. This 
bears more resemblance to systems emerging from Habermas' "lifeworld" on one hand, and to 
the pattern of social evolution described in Georg Lukacs's  Aesthetics and Ontology, everyday 
life and the specific complex systems emerging from it, on the other. (The similarity of the 
structural framework, however, does not necessarily mean that we accept Habermas' "accents" 
in contrast to the system-like formations.) 
 
Another of my theoretical corrections was also developed while I was analysing investigations 
into the sociology of science. On scrutinizing Parons and Platt's book on the American 
university, as well as Ben-David's works, the importance of the operation of economic market 
rationality in the enforcement of the internal evaluation mechanism of the scientific and 
university spheres became evident to me. This brought my attention to another problem, which 
had passed unnoticed before. How could we speak about the differentiations of the subsystems 
of the ECONOMY, science, law and politics when economy is today integrated in science, 
moreover, comparing today's American and German university models it can be concluded that 
it is precisely the imposition of market evaluation on the scientific and university sector that 
ensures the operation of the scientific evaluation mechanisms in a clearer form. This insight has 
made Karoly Polanyi's former distinction between the two meanings of economy especially 
interesting. In its substantive meaning the phrase of "economy"designates the sphere of material 
production (agriculture, industry etc.) which existed in some form or other in every society. In 
its formal meaning economy denotes the mechanisms  of market rationality. By now it has 
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become evident to me that the Functionalist Systems Theory executes an unconscious shift 
between the two meanings of economy; when using economy substantively it describes its 
differentiation from politics, science and art as a subsystem, and when starting to investigate the 
internal workings of modern economy it takes to the analysis of formal economy, that of the 
system of the institutions of market rationality. 
 
The machinery of economy in its substantive sense (material production) and that of market 
rationality tend to show their divergent areas more and more. Market rationality embraces the 
organization of the spheres of art, science, education, etc., which have acquired mass 
dimensions. 
 
Raising the conclusions drawn to a general level I have managed to explore an even more 
important theoretical problem. Economy in its formal sense tends to incorporate the 
organization of an increasin number of social subsystems. The critical remarks and analyses of 
law "gaining an upper hand" in society have been criticising the legal processing of an 
ever-expanding system of social relationships in law since the early 70s. Even in everyday life 
much can be detected and read about the expansion of politics. The same holds true for certain 
branches of art, which include a number of technologies and social situations in artistic 
elaboration. This hadd previously been far from tuypical. Is it a matter of mutual inclusion of the 
subsystems? A partial thematization of this question has already been carried out by Habermas 
in the respect that economic and political rationalities as areas of the instrumental mind 
penetrate into the field of the "life world" and destroy it. In a less dramatic thematization 
Richard Munch described the expansion and mutual interpenetration of the rationalities as the 
basic pattern of desirable social modernization. 
 
These partial thematizations could be fitted into a more comprehensive theoretical framework, if 
we again choose one of Talcott Parsons' initial categories, "inclusion," as a reference. From the 
general idea of mutual inclusions already raised (and again we refer to Parsons' descriptions of 
inclusion) it becomes clear that Parsons basically meant by this category the inclusion of wider 
and wider circles of the social population. However, science, law, etc. are not only organized 
within the ever-widening circles of population, but tend to include in their evaluation patterns a 
host of social situations previouslly unappreciated and with a growing intensity. So the original 
extensive meaning of inclusion involving the inclusion of the population can be given a 
completely different interpretation: it might be interpreted to signify the inclusion of a growing 
number of social situations. Sticking with the quadruple framework of Parons' analysis, this is 
what Munch outlined as his interpenetration theory as opposed to the theories of functional 
differentiation without tracing it back to Parsons' inclusion category. Habermas also dwelt upon 
this problem though in a different conceptual framework and keeping in mind the inclusion of a 
different group of social situations.(The trends of "Verrechtlichung for example.) 
 
Thinking over our initial empirical problem consistently, we have been able to take important 
steps ahead in the exploration of the basic theoretical decisions of modern social theories. 
 
In explaining the two above-mentioned fundamental theoretical decisions and by analysing their 
different results, theories so different in their degree of specificity, like the social theories of 
Luhmann, Habermas, Munch or Georg Lukacs, might be brought closer in their basic pattern. 
This is what I would like to expound in greater detail in my work and to set up an independent 
theoretical concept relying on the afore mentioned corrections. 
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This version is based predominantly on Luhmann's foundations, even if I have come to 
approach the basic patterns of th theories of Habermas, Munch and Georg Lukacs through my 
amendments. That is to say that in spite of my amendments the following discussion is to be 
read as one of the possible Luhmannite theories of sociology. 
 
 
 
                                    PART ONE 
                           Theoretical foundations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                 CHAPTER I 
                                Basic concepts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Communication as basic element of sociality 
 
 
A demanding analysis is supposed to expose for consideration the basic categories and 
elementary distinctions postulated for the subject under investigation before putting them into 
use. The most important among them concerns a basic element of the organization of sociality. 
If we start from the statement still used for the purposes of a number of theoretical analyses that 
society is the aggregate of the relationships between people, we have taken it for granted that an 
individual person is an indivisible and essential element of society, even if this aspect has not 
been accentuated. Consequently all further analysis is built on this premise, and an elementary 
distinction can be made between a minimum of two people, whilst the borderlines between 
more comprehensive social features can be drawn between groups, strata or classes consisting of 
people. Thus social structure is bound to become the structure of the population, like for 
instance the group structure, the stratum-structure and the class structure. But how is it possible 
to locate the structural demarcations and mediation mechanisms of science, ideology, public 
administration, law, economy, etc. against this background? 
 
The mode of thought prevalent in social theory has absorbed this idea since the late 19th 
century, when "man", the basic category of the organization of society came to be broken down 
and was found to play different roles in the operation and composition of the various social 
features and become a member of the society  (1), assuming the norms and behavioural patterns 
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belonging to the various roles in the course of socialization. 
 
The breaking of traditional ties and the growing extent of urbanization both increase the number 
of diverse roles a person has to play and accentuate the differences in their natures. 
 
As a result, the social theories based on individual roles and the relationships between the roles 
instead of on "man" have been able to achieve a higher resolution and are capable of exploring 
the actual organization of society using much finer distinctions. An individual role, however, 
consists of elements easy to analyse and since Max Weber the actions constituting the roles 
have been the focus of theoretical analysis. Behind the differences in roles, the individual types 
of action, the motivations for action and the pattern variables characterising individual action 
can easily be grasped. Talcott Parsons based the understanding of the system-like paradigms of 
society as such on divergent roles, which can be derived from divergent types of action and 
ultimately the acting  unit ("unit act"), which builds up the more complicated paradigms which 
can also be broken down into acting components. 
 
We have come a long way from the compact "man" concept. The higher resolution arose along 
the line man ---> role ---> action ---> acting component, and modern social theories recombine 
their categories, typologies and the distinctions used to grasp broader social paradigms out of 
these. 
 
However, I have found Niklas Luhmann's analysis convincing. He has departed from solutions 
based on the action of individual people (2), Luhmann very drastically separated social theory 
from man as an individual. He found that theoretical thinking still remains within the limitation 
of the old every-day observation:"in a sense society consists of people". Action is associated 
with man as an individual, despite the fact  that the theory analytically subdivides this category. 
Even in the action theory sociality starts with the action between two actors: inter-subjectivity. 
So in the first place the action theory presupposes that understanding of sociality depends on 
action, and in the second it makes a correction (3). 
 
Luhmann rejects action as basic element of sociality and includes communication instead, 
which means the information transfeer between two sensible human beings (or more exactly, 
psychic systems). This transmission and reception, however, involves repeated selection, so the 
question is the "processing of selections". "Begreift man Kommunikation als Synthese dreier 
Selektionen, als Einheit aus Information, Mitteilung und Verstehen, so ist die Kommunikation 
realisiert, wenn und soweit das Verstehen zustandekommt". (Luhmann, l984, p.286) It is an act 
of selection that the information content is articulated mentally; a further selection is represented 
by the communication of messages (the message is always, at least in part, communicated 
wrongly), and the greatest selection wil be carried out when the other party gets to understand 
the message. The point is that sociality is constituted by communication following this pattern 
and consists of the actions of psychic systems (of their coordinated spiritual harmony) so it can 
no longer be subdivided into them. Luhmann thinks that with this approach the organization of 
the social world can be traced along a series of new dimensions, and the way has been paved for 
the exploration of a number of interrelations so far unthematized. 
 
An indivisible component of the social world is elementary communication, which, may 
however, only arise on the basis of a problem-free organization of the physical and biological 
world conditioned upon the existence of the psychic systems developed on this basis, and may 
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form more complex social structures. In addition to amending the fundamental element 
Luhmann separated the psychic and mental processes from the organization of sociality, thus 
establishing an independent system level. The various societal paradigms naturally exercise a 
multiple influence on the organization of psychic processes - just as they influence the entity of 
sociality. But the mutual influence is alway exercised through the selection and transformation 
determined by the respective system level. Luhmann describes the interdependence between the 
two system levels with the category interpenetration. (See Luhmann, 1981, pp. 151-170). 
 
 
2. The systems of sociality: interaction, organization and society 
 
 
Our former use of the word "sociality" can now be better explained. Everyday sociological 
language uses "society" to describe what Luhmann had divided into three system levels. The 
comprehensive terms sociality or "social system" are used to embrace the three levels. As a 
matter of fact, society represent only one of the system levels in the organization of the social 
world and from this system level Luhmann separated the level of organizational systems and the 
level of simple interaction systems. 
 
When in this study we refer to system-like organization or systems, empirical delimitation is 
presupposed, as opposed to Talcott Parsons' "analytical" system concept. In real social existence 
he sees only diffuse overlappings and he thinks the system-like character of social paradigms 
can only  be constructed theoretically. Luhmann also rejects the analytical system  concept and 
he views the  system-like organization of the different social paradigms as specific and 
empirical factors actually existing. On the three system levels of the organization of sociality 
characteristic delimitations can be detected. 
 
The interactions or interactional systems draw their boundaries on the basis of presence or 
absence - Luhmann (1975, pp. 9-21). All communication which takes place between those 
present belongs to the given interaction system. Distance is exclusive.The latter statement has 
recently undergone some some reinterpretation due to the existence of  the telephone, moreover 
even more complex interactions involving great distances have been made possible recently by 
the television-assisted "teleconferences", shere interaction participants on different continents 
communicate in one interaction system. All these technical facilities simply tinge the 
characteristics of the interaction system. In the case of a system constituted by the interaction 
parties actually present and those mediated by some technical means most characteristics are 
common, e.g. the interaction system cannot be too complex because only one person can talk at 
a time and if there is a large  number of participants a really communicative participation of the 
great majority is unlikely. Thus a spontaneous internal delimitation will follow between the 
actual interaction system containing a few active communicants and the rest of those present 
who are degraded to more environments as spectators. 
 
Luhmann has recently outlined his precise views on the boundaries of the interaction systems. It 
apperas from his accounts these days that the intrinsic notional connection themselves delimit 
the interaction, as opposed to the more complex social systems, where the delimitation has to be 
done explicitly beyond the internal logical coherence. Interaction as it were involves a non-stop 
stream of communication and its system-like interdependence is ensured by the circumstance 
that within the given framework of interaction each subsequent unit of comminication should, in 
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some way, join the previous one thematically. Within the same interaction it is impossible to 
make up a drastically  different subject without giving reasons for the change; an explanation 
should be given for the diversion from the previous acts of communication, some kind of link 
should be established between the two utterances. Likewise, the comments previously made on 
the given subject cannot be repeated as if they were non-existent without some embarrassment 
involved; generally speaking the different views voiced cannot be disregarded, and no denial 
can be put forward, unless accompanied by well-founded arguments. Within an interaction 
system the communication acts "tread on each other's heels," partially mirror each other, and 
anyone who ignores this will make the interaction chaotic and incoherent. This is what 
Luhmann calls "the basal self-reference" of the interaction system (Luhmann, 1984, p. 620). 
 
Ultimately this is how it can be visualized that among numerous participants an interaction 
system might be reduced to a closer circle of participants and the rest might be excluded from 
the system. Physical presence of course always makes it possible for any participant to join the 
given interaction system, but then he has to take into account the existing delimitation and he 
can only communicate in  the interaction by imitating it, eventually introducing a new subject 
after some connecting links. 
 
In the case of organization as a social system the delimitation from the environment is more 
marked, in as much as it is the existence (or absence) of membership that decides which act of 
communication belongs to the given organization and which one does not. The system of 
organization may  be more complex, as beyond the individual acts of communication it fixes the 
subjects to be communicated within the organization with binding power for the future,by 
drafting rules it narrows down the range of communication applicable within the various 
subjects (that is to say, it has done "preliminary selection" with binding force for later 
communication within the organization; members can make their own selections in their 
interpretation of the world and by choosing their alternative in the decision-making process only 
within this framework). Building up hierarchical relationships between the members it makes 
the selection  of their superiors in the hierarchy compulsory for those in lower positions. 
 
Finally, society is  the most comprehensiv social system, ensuring common standards of 
cognition, the rules of usage and the cultural symbols for communication within the interactions 
and the system of organization. 
 
Where are the boundaries of society? Luhmann draws the boundaries of "society" as a social 
system from outside: all communication which is in some way available for the participants 
belongs to the same social system. Due to the intertwining of communication in the past century 
we can now talk about a single "world society" (Luhmann, 1975, pp. 31-51). 
 
The three social system levels are entwined in their operation, but viewing them from an 
evolutionary aspect their connections and the significance of the individual system leels might 
be different invarious periods of history. In "face-to face" societies the organization of sociality 
mostly took place within the interaction systems so the boundaries of the most comprehensive 
social system, society, coincided with the boundaries of the community. All communication 
took place in interactions and it was hard to distinguish "society" itself from the interactions, 
which meant that the stability of society was based on its undisturbed interactions. At that time a 
contradiction of any of the communicants which lead to conflict endangered the stability of th 
primitive society as a whole. Tolerating the conradictions and conflicts within the interactions 
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was only possible to the degree to which society was able to stabilize its structures transcending 
the acts of interactions. Beneath this umbrella hosts of interactions arise and cease. Below a 
certain threshold level the disintegration of interactions due to conflicts does not affect the 
undisturbed flow of the total communication within a society. 
 
The society that outgrew the interactions underwent a large-scale increase in complexity, 
although above a certain level it was only through the development of organizational 
communication penetrating between the interactions and the "receding" society that this gap 
could be widened and stabilized, along with that of the complexity of the acts of communication 
within the same society. 
 
According to Luhmann's typology, all forms outside the category of interaction which cannot fit 
directly into the framework of society are covered by the term organization. For this reason it 
has been suggested several times that this typology should be developed further and that group 
should be included as an independent system level (See Neidhard, 1979, Tyrell, 1983). 
However, Luhmann included these group-like structures in "organization", using the concepts 
"membership" and "organization" broadly. 
 
Today's formal organizations can be distinguished from the small natural communities of 
traditional societies only on the grounds of the degree of their formality and the members' free 
access and withdrawal. Yet with Luhmann we might say that societies built up by traditional 
communities participate in the establishment of intra-societal communication by defining some 
comprehensive cultural standards and the rules of usage. The majority of these are developed in 
small, traditional communities bound by restrictions, and regulated by norms long unchanged. 
 
Firstly, with the disruption of the small traditional communities the role of the natural small 
communities as units organizing and influencing social communication will be reduced (e.g. the 
present-day small family), and seconly, the shaping of communication will be taken over by 
formal organizations allowing free access and resignation. So today an increasing proportion of 
interactions takes place in formal organizations and the interactions are organizationally 
"preformed" (4). As regards the remaining non-formal organizations where emotional solidarity 
plays a greater role, their distinction within the "group" category may be considered, but the 
separation of formal organizations within the organizations makes Luhmann's decision to 
renounce their allocation to a separate system level acceptable. 
 
Not only are the majority of interactions organizationally preformed, but beyond general social 
predestination they themselves and the selection of the systems organization are determined by 
subsystems of society with their increasing specificity. To quote Luhmann's phrase "complexity 
is reduced for them". 
 
The issue of  subsystems of society is also a scandalous point in sociological systems theory. 
The "system" concept was adopted in most every-day social science analyses without any 
attempt to identify it accurately - in American sociology, in the late 50s. Talcott Parsons who 
after sporadic attempts (5), introduced the "system" concept into sociology with great success 
considered the systematism of social paradigms suitable for reconstruction only analytically, i.e. 
theoretically. As we know, he presupposed four basic functions in the operation of society as a 
system and he divided society into four social subsystems to fulfill these functions analytically. 
He concluded, however, that empirically or concretely detectable social mechanisms do not 
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necessarily fall into one or another of the four subsystems, so it did not even occur to him that 
he should look for system-like delimitations among the actually functioning social mechanism, 
and he never considered it a theoretical problem. 
 
For a considerable time there was nobody on a general theoretical level who showed any 
intention of re-interpreting Parsons' analytical systems theory as an empirical or concrete 
approach to the social system in principle. However, in the specialized individual branches of 
social sciences an unnoticed tendency to re-interpret started precisely in respect of the social 
sphere under examination: they started to apply the notion of systems theory empirically (6), 
like for instance the categories of feed-back, input-output and equilibrium. 
 
With the propagation of the applications of categories within the systems theory assuming mass 
proportions the theory was transformed impreceptibly in specialized branches of social sciences 
into an empirical or concrete approach to systems and Parsons' categories were used 
simultaneously. However, due to this unconscious reinterpretation the elementary preliminary 
question was left open: "where do empirical or concrete social subsystems draw their 
boundaries (if and where they exist) and to what principles and mechanisms do they conform?" 
For scientists dealing with specific areas the field under examination is also to be marked off at 
the level of every-day thinking: this is science and that is economy, politics, the legal system, 
art, education, etc., as it is well known. 
 
At the level of every-day thinking the demarcation between the various social spheres is not a 
problem - all the less, since during the past centuries science has been represented by 
organizations with clearly defined profiles (academies, universitaries, etc.), the political sphere 
by government offices, parties, etc. However, this is a misleading situation because a subsystem 
of society may actually cease to exist even if the special organizations are maintained. This was 
shown for instance by the example of early socialism in Eastern Europe: the Academy of 
Sciences may have existed but the same ideological and state control functioned in it as in the 
products of "art" (also precisely delimited) or in the law which was made to serve political 
terror. In Western societies the separation mechanisms of subsystems of society really are 
functioning naturally - reality allowed identification of the boundaries of separate organizations 
with those of the subsystems of society even if there was no theoretical justification. 
 
Neither, for a long time, did delimitation of the subsystems of society present a problem for 
Niklas Luhmann. Although in the mid-60's, after some initial hesitation, he rejected Parson's 
analytical approach to systems and adopted the starting point that the subsystems of society are 
delimited from each other  in reality both empirically and concretely (thus rejecting Parsons' 
division into four social subsystems), it was only from the mid-70s that he managed to find a 
unified basis for a theoretical reconstruction of the delimitation between subsystems of the 
society. 
 
In short, Luhmann's present-day views on the delimitation of social subsystems can be 
summarized as follows: a pronounced demarcation of subsystems  of society is a function of 
how well it can arrange itself around a universal binary code (in other words: a "dual 
schematics"). The communications belonging to discrete subsystems of society select the 
information received from reality according to this. In science selection follows the true/false 
binary code; the more specific scientific theories make the selection according to the rules of 
logic and verification processess; in law the distinction between lawful and unlawful,in the 
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system of economy the distinction between profitable and non-profitable control the options and 
selection of communications. 
 
Thus an organizational system is not constitutive when it is a question of delimiting subsystems 
 of society but below this level there should be a less visible mechanism operating: the selection 
of communications belonging to a subsystem is conrolled by a specific binary code, which 
universally permeates the given subsystem. At this point attention should be called to a few 
problems in Luhmann's solution which will be discussed in more detail later. 
 
One of them is that within the subsystems of society he does not delimit the communications 
which apply the discrete universal binary code professionally and the set structures organizing 
them from the applications in everyday life. So, for instance, the system of science includes both 
a scientist's activities in a specialized field subject to the true/false distinction and all types of 
everyday communication. The same holds for the activities of professional jurists who base their 
orientation on the dichotomy of lawful and unlawful, as well as for the actions of anyone 
orientated according to the alwful/unlawful distinction in some cases (7). 
 
As a result of his broad conception of the subsystems  of society Luhmann is biased towards 
neglecting the examination of the set structures, which recruit, select, socialize, evaluate, reward 
and sanction those participating in professional communications of  the discrete subsystems of 
society according to a special binary code, which is to say that these structures aim at forcing the 
professional participants to assert the specific dual paradigm in the clearest possible form 
through the means of structure. Following this line Luhmann would be unable to gather up the 
applications of binary codes in everydays with this. 
 
 
  
3. The contingency of sociality: differentiation in time 
 
 
The separation of discrete subsystems of society in modern societies raises the fulfillment of the 
various basic functions to a high level and makes it possible that within the various social 
subsystems complex structures of selections (those linked with each other) can be built up. The 
immense complexity on a general social level does not cause any selection problems for the 
subsystems as a result of system-like separations as the delimitations degrade the other 
increasingly commplex subsysems to environments beyond the subsystems and each 
predominantly selects information emerging from the environment according to its own dual 
paradigm. Thus the subsystem-like delimitations reduce complexity on a general social level, 
and this allows a drastic growth in complexity without leading to chaos or the disorganization of 
the whole society. 
  
 The subsystem-like delimitation, however, is just one axis along which complexity expands. 
Using Luhmann's expression, this differentiation covers only the substantive (sachliche) and 
social (soziale) dimensions. The third dimension of the composition of sociality is the 
differentiation in time. The complexity ensured in the previous dimensions can be further 
increased if the rigid interlocking of the individual mechanisms within the subsystems can be 
eliminated and elements of a subsystem are allowed to interlink to form new combinations or 
relations. This allows a further growth in the number of elements within the subsystems, i.e. a 
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system might become even more complex, particularly if a form of interlocking can be 
developed where certain elements within the system are joined in a time sequence succeeded by 
their flexible disengagement, which is in turn succeeded by the interlocking of new elements 
(Luhmann, 1981, pp. 101-126). Such a "temporal" sysytem (8) can stabilize the growth of 
complexity by this shift in time. 
  
 A discussion of this kind may sound somewhat abstract, but it provides a theoretical solution 
for such simple things as, for instance, political pluralism. Modern political systems have 
"temporalized" their complexity by basing state power on periodically recurring elections. 
Besides factually existing and operating government policies the future is also present in an 
institutionalized from albeit suspended in the form of alternative party policies and platforms, 
any of which might interlink with the machinery of administration executing the respective 
period's state policies at the following elections should it become the ruling party by acquiring a 
majority at the parliamentary elections. 
  
 Similar differentiations in time can be observed in science. Scientific thinking means working 
on the threshold of knowledge, where there are alternative versions to all the yesses and noes. A 
fair degree of accord might develop in the public's view of a branch of science in support of one 
or another competing theorem. In fact it should develop to the conclusions supported by other 
scientific theorems based on it, even if temporarily. However, the denials, corrections and 
emphasis on new interrelations may shift the points of agreement within the scientific "public 
opinion" towards scientific theorems so far unaccepted here is the stabilization of factually 
existing scientific truths (which are valid and accepted by the majority of the community) with 
concurrent alternative scientific statements supported by only a few scientists. The transposition 
becomes possible in the operation of science in a time sequence. Potentially the "future" is 
extant in the present - a deferred possibility - so the complexity of science can also be increased 
in this direction, beyond the differentiations within the subject or science. 
  
 Differentiation in time is also important in modern social subsystems from another aspect. Here 
the reduction of entropy is focus. The structural separation of the discrete subsystems of society 
makes possible the formulation of the results of selections in communication and decisions and, 
building on these, subsequent selections may be continuously arranged in long selection chain. 
The stabilization of the selection chainss within the subsystems makes possible the absorption 
of a multiplicity of environmental information so that the subsystems considerably outmatch the 
cognitive and decision potentials of everyday thinking conforming to their specific binary code. 
  
 Environmental complexity of the systems is continuously growing with the formation of 
autonomies and the restructuring of the social subsystems constituting the environment, making 
them receptive to changes. It is becoming less and less possible to estimate the present state of 
the environment on the grounds of past analogies. New information on increasingly more 
environmental mechanisms should be gained in an ad hoc manner and a new picture should be 
formed in the course of the decision selections. Such a complex environment can only be 
"scanned" by serial selections contained in lengthy selection chains. 
  
 The reduction of entropy consequently means that it is impossible to start everything all over 
again in the subsystems. The sweeping aside of or ignoring previous selections is excluded  by 
the internal mechanisms of the subsystems or at least there should be sufficient justification for 
discarding previous selections. 
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 To give an example of the reduction in social entropy the decision processes in state policies in 
the Western political systems can be highlighted. Even the platforms of the political parties are 
formulated in long selection chains from which each ruling party considers several decision 
courses taken in their party programmes as given an compulsory when making state decisions - 
at least in the majority of cases. In the bills' preparatory processes the experts' selections 
exploring the fundamental interrelations of the field to be controlled are carried out in 
articulated structures; the manoeuvres of the corporate systems to check the options thus 
brought into the foreground will narrow down the decision alternatives of the bill to be passed 
which serve social consensus- finally, in parliaments, the decision-making selection is made on 
only a few minor details. Any party that wants relinguish the social consensus already achieved 
up to this point and restart the selection chain will exclude itself from the possibility of 
influencing the decisions. Unless it can achieve a majority in support of its intention, it will be 
unable to prevent the former selection chain from closing down and the result from being 
enacted. Of course, if such a party gets a majority it may sweep aside all former selections along 
with the current ruling party and start many things all over again as the new ruling party. Now it 
will be this party that will dominate the series of decision selections before and during the 
parliamentary procedure and the parties wishing to "start everything all over again" may be 
vociferous but cannot actually do anything due to their parliamentary minority. 
  
 In joining the two aspects of differentiation in time it might be said that as a result of political 
pluralism the state political structures are contingent; the coexistence of institutionalized 
alternative party policies suspended on the horizon ensures the possibility of restarting at any 
time, but meanwhile the decision structures prohibit or inhibit restarting in the decision 
preparation stage by arranging the decision selections in chains while the acts are being prepared 
- except in the case of the ruling party being ousted by a new one. A radical changeability in the 
decision premises taking the form of a new ruling party and state policies is thus balanced by 
irreversibilities within the individual processes of state decisions (9). 
  
 On the other hand a state decision system is entropic, where there is no consolidated way of 
changing the decision premises that have developed which may further be bound by 
unchangeable ideological maxims, as is the case in East European political systems. Then again, 
in any given period, within the various decision processes professional, political and  economic 
alternatives are in confrontation and everything starts afresh when there is a relevant or 
quasirelevant world event or a change of a political personality. For instance in the Hungarian 
bill drafting process, although it can take 8-10 years to prepare a bill it is quite feasible for these 
to be several seqments of the total process within which complete plans are consantly being 
formulated. However, because no consensus develops all previous agreements fall and 
everything must be started all over again when sudenly the product of one of the several 
selections will stand and become enacted (10). But in many cases this one is no more stable than 
the previous end products discarded when the bill was drafted, so when a new accidental change 
in political personalities or world events, etc. offers the opportunity the struggle starts for a 
fundamental modification of the act already passed. So, although the political leadership at the 
top is unchangeable, the bulk of legislation shows constant fluctuation. Everything changes and 
changes back again - there are no irreversibilities here. 
  
 The question of entropy can also be raised in the system of modern sciences. Modern science 
shows an increasing tendency to resolve in the course of its progress the compact ideas 
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developed in everyday thinking, it recombines the theoretical categories of more complex social 
paradigms out of the high-resolution fundamental elements and only allows through systematic 
denial the destruction of the structures erected by former scientific statements. No general 
highbrow-communications are admitted by the structures of segregated science. In order to be 
able to publish things in scientific journals or contribute at a scientific conference one has to 
have absorbed the accumulated knowledge and interdependent theorems of a field of science, 
and it is only on this basis that one can make my presence felt in the world of science. On this 
basis one can equally well contravene earlier statements or rebuild the accepted theoretical 
structures, going as far as introducing new basic elements. 
  
 It is here demonstrated that, with refutability and with the tolerance of pluralistic scientific 
truths, on one hand in modern science restarting is always ensured and on the other the 
accumulated selection chains have a binding power until refutation. In a field of science the 
knowledge accumulated has to be known, though not necessarily accepted, which means that 
from the point of view of entropy reduction a young scientist has to start his scientific 
commmunications and the exploration and selection of further alternatives from the level of the 
lengthy selection chains achieved so far - unless he refutes the results to date. 
  
 However, in some new social sciences it can be seen that "anyone on the street" feels entitled to 
publish "scientific" contributions or speak at conferences undistinguished from the general 
intellectual communications, and as there is as yet no consensus in such new scientific 
communities on the delineation of scientific material any professional is justified in feeling he is 
a potential contributor. When a concurrence of opinions has developed and the next generation 
of scientists has been socialized, the entropic state ceases to exist and the internal structures of 
the new science fix the boundaries of the system for professional communications. 
  
 Likewise, another aspect of the reduction of entropy within modern sciences is constituted by 
the obligation of originality. Scientific merits and awards are mostly allocated to the first 
contributor of a scientific theorem; if the language or phraseology has not yet been clearly 
defined in the given science, the second, third or fourth contributor offering more precision 
might also receive such recognition (11). However, later on anyone who is satisfied merely to 
repeat rather belatedly a known scientific theorem will have his paper refused or be denied 
participation at a conference. That is to say, a young scientist has not only to learn the 
accumulated knowledge available, but should refrain from stopping at this point in the selection 
chain, repeat the previous results and continue the selection chains (or deny them and start them 
afresh)! Thus the lengthy chain of irreversibility is corrected by institutionalized reversibilities. 
  
 It is the building up and protection of temporally extensive communication selection sequences 
(or, as we have seen in sciences, the compulsory development of these sequences by the 
obligation of originality) that makes it easier to share the responsibility that decisions involve in 
a society of increasing complexity. Hence substantive or objective complexity goes hand in 
hand with temporal complexity. 
  
  
4. Evolutionary mechanisms 
  
  
Modern societies are adaptive ready for renewal, and social evolution can be traced along the 
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processes where those mechanisms which ensure the ability for renewal develop. This widely 
accepted formula, which is, incidentally true, can be made more precise, if we dig down a level 
deeper and direct our attention to the evolution mechanisms behind the ability to renew. 
  
 Just as in the world of biological systems, also in the world of sociality variation, selection and 
the stabilization of the selected constitute the fundamental evolutionary mechanisms. These 
mechanisms, however, are organized in the specific medium of sociality, the mental structures, 
and they cannot be surveyed using simple biological analogies. In the wake of Donald T. 
Campbell, since the early 70s Niklas Luhmann has been trying to grasp the evolutionary 
mechanisms within discrete subsystems of society (12). 
  
 The first fundamental difference between the biological system level and the evolution of the 
world of sociality is that through language and by recording social structures as mental 
structures the latter can make its choice not only from among factually existing structures but 
also from among the possible structures recorded linguistically or spiritually. This partly allows 
a drastic extension of variations and partly reduces the evolutionary time span, as in this way all 
variations are not to be realized merely to undergo controlled destruction and to allow the 
selected ones to operate. 
  
 In the world of sociality the production of "potential" variations is gaining more and more 
importance as in the course of earlier historical development the number of societies 
implementing autonomous versions of evolution had been decreasing to a point at which started 
the process which led to the present situation where a world society has become an exclusive 
background for the further evolution of sociality.  
  
 This trend reduces the importance of selection from alternatives implemented in various areas 
and increases the proportion of potential alternatives designed intellectually in the "variety pool" 
need for the evolution. 
  
 Formation of the complex society was preconditional upon the institutionalized production of 
variations, selection and also the stabilization of the selected within the discrete subsystems of 
society. In the case of the modern legal system the creation of a continuous machinery of 
law-making ensured the production of variations for the bulk of legal material in operation since 
the late 18th century and nowadays hundreds of legal measures are "stramded" or preserved in 
special legal journals or in bill drafts as a "variety pool" for the preparation of the next change in 
the regulations. The political bodies of government select the law effective at the time from the 
legally possible bulk according to power relations within the society and to the possibility of 
consensus, so finally a proportion of the selected legal measures become stabilized through 
juridical generalization as legal institutions, principles of legal dogmatics, etc. (Luhmann, 1972, 
p. 136). 
  
 In the modern political systems the state policies selected from the alternative political party 
programmes will embody the ability for continuous evolution. Therefore the free formation of 
parties ensures the production of alternatives and periodically recurring parliamentary elections 
will effect the formalized selection from these. Public administration, which is always reshaped 
by the new ruling party aims at putting into practice the selected government policies. 
  
 In the same way. in modern science the coexistence of plural scientific truths and the existence 
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of competing theoretical alternatives provide the variations for the scientific evolution of the 
period. Selection mechanisms also exist in this field. For instance, agreement is more often 
reached to general scientific opinions by backing them up with the theories and statements of 
those of high repute scientifically speaking. It should, however, be emphasized that, as opposed 
to law and politics, a stable attachment to any of the variations does not develop or is not bound 
to develop. Modern scientific truth always remains hypothetical and some of the alternative 
truisms !!instantaneoussly rejected!! may retain a presence in the guidance of scientists with 
almost the same intensity as those scientific statements, which have acquired greater consensus. 
  
 As a matter of fact, scientific truths or statements become the only absolute and undeniable 
truth when, transformed by further selections, they are moved to the areas of ideology, politics, 
law, and, generally, everyday thinking. 
  
 In this sense it way be started that by expanding and investigating all working social 
mechanisms modern science explores masses of alternative modes of operation. Many of these 
become accepted as alternative statements competing within the science. The other subsystems 
of society, own variety production takes over some scientific statements, selected and 
transformed according to its own binary code, and selects out of these the only decision 
alternative it recommends for operation (as a legal measure. party programme, ideological 
theorem, educational material or technology etc.). Thus science becomes the greatest producer 
of varieties within a complex society and the varieties created in great abundance here constitute 
the chief source of variety production in the social subsystems. 
  
 However, these evolutionary mechanisms have so far only been able to assert themselves in 
social evolution with difficulty. The factually operating social structures are hard to stabilize if 
their alternatives are available suspended on the horizon. The existence, where "there is only 
one way things can happen" is easier to stabilize than one where "there are other possible ways". 
Naturally, the former does not make evolution possible, as it annihilates the alternatives which 
could help it to renew. 
  
 In most earlier societies, if they were to function properly, state government was not to be 
questioned, truths were not to be denied and beliefs were more or less automatic. So far the 
West European model of modernization has been the only one able to stabilize a high degree of 
complexity. Today's East European societies demonstrate very well what great damage has been 
caused by political and social structures set up on the basis of the elimination of alternative 
choices and how difficult it is to recreate the evolutionary mechanisms of variation, selection 
and stabilization. 
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                                         CHAPTER II 
                       The subsystems of complex societies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If we discard Parsons analytical approach to systems and take social systems as empirically or 
concretely existing entities, research on delimiting them is theoretically necessitated. As 
described in the previous chapter, after Parsons' theory had become popular the analytical 
approach to systems transformed in the thinking of most sociologists, into a supposition of 
empirical or concrete systems where the spheres of state, science, law and economy easily 
identified by everyday thinking constituted the social subsystems. The concept of system was 
made to fit all societal formations. 
 
However, this approach is only undisputed in everday thinking. Theoretically it proves 
inadequate in drawing up the lines of demarcation within the uniform bulk of complex social 
formations. 
 
 
 
 
1. Differences in the demarcation of organizational and subsystems of society 
 
In modern societies,where formal organizations play an immense role in the workings of life, 
the boundaries of a subsystem  of society coincide with the discrete organizations of the given 
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subsystem in everyday thinking. The boundaries of science are embodied in the walls of 
scientific institutes, academies and universities, those of the educational system are constituted 
by school walls and the boundaries of economy are represented by those of factories and banks. 
 
Organizational detachment, however, is superficial. The actual subsystem-like separations take 
place at a different level and organizational detachment only follows these deeper separations 
approximately.Nevertheless as will be shown later, in come cases, no subsystem-like social 
separations can be detected behind the pronounced organizational detachments and in other 
cases two subsystems of society are delimited within a single organization which shows a 
strikingly marked detachment. (However, even in the latter case the organisational separations 
within the major organisation show that deep down different qualities are delimited.) 
 
In societies where subsystem-like social differentiations actually exist behind the organizational 
differentiations it is no great error if the social scientist identifies them with the boundaries of 
the subsystems. This is the situation in modern Western societies and those built on the same 
model. In a number of other regions, for instance in East European societies, the organizational 
separations were introduced (or maintained), but the actual subsystem-like social detachment 
was never brought about. This is where identification with organizational detachment becomes 
really conspicious, and if we supposed that such a society is unable to further develop beyond a 
certain level of complexity without actual structural separations on the subsystem level, because 
of this theoretical gap the roots of the actual problems cannot be traced. 
 
In East European countries even during the darkest years of Stalinism there were scientific 
institutes and universities which were organisationally independent of the state, just as people 
engaged in art had their aim independent organizations. In reality, however, a single social logic 
acted in all formal independent organizations which spread down from the summit of power to 
the whole of society. In everyday thinking it was obvious that it was not science, art, law or 
economy that was going on, but theoretically, long after it remained unanswered exactly what 
makes the working social structures law, art or economy? 
 
 
2. The delimitation of subsystems of society 
 
 
Anything that has become reality makes subsequent exploration difficult for the research worker 
because of the obviousness of the existing situation. It is only when "something goes wrong 
with the obviousness," and it ceases to function that the exploration of the mechanisms that had 
previously worked unnoticeably becomes possible by contrasting the periods before and after 
the "break-down". In Western Europe the mechanisms ensuring the separation of the 
subsystems of society have been working for a long time, though not without some degree of 
tension, so Niklas Luhmann took decades before he was able to outline the empirical 
delimitation principles of the social subsystems following his rejection of Parsons' analytical 
approach to systems. It was only from the early 80s that he was able to express explicitly the 
delimitation mechanisms involved and put them into focus. 
 
A subsystem of society can be delimited by its being organized around a binary code (or an 
universal dual schematics). The fixed structures of actions and communications fulfilling the 
essential social functions promote selection according to a dual schematics in the definition of 
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the given actions and communications and they take into account selections conforming to 
further aspects of value deflected by the prism of their own universal binary code. The structures 
of detached science emphasize selection according to the true/false dual paradigm; in the legal 
system gaining autonomy the binary code lawful/unlawful and selection conforming to it is 
imposed upon the actions belonging to the respective subsystem, whilst in the economy the 
binary code profitable/non-profitable is imposed together with congruent selection. 
 
If the mechanisms making these universal dual paradigms dominant in a subsystem of society 
and pushing the remaining value aspects into the background are inoperative, even the most 
precise organizational delimitations marking the spheres of university, art and law will remain 
nominal. On the other hand it should be emphasized that in the case of real delimitation of the 
dual paradigms the organizational delimitations to some extend follow and reinfoce it (13). 
Let us have closer look at the question of subsystems of society and their binary code. 
 
In most cases the exploration of the binary code  belonging to a subsystem of society  does not 
present a theoretical problem. The functioning of such a binary code can easily be identified: in 
the case of science it is the true/false dichotomy in art beautiful and ugly, in law lawful and 
unlawful, in economy profitable and non-profitable. From among the major social spheres it is 
in the political system that problems arise in the identification of its central binary code. 
 
Even if in the case of the political system a designation semantically so rich in tradition as the 
true/false dual of science or other duals in art and law has not been formed to describe its binary 
code, in this area too a central binary schematism can be demonstrated which is just being 
developed, and which exercises a powerful effect on the selection mechanisms of all political 
action in modern Western political systems allowing other important aspects to assert 
themselves only after being deflected by its prism. Luhmann points out that the dichotomy of 
government/opposition is the central dual schematism of the political system in the decision 
selection of competitive political organizations. (Luhmann 1985 )The government/opposition 
diad can be demonstrated when describing political actors choice of actions by noting that for 
the leaders, the representatives and the press of the ruling party and for the leaders of the 
organizations close to it, their attitude to the alternatives of everyday political decisions and of 
reactions to world events, etc. is influenced by the consideration whether they can stay in office 
as a ruling body if they support this or that alternative with the large circulation newspapers and 
other media transmitting their views to several million voters, whether the consequent public 
reaction will decrease the number of obtainable votes at the next election. On  the other hand, 
for the leaders, MPs and press of the opposition parties the binary schemitism "remaining in 
opposition or taking office as a ruling body" selects the possible decision alternatives. 
 
A competitive party system, a pluralistic press and public emulation transmitted by the media 
make the binary code government/opposition just as imperative in this way as the orientation 
according to the profitable/non-profitable paradigm for any entrepreneur. 
 
I find the functioning of this dual paradigm in modern Western political systems convincing. 
However, if we apply this consistently in the exploration of delimitations within the state's 
political sphere, the widely used concept of a comprehensive political system should be 
discarded to allow the emergence of a political subsystem in a narrower sense. 
 
In a way we have already made this distinction semantically a differentiation between politics 
 
 
21 
and public administration. The political subsystem only includes the spheres where selection 
according to the binary code government/opposition is dominant and decisive, first and 
foremost the bodies and institutions at the top of state power, the political parties and political 
movements fighting for them, the agencies associated with a party and representing its political 
interests, the political press and other organs of political publicity. Though public administration 
is part of the establishment, with the development of its legal regulation over the last century it 
has become more and more independent from the political organs, which conform to short-term 
political considerations, and its activities have increasingly and more and more hermetically 
been covered by legal regulations. So at any time the ruling party can generally only enforce 
their political priorities and their change in the form of regulations. A party politican-minister 
and the state secretaries around him receive the government offices for the implementation of 
their "ruling party" programme, which has by now become a government programme, but they 
can only get the public administration to put it in practice, if the legal formulae of the valid 
material of administration are changed and the new political priorities are transformed into rules 
of law. So a body of legal material separates politics and public administration, and the two 
spheres only communicate through this. 
 
Thus public administration is not orientated by the dual paradigm of government/opposition, 
and if any of the party politican-ministers should wish to orientate the subordinate public 
administration machinery in this direction, thereby circumventing the law, an action will be 
brought by the affected third parties, jurisdiction will begin in the public administration and 
finally the machinery of the Constitutional Court of Law will endeavour to counteract such legal 
violations. In spite of this a number of such distortions may develop in the everyday practice of 
administration. Public administration, which is becoming increasingly hermetically regulated, is 
predominantly orientated by the lawful/unlawful binary code, as is the case with the juridical 
application of law in the traditional areas of law (civil and criminal law). 
 
Consequently, if it is found that the delimitation of the subsystems of society has taken place 
basically in conformity with the dual schematism, one should renounce the idea of a 
comprehensive political system and instead only speak of a political subsystem in a narrower 
sense and a subsystem of law and public administration. Within these two subsystems the state 
as a system formation at the organizational level, adds an important delimitation to these 
society-level differentiations. This delimitation draws a significant line within the political 
subsystem: it separates the state's political bodies authorizing law-making (and controlling the 
public administration as well as the Judiciary) from the political parties (temporarily) excluded 
from the decision-making processes organizationally. With this separation at the organizational 
level the areas of a ruling party factually capable of implementing its party programme and of 
opposition parties supplying alternatives for the future become segregated within the political 
subsystem. It must be made clear that it is through this internal organizational differentiation 
that the political subsystem is able to stabilize the coexistence of state policies factually 
implemented at present and those of potential existence in the future. So this organizational 
delimitation ensures differentiation in the temporal dimension outside the social and material 
dimension. 
 
Though the internal differentiations within the establishment also still draw a demarcation line 
in another direction, this tends to lose its importance. The issue under discussion is the splitting 
of the subsystem of law and public administration into two. In modern Western societies the 
difference between the public administration (once intertwined with direct political influence) 
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and the Judiciary (with, since the Middle Ages, more autonomy from politics) seems to be 
decreasing rapidly. 
 
Over the last century and a half the mechanism for independent law-making under development 
has been putting more and more restraint on the judges' free application of law and their own 
law development techniques. Linking the different juridical decision levels more precisely and, 
quite recently, with the formation of constitutional jurisdiction, it has, organizationally speaking, 
made the jurisdiction of the Courts a continuous system which by now has become more firmly 
bound to the legal corpus prevailing at any one time. It is the state's political bodies that have, in 
the course of the "positivisation" of law, acquired an increasingly firm grip on the control of 
law-making. So the Judiciary are attached to the Corpus of Law, while control over the Corpus 
is in the possession of the Government's political bodies. So today only this everchanging 
Corpus is between them and the principle of juridical independence defends this demarcation 
line lone: in his decision a judge is solely bound by regulations but these restrictions are very 
stringent. 
 
On the other hand public administration has been breaking away from direct policy-making and 
in Western societies has come under increasingly hermetic legal regulations since the second 
half of the nineteenth century. With the stabilization of the guarantee system of jurisdiction in 
public administration, the latter has acquired as much autonomy during its breaking away from 
politics as the traditional juridical law-making activity. Ultimately, the semantics of the 
separation of public administration and law is too pronounced, as compared with the realistic 
possibility of the two areas getting closer. Just the same, the importance of the separation of 
politics and public administration has not been too emphatic, even though it means a 
"deep-layer" delimitation: it is the delimitation of two subsystems of society. 
 
Hence in today's complex Western societies two subsystems of society seem to stand out from 
the traditionally intertwined conglomeration of politics, public administration and law. 
However, if we have decided to follow the binary code delimitations as a guiding line in our 
research the delimitations should be tracked down more precisely. The situation of the 
law-making sphere is to be considered here. It may be stated that while we think public 
administration can no longer be excluded from the sphere of law, the law-making sphere, which 
belongs here by reasons of tradition, can only be grouped together with the sphere of law due to 
the lack of theoretical clarification. 
 
The law-making sphere is an intermediate area, and as an organizationally constructed system, it 
mediates between the political subsystem in the narrow sense and the   subsystem of law and 
public administration. While it promotes the closing down of the micro-processes of law in the 
face of political influence and the prevalence of the orientation of local activities according to 
the code lawful/unlawful through its special situation, simultaneously it ensures the introduction 
of political priorities into the Corpus of law, so political priorities get to the core of law, are 
transformed in the micro-processes of law and changed into legal measures. 
 
Accordingly, the code of politics in the narrow sense that is the selection according to the 
government/opposition dichotomy makes its presence felt more intensely in some points in the 
decision selection of some of those taking part in the sphere of law-making, while in the case of 
other participants the search for decision alternatives and the sorting out of a number of 
alternatives are carried out in conformity with the dogmatic principles of law that have 
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developed, as well as its rules and categories of interpretation. Both politicians and lawyers take 
part in the sphere of law-making but for the latter the main question is not what is lawful or 
unlawful according to the prevailing law, but whether it should be altered or remain unchanged. 
The main thing to which the juridical experts participating in law-making tend to pay attention 
is that the new corpus should be outlined within the framework of stable legal institutions or 
categories. 
 
2) In the case of the educational system, a central binary code cannot be found, even one of 
fairly recent origin. In this system, which has expanded over the last century and a half to 
involve the masses and incorporate several levels, a series of general fundamental principles and 
aspects of evaluation has been developed, but such a universally effective binary code, which 
could incorporate the selection when recruiting educationists, sorting them out and socializing 
those sorted out, as well as the evaluation, rewarding and sanctioning mechanisms of 
educationists and trainees, cannot be found in the educational subsystem. 
 
Our hypothesis is that in the case of a basic function to be met on the society-level, such as the 
function of education, a sphere of action can only develop successfully beyond one complexity 
if several external principles of organization are combined in which case no universal binary 
code can take shape. In the case of education the penetration of such external dual schematism 
may be represented by the evaluation mechanism of science penetrating within the university 
sphere at the peak of the educational system. Such a tendency can be observed in the American 
educational system, where the position of universities and colleges is predominantly determined 
by their position in the order of merit of scientific reputation (their highest indicator being the 
number of Nobel-laureates and other pre-eminent scientists working at a given university), and 
determining the high-schols they are prepared to receive students from they further an order 
merit, in the core of the educational system which is external from the point of view of 
education. 
 
In an educational unit the hierarchy of excellent teachers in soon established, but there is no 
universal dual schematics which would make such excellent teaching performance measurable 
outside school walls. The same problem is present at universities. A person may be one of the 
most successful communicators of knowledge for decades within a university, but the highest 
appreciation he might get is to have his name carved on a marble tablet or to have his picture 
hung on the wall of the university - beyond that he will remain unknown, as opposed to his 
colleague whose scientific achievements might be singular, but as an educationist he might have 
proved less successful. 
 
So this dual schematism partly replaces the missing binary code  of the educational system, 
pervading it from outside, and though it comes from an external source in respect of the basic 
function of education, still it facilitates the development of a relatively universal order of merit 
among educational units. 
 
The educational market makes it possible for the educational system to grow in its complexity 
while avoiding chaos. In as much as an evaluation and an order of merit can be formed 
throughout the whole of the educational system due to the external "interference" of science, the 
free choice of school by students and their parents will follow this hierarchy and the shifts 
within it. So if the educational units are not directly financed and supported by the state budget, 
but can only be maintaind by high tuition fees for the students, this situation (combined with a 
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free choice of schools and the competition between schools to attract as many students as 
possible) will lead to the development of an educational market, where the economic aspect 
profitable/non-profitable will provide an additional orientation to the evaluation norms present 
in the whole of the educational system. In this way the billions that are spent on the direct 
financing of education and on free education in another structure can be allocated to the socially 
motivated replacement of high fees by government scholarships. So the humanitarian or social 
aspect is not neglected, but schools will be exposed to the decisions of students who are 
primarily influenced by the hierarchy of reputations when choosing their schools. (As we have 
seen this hierarchy is in turn developed by the hierarchy of reputations in science.) 
 
Although no internal universally effective dual schematics has been formed within the 
educational subsystem - at least to date - it has been able to achieve a level of complexity 
through the combination of external binary codes. Nevertheless, this gap may explain the rather 
marked organizational and hierarchical structural of the educational subsystem. In science, art, 
law and economy the dual paradigms present are able to provide orientation for actions, right 
down to individual activities and it is possible to evaluate, reward and sanction these throughout 
the whole of the subsystems relying on them. However, such individual autonomies cannot 
develop within the various educational units. 
 
Hypothetically a theorem can be set up, namely that readiness to use the "organizational 
weapon" depends on how well a universal binary code can control the selections within a 
subsystem, and furthermore if such a binary code can develop universal evaluation and 
rewarding mechanisms within the whole subsystem, spontaneity, competition and the resultant 
specific "markets"can make better provision for evolution (the production of varieties and their 
sorting out), than the system formations on the organization level, which force back 
competition. Thus the importance of organization and market, cooperation and competition, as 
well as their relative proportions can be theoretically explored through the analysis of the central 
binary codes of subsystems. 
 
 
 
3. Everyday life and systems of professional institutions 
 
 
Complex societies have been able to stabilize their complexity so far achieved by establishing 
multi-level system formations. For a social formation with a delimited system-like structure it is 
enough to sense an environment of increasing complexity in a reduced form; this in turn has 
enabled the formation of a highly complex society - viewed from a total societal level. In 
Western societies, as we have seen, the delimitation of the individual subsystems of society took 
place on a much more general level, below that of the organizational systems more tangible for 
everyday thinking. The basis of separation in a sphere of action fulfilling a social function is 
represented by the dominance of a universal binary code. 
 
To have a better understanding, however, a problem not so far dealt with, must be cleared up. It 
is the question of the differences between the application of a universal binary code on a 
professional level and its application in everyday life. The dichotomy truth/falsehood or the 
orientation according to the dual schematism of lawful/unlawful, etc. appear in discussion 
among friends over a glass of beer on the level of everyday thinking, just as in a professional 
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scientist's questioning of reality or in a professional jurist's interpretation of regulations in a 
courtroom. Where should the boundaries of subsystems of society be drawn? The answer to this 
will decide what structures are to be searched for when exploring the existence of 
differentiations. 
 
If the borderline is drawn with greater flexibility, that is to say it is understood that in the 
operating sociality the difference between the professional and everyday applications of binary 
code is insignificant, all communications orientated according to the lawful/unlawful, true/false, 
etc. paradigms have to be included in the given subsystem of society. But how can the 
permanent structures of delimitations between different subsystems be grasped in this way? The 
stuctural differentiations are ensured by the development of communities of scientists, jurists 
and economists specialized according to the dual paradigms true/false, lawful/unlawful or 
economic/uneconomic, etc. and by their own structural differentiation. 
 
Professional selection according to the true/false paradigm, which is carried out by scientists 
working in highly specialized fields under structural conditions which recruited and socialized 
the scientist from the very start considering his degree of congruence with the respective dual 
paradigm and which evaluate, reward or sanction his present activities according to this dual 
paradigm, should be regarded as different in quality to the selections in everyday discussions 
according to very diffuse viewpoints, even if in some situations the selection according to one or 
another dual schematism may be more dominant 
 
Hence the structural differentiations of subsystems of society have to be reduced to the level of 
the systems of professional institutions. In this way social structures which enforce the 
maintenance of the various differentiations become posssible. From another angle enduring 
prevalence of a binary code means that in every case a host of evaluation aspects foreign to it 
have to be relegated to the background. If it is a question of judgement in the light of some 
scientific truth, you should not be influenced in judging another person's statement by the fact 
that you consider him a moral wreck, or conversely, almost a saint. When filling a vacancy in a 
university department, you should not be interested in whether the political attitude of a 
candidate seems acceptable or disgusting to you personally, etc. However, as we all know it is 
very difficult to push these considerations into the background. Only a multitude of 
comprehensive impersonal and coercive structures can ensure that in the majority of cases, in 
communications aimed at the scientific truth superficial aspects can be dispensed with and the 
discussions, evaluations and rewards are really dominated by the ruled generally accepted in 
scientific communities for judging the true/false code. From this point of view I have come to a 
conclusion expressly different from Luhmann's, who does not reduce the boundaries of the 
subsystems of society to the systems of the professional institutions, but includes everyday 
communications as well. 
 
With this theorerical decisions, however, Luhmann's basic categories have been upset at some 
fundamental points. With the separation of everyday life from the systems of professional 
institutions Luhmann's "basic triad", the system levels of interaction, organization ans society 
will have to undergo some amendment. As I see it, in the world of modern complex sociality the 
fundamental differentiation can be achieved along the lines of diffusion and specificity through 
the diffuse-compact communications structures of everyday life on the one hand and through the 
systems of professional institutions specified according to the binary code on the other. In this 
dimension differentiation does not take place along such clearcut boundaries, as is the case 
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between the systems of professional institutions, but the possibility of differentiation and the 
attachment of independent items appear or take place via a mediation sphere. A few areas in the 
sphere of mass communications, which emerges partly from the diffusion of everyday life and 
partly from journalism, a go-between connecting the systems of professional institutions and 
everyday thinking, can be regarded as such mediating spheres. The lower levels of formalized 
education, the ideological sphere or the popularized works or art etc. also serve the purpose of 
bridging these sharp differentiations. 
 
The specific techniques of argumentation, semantic distinctions and modes of expression are 
transferred into the communications of everyday life through these mediators in the course of a 
process of popularization, acting against the diffusion and compactness existing therein. In such 
a way a subtle capacity for negation and categories suitable for finer distinctions become 
attached to everyday thinking. Besides the mediating agents mentioned above the role of general 
intellectual culture may here be underlined in the forwarding to everyday life of the specific 
communication techniques of the systems of professional institutions. 
 
The difference between Luhmann's approach and mine affects Luhmann's "basic triad" 
(interaction, organization and society) at the system level of "society". The systems of 
professional institutions and everyday life mean differentiation of the system level of society 
and the differentiations of subsystems of society dwelt on by Luhmann could only take place in 
conjuction with this delimitation (and, as we have seen, accompanied by the development of 
intermediary spheres). Due to the correction I have made, Jurgen Habermas' division into the 
"lifeworld" and the systems also appears to a certain degree in my work, but with me the 
emphasis is laid on fairly harmonious mediations between everyday life and the superimposed 
systems of professional institutions unlike Habermas', who talks about the systems "colonizing" 
the "lifeworld" (14). If society as a system level is newly divided into two the roles of 
interactions and organizations will be emphasized differently. Generally speaking it can be said 
that the communication structures of everyday life are based to a significant degree on 
interactions or, from another angle, they are formed according to society-level determination. 
The universal standards of society are not transmitted to them directly by the systems of 
professional institutions, but the mediatory spheres popularizing them (mass communications, 
journalism, popularized works of art, etc.). Within the systems of professional institutions, 
however, organizational systems formation is more important, and the selection of the 
communications here is partly determined by the mechanisms of recruiting, socialization, 
evaluation and rewarding built up in the given system of professional institutions as a whole and 
partly by the organizational mechanisms formed by them. This is how the various interactions 
can take place in the systems selected specifically according to the binary code of the given 
system of professional institutions. (The possible contradiction between determination in a 
narrower sense by the organization and determination in a wider sense by the system of 
organizations will be discussed later.) 
 
Summary: I find the amendments concerning Luhmann's "basic triad" acceptable - the division 
of sociality into interactional, organizational and society-system levels - but in addition to this I 
think the system level of the society should be divided into two, everyday life and the systems of 
professional institutions established in the course of modernization. In this dimension the 
division into two is not carried out along a sharp borderline, but accompanied by the 
simultaneous development of popularizing intermediary spheres (15). 
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4. Inclusion and differentiation 
 
 
An independent dimension of the composition of complex societies is constituted by the trends 
of "inclusion", first expressed in this form by Talcott Parsons in the early 60s. By inclusion he 
meant a circle of population widening from the point of view of the operation of the  subsystems 
of society.(Parsons, 1966, p. 135). In Luhmann's work this aspect of the development of 
modernity is expressed by the discontinuance of segmentary differentiations and the functional 
specification of subsystems of society within the framework of a unifying world society 
(Luhman, 1970, p. 171). 
 
This interpretation of inclusion means that the walls separating the small independent societies 
are destroyed, the exchange of goods is organized in a widening circle of population and the 
professional communities of the more and more specialized branches of science develop their 
evaluation and rewarding mechanisms in the totality of world society by using almost 
exclusively one or another world language. The legal differences are gradually eliminated, first 
when equality before law is developed within the national legal systems and later when the 
different legal systems begin to converge internationally. Through inclusion the same events 
taking place within the economic, legal and scientific systems prove decisive from the point of 
view of the individual, whether he lives in an particular region or anywhere in world society. 
Also, while the racial, national, regional or sexual, etc. differences cease from the angle of 
determination presented by the unifying professional systems of institutions, these external 
aspects will be increasingly relegated to the background from the point of view of careers within 
the individual systems of institutions, and anybody can get to the top, provided the 
selection-recruiting-socialization-evaluation and rewarding structures of the different systems of 
institutions allow their advancement. (Let me add in brackets that reality presents great 
deficiencies in the actual implementation of "inclusion".) 
 
Besides the inclusion of population, inclusion has another dimension not elaborated in Parson's 
original version. An intensive extension of the individual systems of professional institutions is 
meant here. An extensive extension of the logic of market economy appears in the original 
thematization, when the organization of material production in more and more comprehensive 
societies and regions and the development of evaluation mechanisms are described. The logic of 
market, however, shows an intensive expansion as well, and in a number of Western societies it 
gradually conquered the organization of reproducing spheres of art, science, education, etc. 
outside material production. All the same science, for example, while it has developed the 
structures which are in accordance with its specific binary code shows a tendency to cover all 
the formations to be examined. 
 
However, the question arises as to where the boundaries are limiting the extension of the power 
of the systems of professional institutions? In the case of science the possibility of covering any 
social formation seems to be problem-free. In this way everything comes under examinations 
and after getting back into everyday life through the intermediary spheres of popularization, 
conclusions drawn from the specific aspects of science will increase reflexivity andd 
self-recognition. 
 
In several cases, though, the spread of the logic of market tends to create rather more 
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contradictory effects. As we have seen and will see in more detail later, the spread of economy 
(that is, the logic of market) elicits positive effects in science and the educational subsystems. In 
the case of the arts, however, the effects in some branches are rather more questionable and the 
market trend may result in evaluation according to "beauty" in an autonomous artistic sense 
being pushed into the background. Within jurisdiction organization according to the logic of 
market would mostly distort the predominance of lawful/unlawful. 
 
In modern societies the legal sphere is getting wider and wider, and in thematizing this 
theoretical analyses deal with it under the heading legal everburdening, emphasizing a 
plentitude of negative features in this trend. In a society of increasing complexity an increasing 
number of social formations and situations will be processed according to the dual paradigm 
lawful/unlawful of the legal sphere, just as according to the true/false dichotomy of science or 
the profitable/non-profitable code of economy. 
 
Such a tendency to intensive propagation can be also observed in the case of the political 
subsystem and the dual schematism of "staying in office"/"joining the opposition" tends to 
include all the social feature in the political answers which promise votes at the next election. In 
this context, however, in Western societies since the 70's, although for a considerable time 
previously the expansion of politics could be observed, the party platforms which have been 
able to be developed into state policies have been those which pledged a reduction, in the power 
so of politics the "inclusion" or intensive propagation of the political subsystem is not endless. 
 
If earlier we had raised the question where to find the limit in the mutual inclusion of systems of 
professional institutions, now the question could be extended and asked in the form how far 
"inclusion", i.e. the intensive extension of some systems of professional institutions to an 
intrinsic evaluation of an increasing number of social situation is to cover the structure of 
everyday life. As it is known Jurgen Habermas saw the main problem of the development of 
modern societies in this dimension: the "systems" colonize or "eat up" the terrain of the 
"lifeworld" (Habermas, 1981/II, pp. 192-219). 
 
This inclusion that narrows down everyday life can actually be detected in the case of some 
systems of professional institutions. But much more markedly, these systems of institutions 
have the effect of acting against diffusion and compactness on the communications structures of 
everyday life. The effect of science and arts with their tendency of specification is not in most 
cases direct but specific methods of argumentation, aspects of selection and distinction 
elaborated by them are transferred to everyday life through mediating and popularizing spheres. 
In this case "inclusion" from the area of the systems of professional institutions practically 
means the "opening up" of everyday life to the mediating popularizing spheres. Following 
Habermas we can consider this "mediation", but this also goes together with an improvement in 
the self-reflexivity potential of everyday communications and with the furthering of the 
problems of everyday life to systems of professional institutions by an intermediary sphere 
(mass communications, political journalism, etc.). 
 
Unlike science and art the systems of institutions of law and market economy have a fairly 
direct access to the structures of everyday life. There are no mediating spheres here. Anything 
which has undergone legal regulation binds the participants of everyday life with the same 
binary rigour as it does the professional jurist acting in the case. This firmness is only relaxed by 
everyday life in the areas where the enforcement of law is not founded on the initiatives of a 
 
 
29 
system of professional legal institutions - mainly in civil law. In the case of a number of legal 
inclusions, however, the legal practice in charge of a new situation will employ legal specialists 
in the new field who will be responsible for observing a given section of everyday life from the 
angle of lawful/unlawful. In regulating certain elements of family relationships tutelary 
authorities enforce the law in the course of their professional duties, just as labour-safety 
inspectors control working conditions professionally. Thus everyday life is narrowed down by 
direct interference and the dual paradigms of binary rigorousness are increasingly applied by 
systems of professional institutions. 
 
Similarly, the extension of the power of the market economy exercises a direct effect on the 
diffuse communications structures of everyday life and the individual finds himself forced into 
making hard decisions in an increasing number of life situations according to the dual 
schematism of profitable/non-profitable. At the same time a person living his everyday life will 
come across partners who observe (or are forced to observe) more and more frequently the 
evaluation aspect of profitable/non-profitable in their decisions or choices of alternatives in 
different situations. 
 
The tendency to inclusion shown by the systems of professional institutions does not simply 
mean the evaluation of one another's areas from their own point of view, but in certain cases a 
direct determination of everyday life (that is, the destruction of its given segment and inclusion 
in a system of professional institutions). In other cases, like in the case of science and art 
inclusion means only the growth of the role of the intermediary spheres of popularization 
between the professional systems and the communications structures of everyday life. 
 
 
5. The double meaning of economy 
 
 
So far I have handled an instance of ambiguity in the concept of "economy" in parentheses and 
discussed the system of economic institutions and its dual paradigm of profitable/non-profitable 
in the same way I discussed the system of institutions of science and art together with their dual 
paradigms. Looking closer at economy it soon becomes clear that it cannot be fit in beside the 
other systems of institutions quite so easily. 
 
Considering this problem we have to go back to Karoly Polanyi's analyses, which distinguished 
between two independent meanings of economy following Carl Menger. Polanyi indicated that 
distinction should be made between the interdependences covered by the concept of "economy" 
relating to the production of material goods, which can be found in all societies in some form 
and the interdependences of formal economy, which exists only if production is organized 
according to the market logic of the exchange of goods (Polanyi, 1976, pp. 202-203). 
 
Polanyi only distinguished between these two meanings of economy to point out (relying on a 
fairly comprehensive theoretical foundation) how transitory and insignificant historically is a 
period represented by the existence of the interdepeendences signified by the second meaning of 
"economy"; the increase in government interferences in the past few decades (New Deal, etc.) 
already indicate a gradual disappearance of the interdependences of formal economy. 
 
I feel inclined to take over this important finding of Polanyi's in the distinction between these 
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two meanings of "economy", but with the idea of developing his initial statements in a 
diametrically opposite direction. As a matter of fact, Polanyi has misinterpreted the advance of 
government interference in modern "capitalist" societies and drawn the conclusion of a gradual 
elimination of the logic of market from these tendencies. Even if "capitalist" government 
interference used to have and still has a deteriorating effect on market, the main rule is that this 
interference will never destroy the orientation of the whole system of economic institutions 
according to lucrativeness, but using monetary means it will indirectly transfer the priorities of 
government policies into the determination of the production units extant on the market 
interfering in the market processes. After a certain degree of complexity has been developed in 
the Western societies, this kind of government interference has been restricted over the past ten 
years. Besides a renaissance of the market, the socio-political arsenal of the state has given 
preference to means subsequently performing compensation or corrections instead of applying 
those previously used which restricted or suspended economic rationality. 
 
Contrary to Polanyi's predictions market rationality in complex Western societies, is not dying 
out. The other example cited by Polanyi for the extinction of market, the East-European 
centrally planned economies, have also proved that above a certain level of complexity, it is not 
possible without spontaneous self-regulation of the market to raise the level of production. 
 
It is much more important, however, that the logic of formal economy has survived not only in 
the area of production, but for the past five decades in the university and scientific spheres (huge 
areas despite their disintegration), the sphere of arts with its mass appeal and a number of other 
fields have partially been organized according to the rationality of market. Today this extension 
of the market makes it conspicuous that a repetition of substantive economy, described by 
Polanyi as formal economy, has been replaced by a gap rather than by something similar. It is 
becoming evident that it is not a question of two sides of the same thing (16), the sphere of 
production has grown to be enormous and complex and it could only develop above a certain 
level if it were reliant on market rationality. 
 
Economics, which took shape graduallay, established too close a connection between the 
aspects of production and market cultivating a common semantic pattern, while elaborating the 
interdependences of production and those of market rationality, the latter having been for a long 
time restricted to the former. This is the relationship Polanyi started to analyse with his 
distinction. In the meantime market rationality spread to a number of spheres and in this context 
the inner complexity of the individual spheres is often ensured by the cooperation of the 
intrinsic evaluation mechanism of the given system of professional institutions and market 
orientation. So Polanyi's distinction can be made more radical, and it should be supposed that 
below the systems of formal economic institutions, which were elaborated with growing 
precision in the last century, there is also a specific evaluation mechanism operating in the area 
of material production. The evaluation of market rationality can organize material production, 
whose complexity has by now grown immensely only with its help. Hypothetically it may be 
stated that the intrinsic evaluation and rewarding mechanism of production is predominantly 
based on the value in use and the intrinsic evaluation of material production is consituted by 
advertising, the prestige hierarchies of the brands of products and companies trade marks and 
these hierarchies' reshaping mechanisms. On the othern hand, the market connections based on 
exchange value receive more emphasis in economics and the previous evaluation has only been 
examined narrowed down, too closely subordinated to this formal evaluation. 
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Radicalizing Polanyi in this way, it is only the system of institutions of material production in a 
substantive sense that can be linked with the systems of institutions of science, art and 
education; the interdependences and systems of institutions of formal economy are organized on 
a more general level as compared to the previous ones. 
 
This finding will also make its presence felt on the level of the basic distinctions we use. As we 
have seen, to get a better understanding of the organization of sociality, besides distinguishing 
organizations and the system levels of society I have divided up the system level of society into 
the diffuse/compact structures of everyday life and the level of superimposed systems of 
professional institutions among some of which the evolving of mediating spheres of 
popularization can be observed. With an even finer approach to this structure, the level of the 
systems of professional institutions is now to be divided up, and economy taken in a formal 
sense should be interpreted as a comprehensive system embracing several systems of 
institutions that does not exist separately from them but comprises the internal aspects of a 
number of systems of institutions. Cooperating with the inrinsic evaluation mechanism of such 
systems of institutions makes the stabilization of their great complexity possible. 
 
In the next chapter I'll examine more closely the systems of professional institutions where a 
rather general market rationality plays the part of one of the evaluation mechanisms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               Chapter III 
    The double rationality of the systems of professional institutions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As one of the results of our investigations we have rejected the application of the concept of 
subsystems of society to describe the differentiation of the system level of society as it did not 
properly express the differences between the applications of the binary codes in the systems of 
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professional institutions and the communications of everyday life. Introducing this finer 
distinction, however, we can see that the theorem of differentiation has so far been able to gain 
ground quickly as without any further explanation, most people had it in mind when they talked 
about the delimitation of the subsystems of science, law, politics, etc. After the clarification 
these subsystems will be called systems of professional institutions. 
 
Now we must take a closer look at their internal composition, their evaluation mechanisms and 
their structures which ensure separation from each other. 
 
It is possible to talk about the existence of a rather general system of professional institutions 
above the organizations of the organizational system level, if an area of social communications 
comes to be organized around a binary code or an universal dual schematism. Such an 
arrangement will only take place around a fairly permanent social function though, as I have 
indicated in the case of education, a central and universal binary code has not always developed 
to meet all social functions. Naturally, the communications area around such a function can only 
develop into a system of professional institutions above the mere organizational system level if 
it can utilize an external universal binary code. This in turn reduces the possibility of its 
autonomy and it will prove unable to exceed a certain degree of complexity. 
 
The main aspects of a system of professional institutions are constituted by the recruiting 
mechanisms of the professional participants communicating according to the given universal 
binary code, the mechanism of selection applied to recruits, the special socialization 
mechanisms of those selected in accordance with a central binary code and by the mechanisms 
evolved to evaluate, reward and occasionally sanction the communications of fully-authorized 
participants. If a selection pattern conforming to a universal binary code has come to figure 
prominently within these aspects we can talk about the creation of a system of professional 
institutions on a more general level beyond a merely organizational system development. 
 
Besides the dominance of its intrinsic universal dual schematics or binary code the creation of 
such a system of professional institutions also means that the other evaluation aspects in society 
and their binary code gradually become of secondary importance and they can only exercise 
their effects in the selections of communications within the systems of institutions after being 
deflected by the prism of their intrinsic universal dual schematism. Two important exceptions 
should be made: one of them concerns the binary code lawful/unlawful of the legal system. If 
this dual paradigm affects some of the decision alternatives raised by the professional 
communications in question it cannot be left unregarded nor can it be applied "deflected by the 
prism" of its intrinsic binary code. That is to say for example that a participant in economic 
communications has to reject the unlawful but profitable alternative - the machinery of law 
enforcement may even force him to do so in the case of any legal infringement. 
 
Another exceptional dichotomy is represented by the binary code of the system of the 
institutions of economy. As we have seen economy as a system of institutions is located on a 
different level from the other systems of professional institutions. Economy is not organized 
independently, but cuts through a multitude of other systems of institutions it built out its own 
system of institutions, evaluating some of their aspects according to the binary code 
profitable/non-profitable. It is in the system of material production that decision alternatives are 
most likely to undergo the evaluation "profitable/non-profitable" to the greatest extent, but in a 
number of aspects defined within other systems of institutions the decisive evaluation angle is 
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that of "profitable/non-profitable" instead of their own central binary code. 
 
How far can this binary code of economy curtail the autonomy of the systems of professional 
institutions? Anyone guided by a communistic vision or a follower of Polanyi might conclude 
that early capitalist development raised the organization of social reproduction to a high level by 
making the exchange of goods universal, but today the structures of the autonomous evaluations 
formed, accompanied by the dominance of the value aspects of lucrativeness, burst open this 
external fibre and economy is being ousted gradually from one system of institutions to another, 
continuously shrinking, and a complex society without a market rationality emerges. 
 
I consider the role of market rationality to be just the opposite, and in the case of a few systems 
of professional institutions I regard the successful enforcement of their intrinsic central binary 
code to be ensured only token accompanied by a parallel evaluation according to market 
rationality. Let us first take as an example of this the organization of the sphere of science. 
 
 
1. The double rationality of the scientific-university sphere 
 
 
In this system of institutions the structures arranged around its intrinsic universal binary code 
can easily be identified as they emerge in various different locations. The earliest signs of the 
professionalization of "gathering knowledge" can be observed in the era of the Renaissance after 
the Greek and Roman initiatives. First they appeared in the Italian city-states, later the patterns 
and institutions developed here spread to Western Europe. 
 
With the specialization of the roles of scholars and of scientists and the separation of the aspects 
of science and art rather well-defined circles of communications were formed, in England in the 
late 17th century, then in France and finally, in the 19th century, Germany became the centre of 
scientific life (Ben-David, 1971, p. 52; Munch, 1984, p. 125). In the course of this development 
investigation was narrowed down to the evaluation aspect true/false and it was within the rather 
closed scientific circles, which distinguished themselves from the diffuse communications 
structures of everyday life, that it was to be defined what could be considered true, what proofs 
of validity and what sort of arguments were required for the specific scientific circle to regard a 
statement as a scientific truth. From the isolated academies of scattered communications 
communities and their connections based on private correspondence modern science set out to 
form a coherent system of institutions and while the evaluations and motivations offered by the 
structures of everyday life proved unsatisfactory for science the development of a firm internal 
evaluation and rewarding mechanism was to be observed. For a scientist the evaluation and 
recognition of his fellow-scientists had become decisive and from then on a professional 
researcher had to be motivated by the possibility of winning this recognition. 
 
Within science the original theorems set up by scientists as individuals and accepted to be true 
by the scientific community became the basis of evaluation and rewarding (Merton, 1973, 
p.358). No matter how much intellectual work a scientist had invested in the exploration of a 
truth and however, creative and intuitive he had had to be, if he chose to publish a short 
description of his findings any of his fellow scientists or even laymen could then make use of 
them. The main rule was that a scientists enjoying scientific priority was to get the recognition 
of the scientific community. 
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Scientists producing original scientific theorems acquire a scientific reputation as a result of the 
recognition, and the reputation hierarchy of an era can be clearly made out from the scientific 
titles, positions, quotation indicators, etc. The increasingly complex scientific communications 
had by the 20th century created a multitude of scientific journals, whose rivalry, and the fact that 
they disclosed alternative scientific statements, increased selection according to the true/false 
binary code when the communications within the impersonal scientific community were 
evaluated. Reputation hierarchies were formed among the journals publishing significant 
scientific revelations, just as among the scientists producing those revelations. With the 
selection of studies flooding into the journals of high reputation evaluation according to the 
true/false code absorbed a new pattern. 
 
For a scientist scientific recognition and the ensuing reputation are the chief sources of 
motivation in his undertaking research work but the same reputation hierarchy provides 
reference points for orientation within the now highly complex life of science. Which journals 
should a research worker keep an eye on out of the thousands of journals in his narrower field of 
study, the papers written by which of his colleagues should he read out of the thousands of 
books? Which ones should he pay special attention to? Similarly, the reliable reputation 
hierarchies make work for a young researcher a lot easier. 
 
Science, which has become embodied by a system of professional institutions, does not only 
perform evaluations and rewarding according to the true/false dichotomy and register them 
structurally in the hierarchies of scientific reputation and their superficial indicators but also 
organizes the socialization of the selected and accumulates the reputation of scientist candidates 
along the lines of its central binary code. 
 
From the 19th century onwards the German university model created universities suitable for 
integrating scientific research, and this model was to spread to most developed societies. The 
corrections applied by the American university model - itself an improved version of the 
German model - were only to make the connections between universities and science more 
intensive. As a basis for recruiting future scientists it is important that in the last phase of 
university education the subject matter of instruction should condition the students for future 
research. This may take the form of a "graduate faculty", as in the United States or postgraduate 
courses which are loosely connected to university training to develop future scientists (See 
Parsons-Platt, 1973, p. 362). In the course of scientific education the examination systems, the 
judgement of dissertations, etc. aim at selecting future scientists according to their scientific 
qualities (at least structurally), while students are also expected to become both aware of the 
rules of ethics in science and socialized in the world of science in the course of their scientific 
training. 
 
Thus the intrinsic evaluation patterns in the world of science are based on the creation of 
original scientific theorems and these are represented by academic titles and positions, lists of 
publications, evaluatins published by highly respected journals, by quotation indicators, etc. 
How can a totally different aspect of evaluation, the evaluation according to profitability, 
operate together with these patterns? It is worth examining the scientific life of the United 
States, where this can be studied in its clearest from. 
 
In the world of American universities the maintenance of the universities is decisively a 
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function of the number of students applying for admission: without high tuition fees and state 
support paid in proportion to the number of students attending the university the universities, or 
at least their money-losing departments (or those deserted by students) would have to close their 
doors (Parsons-Platt, 1973, pp. 286-289; Ben-David, 1971, pp. 126-150). The leaders of 
universities are primarily under the pressure of the logic of the university market and they aim at 
winning over scientists of great scientific reputation, preferably Nobel-laureates, due to 
economic rationality. The hierarchies of scientific reputation, the Academy memberships and 
the allocation of Nobel-prizes, etc. are, on the other hand, preconditioned by a totally different 
evaluation mechanism. 
 
The sociological scool of science starting with Merton (Hagstrom, Storer, Glaser,etc.) explored 
the priorities of scientific discoveries, and the evaluation and rewarding systems of the various 
fields of knowledge which record the original findings in scientific publications as well as the 
frequency of quotations, the Academic positions, the prizes and the reputation hierachies of 
scientific journals, which are all surface indicators of the evaluation and rewarding systems. The 
specific evaluation mechanism of science is constituted by the latter, and they are differentiated 
from the evaluation aspects of achievement of an ideological, moral or political nature, and also 
from an approach suggested by the primary economic aspect of profitability. For the university 
managers this specific scientific evaluation appears as an external facility. They think the 
scientific reputations of the university have to be stepped up or at least maintained so the 
university can attract students (with the high tuition fees and the state subsidies accompanying 
them), preferably the most gifted ones who could be expected to add to the reputation of the 
university with their future achievements in practical life, thus contributing to an increase in the 
number of students. In this way the university manager is orientated by economic rationality in 
the competition between the universities, and this is why he makes efforts to attract a scientist 
who has been appreciated by an evaluation mechanism working independent of his own to his 
university, and this is why the scientists receive a higher than average salary, scientific 
assistence, more than one secretary if the need arises, as well as the financial means needed for 
research. (And any distinguished scientist who will obviously go to the university where the 
conditions are best for him.) 
 
At German universities the situation is not quite the same. In the German Federal Republic the 
state has shouldered the financing of universities over the past 40 years and the students have to 
pay only a nominal fee to the university or college - if there are sufficient social reasons they can 
study completely free of charge. In comparison with the average Western states the competition 
here is rather marked as in Germany, which was disunited for several centuries, a host of towns 
of similar size and importance came into being, and in them were a number of universities with 
great traditions. This is quite unlike France, England or Austria, where Paris, Oxbridge and 
Vienna unquestionably became the centres of learning, not to mention the capitals of 
East-European countries! In these areas, however, one of the mechanisms of self-organization in 
the sphere of science and universities, that of the university market, has ceased to exist. The 
rivalry between the German universities still exists, although for reasons of local prestige, the 
obligations imposed by traditions and a number of other causes, it is not really strong and it 
urgens the leaders of universities to make efforts to win over scientists with high reputations but 
- at least at the faculties of social sciences and the like - the predominance of particular or 
personal evaluations and advantageous positions due to the candidate's political attitude can still 
be detected in the assignment of tenures and the provisions of scientific assistance. 
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As a matter of fact, attracting or retaining professors with the highest scientific reputations is no 
longer vital. If such a professor goes to another university and as a consequence the number of 
students joining the faculty in question decreases it presents no problem for the university. As 
long as acceptable explanations can be given to the bureaucracy of the ministries of education 
financing the uniersities and to their political ministers for the decrease in the number of 
applicants (e.g. the temporarily high unemployment rate among the young graduates in certain 
fields of study, the effects of a demographic low, etc.), the state grants will continue to be 
assigned even in the case of a drastic reduction in the students' numbers. In this situation 
evaluations based on personal likes and dislikes (which do not play an important role when the 
harsh budget restrictions of the university market are in operation) become dominant as a result 
of the differences in power due to the gift of some professors of building up cliques and taking 
dominant roles in the university leadership. Similarly a point not to be overlooked is that the 
distribution of university teaching staff according to political dimensions distorts the 
predominance of the hierarchy of scientific reputation in the assignment of professorial tenures 
and the evaluation according to scientific performance when assitance and research funds are 
allocated to nominees. In the faculties of social sciences and related subjects at a conservative 
rightist university a scientist known as leftist by both the public and the scientific community 
has little chance of being appointed to a professorship, which is precisely the case with a 
conservative or apolitical professor, who may be at a disadvantage at a sociological faculty 
which is dominated by people of activist of leftist tendencies. In the political atmosphere thus 
induced, which is further reinforced by the active political life of the students on the campuses, 
people keenly anticipate the departure of the professor with opposite views, however, 
well-known he might be world-wide. 
 
However, this situation affects the mechanism of scientific evaluations as well. If the climate of 
opinion within a science is biassed towards leftism and moralizing, the reputation of and 
publicity about the scientist (the discussions over his works, the number of his followers, etc.), 
who is of an identical standpoint and is often ready to make moralizing statements of national 
appeal in public, will be disproportionately greater than his scientific performance. On the other 
hand, if he is of a different political disposition or simply non-political and is not ready to make 
public contributions to political or moral discussions, the appreciation of the scientific 
community, the scientific prizes expressing this or other superficial indicators or reputation will 
all lag behind his actual scientific performance. The same phenomenon occurs with opposite 
distortions, if the political dominance is reversed. 
 
The specific evaluation mechanisms of the scientific and university sphere, the hierarchies of 
scientific reputation, are not simply supplemented by the evaluation of the university market and 
the scientific market according to economic reality,but if the latter stops functioning, after a 
period the functioning of this specific evaluation will involve more and more distortions and 
become influenced by a host of random factors. 
 
  
 
2. Further cases of double rationality 
 
 
 
A cooperation of the two kinds of evaluation mechanism can be observed, though besides the 
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positive traits there are a lot of problems as in most areas of art. 
 
The specific evaluations within the sysem of professional institutions of art, the judgement of 
"artistic beauty" in different eras in the various fields of art have been institutionalized by works 
on aesthetics, expert revisions of manuscripts, juries passing judgements on works of art and by 
the selections of literary journals (Luhmann, 1981, p. 252). This evaluation, just as in the case of 
the intrinsic evaluation schemes of science, in expressed in the reputation hierarchies within a 
given period's artistic community, by their surface indicators, in the order of prizes within the 
different branches of art, the viewers' indices, etc. 
 
A strict adherence to this evaluation mechanism, the realization of evaluations where all aspects 
of appreciation besides those of artistic beauty are done away with are only imaginable with 
some degree of distortion. Our experiences so far in East Europe, where the logic of market in 
art has been suspended for decades and art has been directly financed by the state, show that in 
these circumstances particular interests, the gift of building up cliques and maintaining 
connections with the state as a financing authority have distorted the specific evaluation patterns 
in art. Of course, in Eastern Europe the state financing of art has also for a long time distorted 
the evaluations according to "artistic beauty" because Stalinist art policies forced art to glorify 
certain political objectives directly and rewarded or paid the artists according to their conformity 
with these expectations. On the other hand, these days - in the absence of institutions of 
independent political articulation - it is literature especially that has taken up the task of 
discussing social political questions publicly. The ability to do so and the success achieved are 
extrinsic in relation to artistic value but even if the existence of a democratic and legally 
regulated public administration is assumed it is questionable whether the replacement of a 
market mediating the value judgement of the public, of the "consumer" or of art by direct state 
financing would not entail negative effects in objectivity in intrinsic evaluations of art. 
 
In this respect, however, there is an important difference in the relationship between 
professional art and everyday life and that between professional science and everyday life. In 
both cases a mediating sphere of popularization developed, which by introducing them into 
everyday life, transformed and popularized new distinctions, new approaches and new 
phraseologies or categories which had become incomprehensible for the participants of 
everyday communication due to specialization within the systems of professional institutions. 
However, distinction should be made between connections between evaluations within the 
individual systems of professional institutions and everyday appreciations. In the case of science 
lay people consider themselves unsuitable to pass judgement, and although it is possible for 
them to understand popularized science, they will appreciate scientists who have worked out 
given scientific theorems and have been held in high esteem within the scientific community. 
They will send their children to study at universities which employ such scientists, etc. In the 
case of the products of the sphere of art, however, the intrinsic evaluations are not respected by 
the wider public who for the most part set a higher value on the products o popularizing art. The 
rationality of market introduces this element in the internal structure and in selections of the 
system of professional institutions and it will distort the mechanisms of rewarding and 
evaluation. The tendency in internal artistic evaluations to precondemn any effort at 
popularization and the suspicion aroused by all works of art that have become popular should be 
interpreted as reflexes of self-defence. 
 
Ultimately, because of the problematic connections between the intrinsic evaluations and those 
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of everyday life the rationality of market cannot enforce and add to the intrinsic evaluations in 
art so optimally as is the case with science. 
 
As regards the system of education, the double evaluation pattern may be more harmonious, 
because as we have seen in the previous chapter it is the evaluations of science mediated by the 
university sphere that directly suggest the patterns valid in the whole of the educational system 
and the influencial power exercised by profit-earning capacity in the market can assert these 
hierachies. 
 
It might be of some interest at this point to raise the queestion of the evaluation problems in the 
system of professional sports institutions. In the last few decades the number of professional 
participants in this sphere has multiplied and their activities are watched and appreciated all 
over the world. How far can this be regarded as a subsystem of society formation beyound the 
development of the system of organizations which has evidently taken place? Is there a central 
universal binary code extant in this sphere which dominates the mechanisms of recruitment, 
selection and socialization together with those of evaluation, rewarding and sanctioning in the 
organization of professional sports activities? 
 
While semantically no uniform binary code has developed, although the intrinsic evaluation 
mechanisms can clearly be identified in the highly objective performance indicators within the 
different branches of sport, in sports magazines, sports columns and in the works of sports 
writers which cover the whole subsystem in their evaluations. And perhaps below the standards 
of "fair play" (which are generally agreed upon) the dichotomy of "win or fall out" ensuring a 
"tough binary" evaluation and dominating the selections in the shole sphere of professional 
sports is in operation, even if it is not emphasized semantically. 
 
This intrinsic evaluation pattern can only be increased by the evaluation of the sports market 
according to the profit-earning capacity involved. On the other hand if sports clubs, associations 
or teams are freed from the influential power of the sports market, this role being taken over by 
direct government financing, reasons of personal prestige (so far latent) and the effects of other 
particular factors will reduce the organizational power of a sports reputation hierarchy based on 
actual sports achievements and the evaluation mechanism itself may be distorted by evaluation 
aspects unrelated to sports. (It is not only a question of the reputation hierarchy based on sports 
achievements failing to set up a selection within the sphere of sports, but also the fact that the 
composition of the hierarchy itself is a result of extrinsic evaluations.) 
 
In the case of sports there is no gap between professional and everyday evaluations, as there is in 
art. The evaluations of sports fans may not always be as refined as those of professional sports 
specialists, but their competence and judgement is not markedly different. In this area the agents 
of popularization are not in a position to deprive the very best from their success in order to 
enjoy it themselves via the market. 
 
In the cases of a number of other systems of professional institutions such a close connection 
cannot be experienced between the intrinsic evaluation mechanism and the evaluation according 
to profit-making capacity offered by the market. Within the sphere of law, for instance, the 
lawful/unlawful code dominates and the appeals to higher tribunals, legality supervision and the 
revisions of the Court of Constitution are all aimed at removing the subjectivism of judges or 
other enforcers of law from the operation of this specific dual schematism. The financing of the 
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legal service (government-financed free legal assistance or financing by the party losing the suit, 
etc.) does not influence the meritricious functioning of the dichotomy "lawful/unlawful".  
 
Likewise, seeking a solution to the problem of financing is not such a matter of urgency within 
political systems as it is in the life of universities, science or sports. Within the modern Western 
political system, in the narrow political sphere (the political parties, the political organs of 
interest, party press, parliament and government) a specific binary code has developed, which 
makes its presence felt more and more clearly in the decisions of parties, parliamentary factions 
and the government, in the selection of news in the party press and the emphasis on certain 
events: staying in office/going into opposition - reversed in the case of opposition parties, 
parliamentary factions or press organs. The competitive party system, parliament which is based 
on parties (and the whole state hierarchy subject to it) as well as government dependent on the 
confidence of the majority are all watching out for the next elections. When making political 
statements, discusscing bills in parliament, giving preferences to one or another political 
alternative, etc. they consider the increase or decrease of their chances. In ethical or moral 
issues, judgements of justness or social political decisions the aspects of economy assert 
themselves only deflected by the prism of this code. Even if a decision alternative in economic 
policy should later prove to be disastrous from the point of view of the national economy, the 
government in office at the time or several of the parties that wish to become ruling parties will 
support the idea if the group represents an influential section of the public opinion and if support 
for the group is likely to attract more votes at the next election. This is the specific binary code 
of the actitivies within the political sphere and it is not affected strongly by the way the parties, 
the press, the government offices and other political organs are financed, as are the binary codes 
of the subsystems of society previously mentioned - at least as long as the conditions of 
competition are maintained. This is to say that as long as several parties have the same chance to 
assume government power the political press will remain pluralistic, etc. The same holds true 
for public administration. For the past century it has exhibited patterns of increasingly hermetic 
legal regulation, where the dichotomy of lawful/unlawful dominates as an evaluation 
mechanism and the way of financing is a self-contained dimension of value independent from 
this. This means that if a decision alternative in public administration "would bring more profit" 
than another according to economic judgement but is illegal from the viewpoint of the 
respective regulations the authorities in public administration should not make this decision and 
the courts of the establishment or those of the Law of Constitution may subsequently force them 
not to do so.  
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             The alternative thematizations of social structure 
               (Habermas, Munch, Luhmann, Lukacs, Parsons) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the present study the basic categories of my disquisition have been taken mostly from 
Luhmann's theories elaborated up until the mid-70s, through my corrections I have got mearer 
Jurgen Habermas', Richard Munch's and to a certain extent Georg Lukacs's ideas concerning 
social structure at several points. However, my conceptual structure continues to remain 
basically Luhmannite, and so quite often the similarity to the other theories mentioned is only 
superficial. A turn may be observed in Luhmann's theoretical development in the past few years 
as he has incorporated the category "autopoiesis" in his theory and this creates a considerable 
gap between his earlier and present work affecting certain important points. This is important 
for us here, because my present corrections affecting Luhmann represent differences exactly 
opposite to those he developed as a result of his conception of "autopoiesis". After all, there are 
marked conceptional differences between the present discussion and Luhmann's today's 
interpretation of social differentiation. So at the end of this Chapter I will describe Luhmann's 
conception of an autopoietic social subsystem, contrasting it with his earlier view which 
constituted a starting point for me. 
 
 
 
1. Jürgen Habermas: instrumental rationality and "life world" 
 
 
 
Habermas backs up the scepticism concerning modernity gradually gaining ground in the 
intellectual strata of Western societies, with a comprehensive theoretical and conceptual 
apparatus putting communicative rationality at the focus of his social theory and contrasting it 
with instrumental rationality. His analyses of rationality are mainly founded on Max Weber's 
premises and he arrives at the concept of communicative rationality through reshaping them 
critically. 
 
Habermas starts analysing Weber by considering "action theory". Accepting Wolfgang 
Schluchter's suggestion, he sees a single type of action behind Weber's typology of action 
(action of means/end rationality, value rationality and affectual as well as traditional action), to 
which can be traced back all the rest, including sub-categories. This type of action is that of 
means/end rationality (or instrumental rationality). Having the value horizon in mind the actor 
here chooses an end and considering the possible collateral consequences he sets up adequate 
means and series of activities in conformity with the end. In other types of action the actor 
continues to follow this model but the factual elements he embraces with his consciousness 
undergo gradual restrictions. An actor following value rationality does not consider the 
incidental consequences; in the mind of the affectual actor not only collateral consequences but 
also value premises are suspended, and finally the mental processes following the action of 
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traditional rationality push aside not only the collateral consequences and the value premises but 
the end to be achieved (which would determine the action) as well (Habermas, 1984, p. 459). 
That is to say, this typology of Webers is not a typology: without actually referring to his source 
Weber considers teleological action (an axiom in European thinking since Aristotle) as a 
characteristic of human action and he expounds his quadripole typology based on this action 
model. When accepting this teleological action model Weber starts from the idea of a uniform 
world, where the elements of instrumental rationality have become institutionalized. 
Accordingly, he interprets the development of modernity as the victory of means/end rationality. 
 
Using Karl Popper's categories Habermas extends Weber's rationality analyses at their cardinal 
points when he approaches the structures of reality by dividing them up into three autonomous 
worlds. Besides the objective world, as we generally understand it - the world of objects where 
orientation takes place through a cognitive attitude - he distinguishes the social world (the world 
of normative and value-oriented relationships between people) and the subjective world (the 
world of the internal subjectivity, convictions and thoughts of the individual), Habermas thinks 
that with this approach new aspects of social reality can be thematized, while with the 
traditional "single world" concept the social-normative sphere and the world of subjectivity 
firstly will be distorted if they are to be analysed through the aspects of cognitive rationality of 
the objective world, secondly, cannot be grasped in their total complexity. 
 
Disregarding its ontological extension, Habermas finds Weber's concept of teleological action 
(with its unexplained origin) also rather narrow from the viewpoint of action theory. Human 
action has other aspects, too, which will evade investigations in this way, although they also 
undergo changes in the course of modernization of society. Besides teleological or instrumental 
action (in other words, cognitive action or action following the means/end model) Habermas 
distinguishes action of normative rationality and dramaturgical action, which expresses internal 
subjectivity (Habermas, 1981/I, pp. 127-129). Habermas detaches these aspects of action from 
the standards of value set to measure teleological action upholding the "three world" concept, 
and thinks the true/false evaluation categories of the objective world are only suitable for 
judging teleological action. The action of normative rationality belongs to the social world while 
the dramaturgical or expressive action embodies the subjective world. All human action can be 
judged/criticized, improved or rationalized from aspects of all three world, although quite 
frequently there is one dominant feature explicitly manifested in one kind of action. An actor 
always performs his action as member of a specific group of people or community and in this 
relationship he behaves and is expected to behave in a way conforming to different norms than 
at the time when he approaches world events cognitively as an individual following the 
means/end schema, so from this angle his action will not be judged according to the degree of 
means/end rationality. Similarly, the relationship between external action and internal 
subjectivity of the actor is often a matter of analysis: in this case action will be judged according 
to the degrees of sincerity. 
 
Habermas argues that rationality analyses have so far only considered the means/end rationality 
aspect of human action open to criticism and they have examined the changes in social 
institutions solely from the aspect of means/end rationality. Other aspects of action, however, 
can be rationalized just the same and there are many signs indicating that they are rationalized. 
Since the development of the Freudian psychoanalytic therapies one of Habermas' examples has 
been th outcropping of the subjective world and the methods of expressing subjectivity. He 
includes in this domain the possibility of improvement in the expression of subjectivity in 
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criticisms of art. 
 
So breaking away from the model of teleological action Habermas explores two independent 
dimensions of rationality besides the instrumental/cognitive rationality, and which cannot be 
traced back to it, the moral/practical rationality expresssing the social element in action (and the 
institutions representing it) and the aesthetic/practical rationality evaluating the dramaturgic 
element in action (Habermas, 1981/I, pp. 448-451). 
 
In order to describe communicative rationality Habermas also starts with considerations of 
action theory. It was in the trends of phenomenological sociology and symbolic interactionism 
that the identification of discourse aimed at thematizing the activites of value analysis and 
understanding in order to define situations either explicitly or implicitly in the case of joint 
actions became fundamental. Discourse is aimed at understanding or agreement and people 
acting in real situations carry out activities of this kind before their important actions. So 
discourse or communicative action can be interpreted as some kind of "preliminary act", which 
precedes effective action (instrumental, normative or dramaturgic) carried out in the objective 
world. 
 
Habermas takes another few steps from discourse to communicative rationality. Based on Max 
Weber's writings he distinguishes succes-oriented and agreement-oriented action according to 
the intentions of the actors. This is what Habermas calls Weber's "unofficial" typology of action 
when he finds the "official"cquadripole classification already described too narrow. 
Communicative action is of the agreement-oriented type and this form may be taken by the 
dramaturgic or normative action if a discourse (or ideal speech-situation) develops between the 
prticipants with the view to coming to an agreement over subjectivity, the valid norms and 
values, as well as the concrete activities to be derived from them. Instrumental action is 
success-oriented by nature, so it is unsuitable for communicative action but for the sake of 
success even such action may be - and in the case of actual doers often is - preceded by 
understanding and agreement-oriented activity, which appears to be disjunct from the 
instrumental role and the mutual agreement between participants will become emphatic. 
Habermas calls this conversation - agreement-oriented preliminary action preceding 
instrumental action. 
 
In the next step Habermas transgresses the starting points of action theory and introduces the 
concept of "life world"as a social or structural correlate of agreement orientation. With Alfred 
Schutz this notion covers the unexplained background knowledge of the participants of joint 
action - this is the world of "matters of course" in the judgement of situations, which makes the 
coordination of activities possible even without complicated checking procedures. "... >>life 
world<< (Lebenswelt) can be interpreted as a linguistically organized set of patterns passed 
down to us through cultural channels" (Habermas, 1981/II, p. 189). Habermas hides this 
epistemological and gnose-sociological conception of "life world" behind Durkheim's analyses 
of collective consciousness and interprets the differentiation processes of collective 
consciousness emphasized by Durkheim (the differentiation of the components personality, 
society and culture) as the rationalization of life world. 
 
In this sense "life world" covers the community aspects of society in accordance with the 
dichotomy of "Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft" elaborated by Ferdinand Tonnies. In societal 
communities agreement-orientation is the dominant feature. A success-oriented cognitive or 
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instrumental approach here would mean the distruction of the communities. 
 
Habermas emphasizes it from a different angle, that the motivation energies of individuals in 
society (which are fundamental even in means/end-oriented action or in the case of actors 
systematically and consciously adopting a way of life of instrumental or cognitive rationality) 
are recreated in features representing the "life world". It was due to the stimulating energies of 
fundamental normative and value-oriented motifs that the activities of Protestant entrepreneurs 
in early capitalism could become dominated by the instrumental or cognitive dimension in their 
ascetic way of life.Invisible and unthematized structures of a community "life world" are 
operating, and the cognitive/instrumental surface structure of modern society is built on their 
base. 
 
So the contrast between communicative rationality and the instrumental/cognitive rationality is 
expressed on the level of societal structure in the diadic schematism of the structures of life 
world and the system-like features developing on their foundations and following the means/end 
rationality. Having developed this conceptual construction Habermas repeatedly evaluates the 
rationalization trends of European modernization to date as well as the alternatives of possible 
future development. 
 
Like Weber he sees instrumental rationality taking shape more and more characteristically 
within modern history in economic development built on the logic of the exchange of goods, in 
the development of formalized modern law, in the formation of public administration separated 
from politics, in scientific research showing a high degree of organization and in the mass 
propagation of formalized education. But on the other hand he interprets the individualization 
already indicated by Durkheim, the tendency to abstraction in the development of norms and 
values, the founding of ethical control on abstract principles as well as the formation and 
development of the reflexive capacity of individual consciousness and those of the mechanisms 
promoting it (the forms of political participation and discourse, certain aspects of journalism 
and mass communication, etc.) as a parallel emergence of communicative rationality. 
 
Evaluating the future chances of societal modernization with this conception, Habermas surveys 
the possible lines of development more optimistically. It is well-known that Weber regarded the 
development of the modern world and the increasing role of bureaucracy behind the efficiency 
of rational economy, law and public administration as the main danger threatening human 
society. He depicted the picture of a "house of servitude" as a possible end point of development 
where most of the achievements due to individual freedom will be withdrawn. This is what 
Horkheimer and Adorno drew on when they expounded "the Critique of Instrumental Reason", 
which stigmatizes the whole Western development as a "dead end" of civilization (Axel 
Honneth, 1979). 
 
Having outlined communicative rationality Habermas finds this diagnosis of the future too 
pessimistic. To him, too the evolution of instrumental rationality, plays the dominant role in 
modernization but in the institutions of modern law, public administration, science and 
education dominated by instrumental rationality he detects, though subordinately, the 
rationalization of communication patterns aimed at agreement or discourse. 
 
The institutions of modern societies show an increasing tendency to differentiation and 
specification, and in order to achieve success they are becoming more and more standardized 
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and sophisticated. However, life world and community features can still be detected in them, as 
surviving and developing elements. 
 
In this way Habermas is optimistic in judging the trends of modernization, but he also draws 
attention to the deadlock of modernization outlined by Horkheimer et al. describing it as a real 
danger. In the Western development of the last few decades he thinks even the mutilated 
communicative structures have become endangered. The aspects of instrumental rationality tend 
to deface and destroy the remaining "nests" of community spirit and this may not only step any 
further evolution of communicative rationalization but also main the invisibly operating basis of 
instrumental features - with the removal of intimate community features the motivation energies 
of the new generations, the indispensable latent value stocks even an instrumental way of life 
cannot do without are destroyed, because of which a modern individual is prepared to assume a 
systematic instrumental regime. In early capitalism the ascetic Protestant entrepreneur, who 
systematically shaped the days of his life according to the instrumental/cognitive standards in 
order to achieve success, agreed to lead a hard life in exchange for salvation. After the explicit 
religious convictions had faded, the performance-oriented way of life in subsequent generations 
was ensured through the transfer of norms, values and attitudes by the sphere of socialization. 
However, there should always be something to serve as a background for the adoption of 
instrumental attitude and this basis of motivation has to be continuously reproduced. 
 
Habermas says the problem does not lie in the trends of instrumental rationalization but in the 
circumstance that the social subsystems developing in this line are starting to assume functions 
that belong to the area of life world. So the instrumental subsystems "colonize" the life world 
and gradually destroy the reproduction areas of motivation energies - the family and the other 
natural community features based on intimacy; they relegate the normative ties of society into 
the legal sphere and the earlier intra-familiar functions are replaced by the bureaucratic and 
monetary services of a welfare state for example the care of old people or helping relations or 
family members who are in trouble, etc. (Habermas, 1981/II, pp.. 515-548). 
 
 
Similarities and differences 
 
 
Habermas grasps the structure of modern societies in the duality of life world and organization 
into systems. Through the modification I introduced when reducing Luhmann's subsystems of 
society to the professional systems of institutions, I also came to detect the rather diffuse 
communication structures of everyday life beneath the systems of professional institutions. 
Consequently my views concerning the basic structure of society represent some shift from 
Luhmann to Habermas. However, important differences remain. 
 
1. Contrary to Habermas I consider society only as a system level and in regarding interaction 
and the formation of organizations as an independent system formation, I detect the 
development of a multitude of communications systems within the communications structures 
of everyday life (mainly systems of interaction but also organizational systems). 
 
2. Contrary to Habermas, I think that there are not only two but a plenitude professional systems 
ascending above everyday life. He considers economy and the state as such systems, whereas I 
thing economy is independent as an all-embracing system of professional institutions, although 
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the systems of professional legal/administrative, political, university/scientific, educational, art, 
religious, etc. are also seen to show a fair degree of independence in modern Western societies 
with their own structures of recruiting, socialization and evaluation. 
 
3. As distinct from Habermas' picture of the structure of society, I clearly see a number of 
popularizing and mediating spheres between the systems of professional institutions and the 
more diffuse everyday life. These are partly responsible for transforming and popularizing for 
everyday communication the new semantic sets, distinctions, categories and ways of approach 
and expression of the specified professional communications and partly provide the systems of 
professional institutions with material by opening the eyes of the wider public to the problems 
of everyday life. The rapidly growing mass communication sphere can be regarded as such a 
mediating sphere, just like the popularized mass culture between art and everyday life or like 
journalism and educational programmes between science and everyday life. Among the organs 
of mediation mention may also be made of the educational system, which selectively transfers 
certain products of specialized science and art into everyday communications, although higher 
education and the activities associated with it are in closer connection with the systems of 
professional institutions and are shaped according to the patterns set by them. 
 
4. Finally the most important difference between "life world" as I use it and Habermas's is that 
with Habermas, life world is reduced to a community with a uniform moral background and 
solidarity and he lays the emphasis on the destruction of this community when describing the 
formation of systems. With this method Habermas, in fact identified life world, which originally 
meant a rather neutral and diffuse background knowledge, with Parsons' societal community 
with the difference that, as opposed to Parsons, he does not regard it as a system. 
 
In spite of the apparent structural similarity the dichotomy of everyday life as used here and the 
system of professional institutions emerging from it is markedly different from the picture of the 
societal structure of Habermas' dichottomy of "life world" and " system". 
 
 
 
2. Richard Münch: the interpenetrations of social rationalities 
 
 
 
Münch's basic idea is interpenetration. He contrasts this aspect with the premise that the 
modernization of European societies and the rationalization of the various social spheres meant 
the development of their self-regulation and their independent logic. On the contrary, says 
Munch, the self-reference of the different spheres can be observed rather in the cases of the 
stagnating Indian, Chinese or Islamic empires. European development, an offspring of 
Greco-Roman civilization, is characterized precisely by the mutual pervasion of the rationality 
aspects of the various social spheres: in other words, their interpenetration. This interpenetration 
distinguishes the development of European societies from Eastern civilizations, and this is what 
has made possible a breakthrough of dynamism in society. In following through his idea of 
interpenetration Munch founded his theoretical framework primarily on Parsons' categories and 
he drew on Weber's work for the empirical material he used in comparing Eastern and Western 
civilizations. 
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Following Parsons, Münch distinguishes in all social spheres and in individual social activities 
four components which determine the operation of specific social institutions - achieving 
various degrees of development. In all institutions of modern societies can be found the 
community-normative component, which integrates the institution, the cultural aspect, which 
generalizes the patterns of both actions and symbols, the professional component, which 
introduces specification and finally, the adaptive component which provides situative reactions 
and changeability. 
 
Similarly, Münch follows Parsons when he accepts the concept of the quadripole-analytical 
distribution of the social spheres and their further internal quadripole distribution according to 
the same aspects. He means by the primary spheres of society as a whole the economic system, 
the political system, the community system and the socio-cultural system. To give an example 
of "internal quadripole distribution" he includes in the subsystems of the 1. socio-cultural 
sphere: the subsystem of rational discourse (incorporating meta-scientific theory development, 
the system of the most generally used symbols), the subsystem of rational science, which is the 
area of empirical sciences, the theories founded on them, etc., the subsystem of the normative 
development of cultural consensus constitutes the communit 
 finally, the fourth, the university/professional subsystem. (As can be seen, science, which is 
usually regarded as a single unit, is divided by Munch into the subsystem of rational discourse 
and empirical science, on the other hand, the sphere of art is difficult to locate.) 2. He includes 
in the internal quadruplet of the political system public administration, the law, the constitution 
(as a sphere responsible for the cultural generalization of the political sphere and for its general 
standards) and the sphere of articulation of political will (parties, representation of interests, 
political press, etc.) As demonstrated the four internal subsystems required by the schema could 
only be produced by the separation of the constitution from law. 3. The internal subsystems of 
the economic sphere are constituted by the market subsystem, the subsystem of market 
collectivity (which means the sphere of the solidarity/normativity standards required for the 
operation of the market in the sense Durkheim described as the "extracontractarian 
preconditions" of the contract), by the economic-cultural system (which ensures cultural 
discourse and consensus over the criteria of economic rationality) and finally by the subsystem 
of economic investment and enterprise (which opens up the economic  sphere to the sphere of 
politics and public administration). 4. Finally the collectivity system of society can be divided 
into economic collectivity, cultural, political and ethical collectivity. 
 
Münch's conceptual structure is made rather rigid by his sticking to the Parsonian quadripole 
distribution. Fortunately when carrying through the idea of interpenetration he concentrates on 
the empirically coherent institutional differentiations. 
 
In the conception of interpenetration his starting point is that the above-mentioned spheres of 
society and their major internal components have only been able to interpenetrate each other 
successfully in the modern European societies and this is why some institutions have been 
founded to transmit the value aspects of one sphere to another. Let's see Munch's attempts for 
specificity in the scientific sphere, because this is where he managed to carry through his basic 
idea in its clearest form. 
 
What is the special trait in the development of European science compared with scientific 
thinking in Eastern civilizations and how could it exercise its impulsive effect in Europe while 
the same phenomenon cannot be observed in the development of Eastern science? In the 
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development of European science by the end of the renaissance and after several hundred years 
of history which had become roughly united in a uniform complex. "What distinguishes modern 
occidental science from the ways of thinking, verification, experimenting and the solution of 
technical problems in other countries lies in the unity of abstract conceptual and theoretical 
constructions, deductive and logical argumentation, rational and empirical experimentation and 
practical technologies, brought about only by Western science." (Munch, 1984, p. 200.) 
 
As is well-known, for instance, until the 15th century China had been far superior to Europe in 
the field of technical inventions. However, their highly developed empirical experimentation 
was completely devoid of the generalization of empirical knowledge and the establishment of 
abstract theories. The empirical experiments were not aimed at providing a practical check for 
some abstract truth, as in the rational and  experimental sciecne which had developed by the 
time of the European Renaissance, but at being item-level solutions given to item-level 
problems where the idea of exploring abstract connections had not even emerged! In the wake 
of Weber, Munch pointed out how far from accidental it has been that the problem had not even 
emerged and how many specific lines of development were required by rational European 
experimental science to unite the development of abstract theories with the finding of concrete 
solutions to problems empirically. 
 
Investigation into the characteristics of science in contemporary India seen to support Munch's 
ideas of interpenetration even further. In India, as it were, not only was the empirical 
experimentation well-developed (as in China) but, parallel to it, abstract thinking also showed a 
high degree of development, e.g. in chemistry, mathematics, medicine as well as a high level of 
achievement in philosophical and logical thinking. Munch revealed that for a number of 
fundamental reasons they showed an isolated pattern of development which made it impossible 
for empirical problem-solving thinking to be shifted in order to seek universal truths, and, 
conversely, for abstract thinking to approach reality. 
 
One of the basic reasons was the caste system with its isolated ethical norms, patterns of 
thinking, etc. This prevented the scientific components from exhibiting high degrees of 
development in the individual castes due to interpenetration of one another. Munch carried out a 
diachronic examination of this underlying problem and pointed out how necessary were both the 
development of the bourgeoisie and the decrease in the distance between the orders so as to 
make it possible for the components of science to unite and develop a rational, uniform abstract 
and empirical science in modern-day Europe. 
 
In Münch's view the idea of interpenetration has an explanatory value not only in the conrast 
with the Eastern development of sciences, but it also has the capacity of revelation in the 
comparison of the sciences of the major European societies and, now, of those of the USA and 
Japan. In accordance with the uniform character of European culture interpenetration is present 
in all modern societies but its extent, the balanced interpenetration of the components shows 
great differences. Hence the centre of gravity of the development of science in the last century 
shifted to where interpenetration could most harmoniously occur. 
 
The first major convergence of theoretical thinking and a practical approach to problems could 
be observed in a few Italian city states at the time of the Reinaissance in Europe. University 
scientists primarily contributed to solving the problems of practical architecture and there were 
gradually set up communities, incorporating artists, scientists and craftsmen, which first 
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produced the intellectual background for the experimentatiion aimed at the exploration of the 
interdependences of the rational and abstract spheres, which was later to become so important. It 
was then already typical that the university prestige of scientists engaged in natural sciences and 
mathematics was low at those universities dominated by philosophy, theology and, later, law 
and they found actually recognition in communities outside the university. Hence the synthesis 
of abstract, theoretical thinking and the practical solutions to problems (techniques) could only 
be realized outside the university. 
 
The same thing applied to 17th century England, where, by that time, the centre of gravity of 
scientific thinking had been shifted. Here, as earlier in Italy, an elementary precondition was that 
the barriers of culture and prestige should largely have been eliminated and the synthesis of the 
varying components of thinking should find a social medium in the bourgeois strata. In the 
Royal Society, formed to cultivate science, the membership included aristocrats, merchants, 
craftsmen and professionals of non-noble birth. Such a thing continued to be unthinkable in 
other European societies for a long time. After its Italian origins the abstract/empirical method 
of modern natural sciences ultimately took root in the English phase of development. 
Subsequent French and German scientific development continued on this basis, although the 
interpenetration of the different components or in other words the weight of abstract 
theoretization and the practical solutions to the problems testified to a different regime of 
development. 
 
Münch sees the different extent of the embedment of theoretical thinking into practice in 
modern societies as being how much the developing intelligentsia has been able to rise above 
practice. There are fundamental differences between the ways English and 20th century 
American scientific life and German or French science were attached to practice. The difference 
can largely be traced back to the different roles played by the state (which are in themselves the 
consequences of countless differences). In England but, later, mainly in the United States, the 
scientific sphere became directly integrated in social practice, while in Germany and France the 
intellectual layers became more isolated from practice. The university and scientific institutions 
were attached to the state, whereas in the Anglo-Saxon countries these have been and still are 
connected to social practice by the mechanisms of the market. 
 
In both solutions the interpenetration of the theoretical sphere and the practical sphere can be 
observed, but it took place less efficiently in the science of Germany and France (and in the 
other countries influenced by them) because of the mediating of the state (Munch, 1984, pp. 
230-245). So Munch concluded that modern scientific rationality cannot be interpreted as the 
development of the self-reference of science - on the contrary, it should be conceived as the 
amalgamation of the logics of different spheres. 
 
This also applies to economy. While most analysts consider the development of the logic of the 
exchange of goods as the rise of an independent economic rationality, Munch pointed out that 
the new factor in European development was not this, but the fact that the social medium 
indirect contact with the exchange of goods is also tied by ethical and moral bonds in spite of 
the exchange of goods. In the case of other civilizations the validity of ethical and normative 
standards could be observed in small, natural communities and in those community forms 
directly above them, but precisely because of the sense of solidarity the rules on the exchange of 
goods could not assert themselves within this circle. Where the latter were functioning the 
ethical norms were no longer valid. The novelty in European development was that the validity 
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of ethical norms and a rather abstract form of solidarity were able to become generalized in such 
a way that in the meantime the logic of the exchange of goods, which was spreading, could be 
brought into line with them. Law, which was bein formalized and which accompanied this 
development, could only bring the logic of the exchange of goods and the universal normative 
standards into agreement on this ethical basis. Not self-reference but, rather, interpenetration 
asserted itself again. 
 
Not only between the components of collectivity and the exchange of goods, but also through 
the attachment of science to practice (which, as we have seen, was also a product of European 
development), and through the government's economic policies and investments the political 
and administrative sphere of society also became intertwined with the aspects of economic 
rationality. 
 
Münch also detected interpenetration in the sphere of politics. It is easier to find a political logic 
of power without morale in certain eras of Eastern civilization, especially in the case of former 
Indian empires. The self-referential logic of pure machiavellian politics can better be analysed 
there than in modern political systems. Such a political system is characterized by 
interpenetration, where the cultural standards are ensured by the sphere of constitution 
(discourse over the basic principles underlying the procedures of th Court of Constitution, etc.), 
the ethical/universal foundations are represented by the lgal system (foundations of a 
constitutional state); the political parties and corporate system open up modern political systems 
to the interests of society; the rationality aspects of the political ssphere are interpenetrated by 
professional standards through  the specialized public administration regulated by law and 
controlled by  the articulation of political interests (Munch, 1984, pp. 303-311). Munch 
concludes his analyses by asking how the modernization of politics can be taken as the 
formation of the self-reference of the political spheres, when so many interdependences are 
evidently present? 
 
 
 
Similarities and differences 
 
 
First of all it is worth considering why Münch kept criticising the theories of differentiation so 
violently. His own discussions do not make this quite clear, but the key to it is the extension of 
Parsons' category, the inclusion. In Parsons' interpretation inclusion meant in the first place the 
inclusion of an ever-growing proportion of the population into the range of social sub-system 
(Parsons, 1966, p. 40). Subsequently, as an element of this he emphasized that with the 
inclusion of the population the morality-solidarity will be extended to include groups formerly 
excluded (See especially Parsons, 1971, p. 26). 
 
Luhmann indicated the reduction of segmentary differentiation as being a contralateral 
manifestation of the inclusion of the population and by inclusion he means society becoming a 
world society. However he did not systematically consider the intensive expansion of the value 
aspects of subsystems  of society as the tendencies of the mutual inclusion of the subsystems, or 
as we have indicated in the first chapter the different limitations of the subsystems in these 
tendencies. The differentiation of the subsystems actually appears as the disintegration of 
society, which is held together only by the media and the intermediary spheres. 
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Münch detected this problem in Luhmann's social theory. Subsequently he completely rejected 
the theory of differentiation and put into prominence  the interpenetration processes of all 
former European ssocial development. In way he automatically understated the similarly 
identifiable historical processes, which Luhmann was able to point out as differentiations of the 
value aspects of the subsystems of society. So for instance mention can here be made of 
secularization, the processes of differentiation of political states, the process of the 
depolitization of public administration, and that of its coming differentiated from the ideology 
of science and politics, etc. In my analyses this intensive aspect of inclusion is also in focus, so 
in some respects my ideas have approached Munch's views, but there are still a number of 
important differences. 
 
1. The most significant difference is that Münch accepts Parsons' approach of an analytical 
quadripole system, and he forces the structure of the society into it. Conversely, on the basis of 
Luhmann's concrete empirical approach to the system, I start with a multitude of systems of 
professional institutions. Wherever a universal dual schematics  can organize a communication 
area round it with stable structures of recruiting, socialization and evaluation, a system of 
professional institutions is outlined. 
 
2. A further difference is that after Luhmann I regard society as just one of the system levels 
together with the systems of organization and interaction, and I divide society internally at the 
first level of division into everyday life and the professional systems emerging from it through 
mediating spheres. In Münch's work there are analytical quadripole systems built on each other 
everywhere and societal community remains a system which never becomes re-evaluated into a 
"life world", as with Habermas. 
 
3. Where I got nearest Münch's ideas is in the double rationality of the system of professional 
institutions. As I have underlined, besides the evaluation rationality of their own, only economic 
rationality plays a part in the case of some systems of professional institutions whereas in other 
cases a possible intrusion of the legal sphere still cannot be averted by the value aspects 
associated with the system of institutions (which is to say that it cannot deflect the dichomoty of 
lawful/unlawful by the prism of its own dual paradigm). 
 
Finally here are the most important differences between Münch's ideas and mine: 
- it is not a question of the interpenetration of four rationalities; 
- within one system of institutions one central dual schematics will become dominant, only 
allowing the other to assert themselves subordinately; 
- within a few systems of professional institutions the aspect of economic rentability will play a 
dominant role beside their own binary code, and this will strengthen the dominant role of the 
particular binary code. It is only a precondition of the operation of the society as a whole as a 
means of social coordination and integration; 
- the further value aspects of society influence selections within all systems of professional 
institutions, but the latter can assert themselves only in subordination to the former. 
 
 
 
3. Talcott Parons: analytical subsystems and professions 
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In my analyses so far I have taken over and used directly very little of Parsons' comprehensive 
theoretical framework, but quite often Parsons' one-time theoretical initiatives gave me my 
guideline via Luhmann's, Munch's and Habermas' mediation. 
I rejected Parsons' analytical approach to systems and his tucking the composition of the social 
world into the rigid schema of a quadripole system in favour of Luhmann's more flexible 
theoretical framework, where the system levels and the mechanisms of the system-like 
delimitations of the organization of sociality are embraced empirically and specifically. The 
difference between Luhmann's approach and mine, my narrowing down the subsystems of 
society to professional components, makes a relatively neglected category of Parsons' theoretical 
system interesting to me. Parsons had already dealt with the organization and internal autonomy 
of professions in a separate short study in 1939, and later he mainly analysed the internal 
organization of the legal and medical professions (Conf. Parsons, 1939, 1952, 1960). In a 1968 
encyclopaedical entry he again described the category of profession from a principled position 
(Parsons, 1968). From several points of view these analyses reflect the internal organization of 
the systems of professional institutions as I used them, so for the sake of arriving at a more 
clear-cut definition by contraposition it is worth comparing my category to Parsons' professions. 
 
Profession as a particular line of occupation and its collectivity had already been investigated at 
the beginning of the present century. So as early as 1915 Flexner analysed the qualities that 
distinguish the "professions" within the groups of occupations (Freidson, 1983, p. 21).Certain 
professions, such as those of the politicians and scientists, were analysed by Max Weber to great 
effect, and in the 30s there were several comprehensive works describing th professions. The 
research done in the last few decades can be traced back to two starting points: first and 
foremost to Parsons' above-mentioned articles and secondly to Everett Hughes' theoretical 
framework. As member of the Chicago school Hughes stimulated his pupils to carry out a wide 
range of empirical investigations, while Parsons' influence was represented by the embedding of 
the professions into an embracing theoretical framework. 
 
Parsons accommodated th professions in the "occupational system" on the level of his analytical 
social subsystems. The intertwining of social subsystems with cultural subsystems, or in another 
direction with the behavioural systems and biological foundations of individual people provides 
the general system level of activity where the development of the human world takes place. For 
us however the internal analysis of professions is more important than placing the in Parsons' 
embracing theoretical framework. (I have already analysed the shifts in the development of 
Parsons' analytical framework in an earlier work; Pokol, 1987, pp. 158-230). 
 
Initially Parsons' theoretical interest in the professions was motivated by the fact that their 
members could not be classified into communities with altruistic motivations, nor into groups of 
people who are motivated by business interests. Scientists, doctors, lawyers and businessmen 
are characterized by functional specificity and a universal treatment of knowledge aiming at 
objectivity, but their activities are oriented by many motivations which cannot be merely 
reduced to efforts to acquire material wealth (Parsons, 1939, pp. 38-39). Within a professional 
community there exists an evaluation mechanism rooted elsewhere which orientates the 
activities of doctors, lawyers and scientists besides the seeking of material wealth: "...the aim of 
attaining great respect or, in Thomas's words, >>acquiring recognition<< within one's own 
professional group," says Parsons (ibid. p. 14). 
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In his later studies, parallel with the development of his theoretical framework Parsons took 
some steps towards the exploration of the operation of the somewhat more general evaluation 
mechanisms of the professions. He emphasized it especially clearly in his 1968 encyclopaedic 
entry that beyond individual organizations evaluation by the profession as a whole or control by 
the whole profession over the individual could only become dominant in cases where private 
practice played a leading role rather than concentration into large organizations. For instance, 
this is the case with lawyers in England and the activities of doctors are another good example 
(Parsons, 1968, p. 541). 
In this way the individual is not subject to an organizational hierarchy but is influenced more 
directly by the impersonal and universal evaluation mechanism of the wider profession. 
Although by the 20th century these professions have to some extent become composed of large 
organizations, the professional evaluations and characteristics already developed forced the 
organizations to change their character. (When later analysing the American university, to make 
this observation more specific Parsons developed the category of "institutionalised 
individualism" which contains the coexistence of scientists working in the big university 
organization free of hierarchy and the evaluation and control of the scientific community as a 
whole outside the university organization.) 
 
In his final version (1968) Parsons found the cardinal quality of professions, as opposed to other 
occupational groups and trades, in their reliance on science. A profession consists of two 
components: its core is constituted by the scientific institutions and universities belonging to the 
profession and it extends to the sphere of carrying out the practical applications of the scientific 
knowledge involved (Parsons, 1968, pp. 536-537). 
 
Such organization could already be experienced very early in the work of doctors and jurists so 
Parsons regarded these as the typical examples of the professions. In the past century however, 
due to technical development, the application of scientific technologies has ousted the earlier 
experimental approach of craftsmanship, engineering and thus the layer of engineers is 
becoming professionalized, just like the activities of teachers, social workers and the 
communities of a number of other occupations. 
 
Joseph Ben-David then arrived at the conclusion that science is the "profession of professions", 
which acts as a "gate keeper" in controlling the internal organization and evaluation mechanisms 
of the different occupations (Ben-David, 1976, p. 876). 
 
Parsons' analyses had given a lot of incentive to scientists in later times in working out their 
theoretical structures. So, for instance, when Merton was investigating the evaluation and 
rewarding mechanisms of the internal sphere of science in the 50s, he could draw on Parsons' 
1939 study which gave an early indication of an evaluation mechanism based on "recognition" 
(17). Similarly, Parsons had demonstrated the contradictions between the impersonal control 
mechanisms about the members of the wider community of a community and those of the 
organizational hierarchies, as later Glaser (Glaser 1965) and these same studies contained 
valuable starting-points for Hagstrom's work, in which he analysed the scientific community. 
However, I regard as generally misconceived the theoretical framework of the organization of 
professions in the form elaborated by Parsons. 
 
My main objection to this theoretical framework is that he attached too strongly to science the 
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internal evaluations and features of the systems of professional institutions (18), and in this way 
he could only express their intrinsic complexity in a distorted form. With this approach the 
analysis of the field of science investigating the various spheres as well as the analysis of 
science as a whole also became distorted because Parsons develops too strong a connection 
between them and the layer of their practical application. 
 
The internal organization of science and that of the spheres carrying out its practical applications 
are becoming more and more divergent as their functional differentiation is being realized more 
and more clearly in the course of social evolution. Parsons himself saw it without feeling 
inclined to draw any conclusion to be integrated into the theory of professions. In respect of the 
scientific fields of the two most important professions of model value Parsons, in 1973, 
indicated in a book of his that out of the "practical/symptomatic manipulations" necessitated 
earlier by the practical sphere law and medicine had, over the last few decades developed into 
real sciences, in as much as medicine, relying on the results of the newly-developed 
biochemistry, physiology, psychology and even socio-psychology and sociology, has begun to 
investigate these connections in universities and in clinical medical practice as well as and while 
providing a medical service. In the same way, instead of pursuing its earlier activities of 
systematizing cases and elaborating maxim of law, legal science has settled on the foundations 
of recent developments in economics, political science and sociology, and while attending to the 
operation of law it analyses these rather specific interdependences (Parsons-Platt, 1973, p. 214). 
 
However, this means that the legal and medical activities "which have really become scientific" 
are increasingly breaking away from the communities and evaluations of their professions and 
becoming orientated according to the scientific evaluation patterns prevailing in their wider 
scientific communities. (Practical reports also confirm conflict between the attitudes of doctors 
doing research and those engaged in practice, because this change in medical science has not 
been followed by the appropriate separation of the two types of activity institutionally.) This 
means that the organization and operation of the internal evaluation mechanisms of the 
professions have to be detached from the universities and scientific institutions executing the 
intra-scientific reflection of the given practical spheres theoretically. However, this amounts to a 
rejection of the central idea of Parsons' analysis concerning professions. 
 
Another problem in Parsons' analyses of professions is presented by their delimitation. As a 
matter of fact, in this case, while trying to avoid the distinctions and delimitations used in 
everyday life in order to evade the misleading effect of everyday evidence throughout his entire 
theory - he worked out the highly unnatural analytical quadripole distribution of systems to 
replace them - he accepted almost literally the "entities" of everyday thinking. He makes too 
direct use of the occupational groups which are striking features of practical life, and taking 
their structures for granted he tries to make statements suitable for generalizations. (Larson 
emphasizes this problem as one affecting the whole of research into professions to date. See 
Larson, p. 111). 
 
With Parsons professions are reduced  to communities of various occupational groups, while the 
limits of the systems of professional institutions, as I understand them, far exceed the individual 
groups and include multitudes of occupational groups organized around comprehensive social 
functions. This also means that in this way the uniform community character is more likely to 
disappear and we can only see the institutionalization of common evaluation mechanisms on a 
rather abstract level. For example, besides jurists, other occupational groups of the legal sphere 
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are incorporate in the system of professional institutions of law, such as the groups of non-legal 
occupations working in organs of public administration; similarly, within the area of science, 
research there are, besides the scientists themselves, organizers and layers of managers at the 
universities and institutions. 
 
Hence the boundaries of the systems of professional institutions are wider than Parsons 
indicated when describing professions. Even more important is the difference in our respective 
views that to me a system of professional institutions can only be established where a universal 
binary code becomes dominant in the recruitment, socialization, evaluation, rewarding and 
sanctioning of those fulfilling a social function. 
 
Consequently, the mechanisms of systems of professional institutions could only be detected 
where such a universal binary code could develop and acquire a dominant position in pursuing a 
sphere of activity. Evaluation of a complete profession can only be realized in practice where 
different performances in the execution of certain activities can be compared on a universal and 
specific scale or if it is possible for the participants of a profession to be orientated 
autonomously among the impersonal norms of the profession as a whole. Whereover such a 
system has failed to develop, only the organizational hierarchies can control the selections of the 
participants and systematize them. (For instance, this is the case with the participants of 
education as opposed to those in science, where a universal binary code  is available.) 
 
In this way the theoretical problem that the research into professions seems to have been trying 
to combat for a long time is likely to be solved: how is it possible to delimit professional 
organization from simple occupational groups? Preconditioning professions on universal binary 
code reduces the circle of possible professions very radically. For instance, due to the lack of a 
universal binary code within health care the medical profession, considered as one with model 
value, appears to be a guildlike residuum rather than the core of a system of professional 
institutions. If one thinks of specialists and their international hierarchy as a counter-argument, 
it should be noted that this list evaluates rather on the basis of scientific performance than on 
that of therapeutic activities. The previously indicated tendency to delimitation between 
medicine as a science and as therapeutic medical practice may very well soon make this 
problem a matter of course. 
 
Parsons and the research into professions in general go a long way in concentrating the 
characteristics of professions around collectivity. In research the following attributes are usually 
registered: the members of professions 
1. apply an independent scientific corpus in their activities; 
2. are service-oriented rather than controlled by self-interest; 
3. organize the scientific corpus and techniques needed for their activities into separate schools, 
which are disposed of by the profession as a community; 
4. they are privileged in exercising self-government (Larson, 1977, p. X). 
 
These attributes truly reflect some aspects of the organization on the professionals in the 
scientific and legal spheres and some of their evaluation mechanisms, but they fail to reflect for 
instance the characteristics of those professional system organized by political competition. 
Orientated according to the binary code of staying in office going into opposition the strata of 
politicians belonging to the competitive political spheres acquire highly specific knowledge but 
their recruitment and socialization do not take place in formalized schools but within the 
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operation of political parties and groups of shared political interest. Their organization into 
communities is excluded even if lasting friendships can be made between politicians of 
opposing parties in public, in parliamentary lobbies, at inter-party negotiations, etc. 
 
The same holds true in respect of thee market-rationality-oriented stratum of managers. 
Although in Parsons' original version it was in contrast to the activities of this self-interest 
motivated layer that the category of the professional person aspiring for recognition beyond 
material wealth (acknowledgement, reputation, etc.) was set up, systems of professional 
institutions as I use the term can be identified everywhere a universal dual schematics can 
determine the recruitment, socialization, evaluation and rewarding of the participants. Therefore 
I have attempted to reconstruct the structures of the systems of professional institutions on a 
more abstract level than that they occupied in Parsons' analyses of professions. 
 
The sphere of art will also be excluded from the research of professions, because the individual 
branches of art fall so far apart that in reality no general common feature can be presumed. On 
the other hand, the individual nature of artistic creation within a field of art will preclude the 
development of the forms of community control and evaluation customary elsewhere. In 
addition, in East-European countries where in the Stalinist era organizational structures 
embracing all the branches of art were set up, practice shows that even when political pressures 
no longer affected the arts, they failed to set about dealing with internal artistic problems but 
immediately began to act as quasi political parties spontaneously and those artists who excel in 
their political ambitions and related abilities enjoy preferential treatment. Conversely, artists 
who are more valuable artistically but who are apolitical do not occupy prominent places in such 
structures. So, as opposed to the communities of scientists, jurists and doctors, the various 
branches of art will only help the development of community structures around certain trends 
and schools, not on a comprehensive community level. 
 
Because of its specific orientation Parsons' approach to the problems of professions does not 
allow us to connect our category of the system of professional institutions to his analyses, in 
spite of being identical names. His analyses can only be utilized with the detour Luhmann made 
when reinterpreting the analytical subsystems as concrete and empirical subsystems of society, 
which I have subsequently narrowed down to the professional components of the subsystems of 
society by introducing amendments into Luhmann's work (19). 
 
 
 
4. Niklas Luhmann: the autopoiesis of the subsystems of society 
 
 
Attempts have been made so far to indicate my amendments to Luhmann's categories while 
emphasizing that I have taken from his theory most of the distinctions and starting points used 
here. I can only repeat the distribution of the system levels of society into systems of 
professional institutions and communication structures of everyday life and the elevation of 
economy as a system of professional institutions from the other systems, placing it on a 
separate, more general level - as distinct from his way of handling these matters. At certain 
crucial points these amendments have led to a different view of the social structure from 
Luhmann's initial picture. Using his pre-mid 70's works made it easier for me to embark on this 
project. However from the early 80s on Luhmann accentuated his analyses of societal 
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subsystems by putting in focus in novel ways the concept of autopoiesis (a development of 
general systems theory) thus helping his former theory to developed in a direction diametrically 
opposite to my corrections. To begin with, let me look at the shifts in Luhmann's theory of the 
subsystems of society caused by the concept of autopoiesis in order to contrast this with the 
concept of social structure expounded here. 
 
 
The autopoiesis of the subsystems of society 
 
 
The concept of autopoiesis had been expounded by the early 70s by a Chilean biologist, 
Humberto Maturana. Maturana took his first step towards the elaboration of his concept 
rejecting functionalism because he thought it was only outward observation that introduced 
functionalism into the coordinated arrangement of the internal processes within living organism. 
 
The neurons and various organisms self-reproduce by means of their internal structures with the 
help of their existing elements and although in turn the more general biological systems use 
these as construction components to build themselves up, the individual parts, which are also 
systems change basically in the way determined by their internal structures. The more general 
system utilizes its partical systems as carriers and producers of certain qualities according to its 
own structure, but in spite of this limited utilization they are not organized to ensure these 
qualities (although an outward observer might arrive at this conclusion when observing the 
regular "cooperation" of these parts during his investigations into more general biological 
systems), but carry out their own cyclic reproduction as determined by their own inner 
structures.(Maturana 1982).To give a rather direct summary of Maturana's thesis: it is not the 
whole that determines the parts; they decisively determine themselves, and the constellation of 
their qualities produced as "side products" will make possible the development and continuous 
reproduction of the whole as a more general entity. 
 
The partial systems are far more autonomous than biological functionalism has traditionally 
supposed them to be. There is no hierarchical connection between the partial systems despite the 
fact that an outward observer may regard the activities of a definite part over the rest as those of 
a "Kommandozentrale". 
 
The ultimate conclusion of Maturana's autopoietic systems concept is an emphasis on the 
autonomy and self-determination of the partial systems of the complex whole. The reproduction 
of these partial systems takes place in an autopoietically closed formation. A more general 
system cannot determine the internal processes of its partial systems but the its effects reach the 
micro-processes "strained" by the internal structure of the partial systems. In the course of its 
reproduction the autopoietic system creates new elements with the help of those already 
existing, relying on the structure maintained by the harmonious arrangement of the elements in a 
cyclically repetitive process. 
 
Maturana's explanations and unusual theoretical "opening gambits" exercised an elementary 
effect on Luhmann, who from the early 80s on, began giving a modified description of the 
subsystems of society as ones built on a pattern of autopoiesis. 
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The autopoiesis of economy 
 
 
Luhmann has succeeded in transferring his concept of autopoietic confinement to the 
subsystems of society most convincingly and with the highest degree of elaboration in respect of 
economy as a system (Luhmann, 1984/b). 
 
Let me reiterate Maturana's theorem: an autopoietic system creates its new elements out of its 
existing elements in an uninterrupted chain, drawing only material and energy from the 
environment. Luhmann focused his attention on the reconstruction of this basic cyclical process 
in economy. Presupposing an ideal market economy he identified it in the process of effecting 
payment ("Zahlung"). In a typical market economy every payment makes other payments 
possible, the lack of payment leads to failure to effect other payment and the purchase of 
anything involves renouncing some other purchase. Ultimately, the effect of every economic act 
is "doubled": you buy a certain thing but at the same time renounce something else. The 
attachment of payment to payment keeps the system "tight" and with this, the range of the future 
activities of the other economic units becomes calculable. 
 
Thus a market economy is an uninterrupted process of payments, regulated by prices. Prices 
open up the internal circular processes of economy to the environment, being based on need. 
Although in his new concept Luhmann lays great emphasis on the isolation of the subsystems of 
society - after they became functionally separated in the course of social evolution - at the same 
time he makes repeated attempts to elaborate partial openness. The closed character of economy 
is eliminated by orientation to demands. Prices transmit shifts in need and thus introduce 
environmental changes into the process of payment, thwarting several acts of payment but 
ensuring under normal economic circumstances the continuation of the payment cycle in the 
majority of cases. 
 
Thus economy becomes insensitive to all outward circumstances; all economically relevant 
activities are solely motivated by the chances of payment while being orientated by prices. 
However by basing prices on need this closed-up economy which is insensitive to all external 
motivs becomes "hypersensitive" from one aspect: it registers even the slightest movements in 
demand or any events that may potentially lead to such shifts with increased sensitivity through 
its well-developeed warning system (capital, stock exchanges, marketing mechanisms, etc.) and 
responds by restructuring itself. The slogan "Je geschlossener, desto mehr offen" would best 
describe Luhmann's concept of autopoiesis. His fundamental idea may be summarized by 
visualizing the picture "confinement on all sides, except on one aspect where hypersensitivity 
prevails". 
 
If economy is thought of in the sense of formal economy as we use it, then in this case the 
transfer of the concept of autopoiesis to the subsystems of society seems to be acceptable to me. 
With regard to the other subsystems, however, a number of elementary problems may be 
discovered in Luhmann's texts. 
 
All these issues can easily be identified as a shift from Luhmann's earlier position in the area of 
the legal system. The closed-up autopoietic system produces its new elements out of its existing 
elements and with the help of its existing elements. In the case of the system of law this is 
expressed by the possibility of the new norms being traced back to the old norms or in a wider 
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context by the derivation of new legal decisions from prevailing legal decisions. "The 
self-reproduction of law takes place as a change in law, as a transfer of the quality of normative 
validity into partially new expectations." (Luhmann, 1983, p. 136.) 
 
The autopoiesis of law is embodied by an uninterrupted cyclical process of legal decisions 
where normative validity is transmitted in a closed process. Luhmann found the way a closed 
system of law reacts to the environment in the dualigy of the normative confinement of law (Je 
geschlossener, desto mehr offen - the more closed, the more open) and its cognitive openness. 
 
Let me consider this further, because the shift in the whole of Luhmann's system of thinking can 
be seen most clearly at this point. Luhmann previously discussed the normative and cognitive 
elements of the system of law, attributing a great significance to them, in his "Sociology of 
Law" written 16 years ago. A comparison between that and the present version demonstrates 
very well the effects of his conversion to the concept of autopoiesis. 
 
In his 1972 "Sociology of Law" Luhmann thought that the institutionalization of the law-making 
process rising above the sphere of the application of law represented the law being founded on 
change. In the law-making process it is possible to detect an effective legal measure which has 
been made inadequate by social change, and if such a measure is broken massively the 
law-maker may conclude that it is necessary to change the effective regulations. So at this point 
law-makers are related cognitively to the measures of the prevailing law. "Should it stay as it is 
or shall we change it?" - this attitude is typical of law-makers. On the other hand the attitude of 
jurists is compulsorily normative both in jurisdiction and in other sspheres of the application of 
law. There it is not possible to "learn" from the criticism of society, a judge cannot draw the 
conclusion that the given legal regulations do not comply with the requirements of society (as 
law-makers can). With the development of the liberalization of law-making and a simultaneous 
increase in the observation of normativity in the application of law, law can be changed partly 
by moderation and partly, by a society mindful of the prevailing rules which trusts that judges 
will decide in future legal matters accordingly - thus ensuring a calculable legal terrain. 
Luhmann solves this problem area in a manner diametrically opposed to the foregoing. 
 
According to his present starting-point both the normative and the cognitive elements are 
present in each legal decision. "All operation in law and all legal processing of information are 
simultaneously exposed to normative and cognitive orientations. The normative quality serves 
the autopoiesis of the system laying out its contours and separating it from the environment. The 
cognitive quality ensures the harmony of these processes with the environment of the system." 
(Luhmann, 1983, p. 139.) According to the new concept law is exposed to the learning process 
in all facets of its operation, whereas the old one envisages learning only in a procedure 
specifically meant for thi purpose. 
 
Not only has the subject of changing the law been shifted from law-making to the area within 
the law, but by connecting the legal system to politics Luhmann has revised his entire former 
concept in his new works. 
 
This passage from the 1972 "Sociology of Law" directs attention to the degree of the change. 
"Positives Recht entsteht, wenn ein Teilsystem der Gesellschaft die Entscheidung ]ber das 
Recht usurpiert und dann das Gesellschaftsystem im ganzen als seine Unwelt ... behandeln kann 
... Nicht zufällig also entsteht die Vorstellung einer 'Trennung' von Staat und Gesellschaft zu der 
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Zeit, die das Recht positiviert. Positives Recht ist unvermeidbar politisch augew[hltes, 
'staatliches' Recht." (My italics. B.P., Luhmann, 1972, p. 244.) On the other hand he now calls 
this an instrumentalist view of law, which "has stated with systematical validity, at least since 
Bodin, that law is a means of state politics" (Luhmann, 1985, p. 35). Politics is a parasite of law 
which advances the categories of its own value orientation (staying in office/going into 
opposition) towards the orientation categories of the legal system (lawful/unlawful) uninvited. 
 
The separation of the legal system from the sphere of state and politics is also expressed in 
Luhmann's new material by the fact that he emphasizes the exclusion of the transitional areas or 
mediating processes from between the autopoietically closed subsystems of society as a matter 
of principle. While earlier he considered the law-making process as the opening up to political 
programmes of the legal system trapped in its micro-processors, and through this to society, he 
now emphasizes the impossibility of this. His argument is this: the sphere of law includes 
everything orientated according to the category of "lawful/unlawful". "Not only the 
organizational/professional complex but all communications orientated according to the code of 
law belong to the operations of the legal system - it is immaterial whether it is a matter of 
compulsory decision or a >private< legal statement ... all legally coded communications will be 
included in the legal system due to their being assigned to this coding. This either happens or 
does not happen - there are no transitional states or intermediary areas." (Luhmann, 1986, p. 
178.) 
 
This means that Luhmann's concept of law has changed fundamentally. How far does his 
theorem hold true for the reality of operating legal systems? In my opinion his old concept 
reflected the actual situation much better - at least as far as continental law is concerned - even if 
the objection could be made that it was not suitable for expressing the "over-straining" of law by 
politics. With his present concept, however, the legal systems of Anglo-Saxon countries are 
better appreciated where the reality of the autonomy of the legal sphere from the 
narrowly-defined political sphere is even greater as an after-effect of several centuries of the law 
development techniques used by "common law" and the issue of new legal measures shows a 
stronger dependence on existing legal norms, High Court precedents and juridical development 
techniques. While on the Continent the changes in the social spheres are more strongly attached 
to the political sphere, via which they reach the legal sphere after evolving first into party 
platforms and them into government programmes - laws - (using Luhmann's old expression, 
through "political centralization" of social tensions and problems), in Anglo-Saxon legal 
systems they become integrated into the legal system through the micro-processes of law and 
introduce changes into it without the problems being politicized through changes in the persons 
and opinions of judges and other applicants of the law. Law is indeed exposed there to the 
learning process "on every limb". This is true even if High Court precedents play a role in 
controlling the way by which social problems are transformed into law. 
 
However, even in the countries of common law there is a tendency towards increasing the role 
of statutory law (written law) created by the government/political sphere and the grip of political 
control over the once-autonomous juridical devvelopment of law tightens. 
 
Thus Luhmann adopted an approach to the structure of the legal system diametrically opposed 
to his former sociology of law, basing his concept on the theory of autopoiesis. However, on 
looking at the facts of reality I find it hard to follow him through his new affiliations. 
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In respect of the other subsystems of society Luhmann faces even greater problems when he 
strives to work out their autopoietic closure and their uniform internal cyclical process. In my 
opinion his experiments so far also bring to the surface ssome formerly undetected basic 
problems. In the case of the political system these can be spotted very clearly. 
 
When the author aims at elaborating a closed, uniform process (or at least a structure), the 
antagonistic features of the internal components of the politicam system, which have 
traditionally been grouped together, become prominent. How can a "common code" or dual 
category of orientation be worked out firstly for motivations within the sphere of party politics 
and secondly, for the closely associated sphere of those working in the legally regulated public 
administration? Luhmann percieves the birth of a code for the political system in the 
institutionalization of the positional duality of government and opposition. If modern political 
systems are considered, this duality really embodies the motivations of activities and decisions 
in the political/government bodies as well as in the political party organs. Besides a number of 
moral and ideological aspects being taken into account, the dilemmas staying in office/going 
into opposition or (for the opposition) taking office/staying in opposition will remain 
fundamental considerations when a stand is developed concerning some problem arising. The 
social problems and tensions will exercise a muted effect on the political sphere for example 
when deflected by the prism of this code. 
 
It is obvious, however, that this code does not orientate activities within public administration; 
or at last if it does play a role (e.g. if a minister, motivated by considerations of party policy, 
instructs the organs of public administration to follow a certain line disregarding the effective 
regulations), a chain of courts in the area of public administration as well as law courts of 
constitution and a host of other mechanisms will aim at stopping it. And even if I must admit 
that in spite of tthe guarantees the code of politics prevails in many cases within the legally 
regulated public administration, I still find Luhmann's attempt in respect of the whole political 
system rather problematic as it considers feasible the elaboration of a uniform code. On the 
contrary, his experiments have convinced me that the state and political sphere should not be 
regarded as a unified subsystem. If any serious attempt is to be made to work out the orientation 
categories actually valid in its inernal areas, public administration and the narrowly based 
political sphere are to be separated and they should both be considered as primary subsystems of 
society. The political sphere in this context embraces the sphere of party policy and the political 
gremia within the state: primarily the government and parliament, as well as the group of 
politicians around the minister in top government office. In contrast to the staff of civil servants 
in the ministries this group of politicians changes periodically following the changes in the 
ruling party. 
 
In the case of the legal sphere the situation is similar. The law-making process cannot really be 
"tucked into" the legal system. As I have already mentioned, its relationship to the prevailing 
law is characterized by the approach "let's leave it as it is or let's change it". In contrast with the 
sphere of the application of law guided by the effective law and with every-day legal battles, 
some of the law-makers (the members of the government, MPs representing their parties and 
those belonging to the opposition) are predominantly orientated by a diad of explicitly political 
categories, we may be ousted if we change this law in these ways, or else we may strengthen our 
chances for the next elections. (The same works vice versa with the opposition.) Naturally, in 
the law-making process a host of jurist experts are also present, who approach the changes 
proposed not only from the angle of political considerations but from the side of legal 
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institutions developed according to the internal logic of the legal sphere over the course of the 
centuries. And although they are not orientated by the "lawful/unlawful" code, as their 
counterparts who apply the law, they are at least disposed to pay attention to whether or not a 
proposed change is in line with the basic institutions of the given legal system. 
 
In his new works on the sociology of law Luhmann himself is uncertain about where the 
law-making process really belongs. While in his 1972 Sociology of Law he focuses on this 
process - with repeated emphasis on its inevitable attachment to politics - recently he has taken 
sides with the separation of the legal and the political systems of law, and he either fails to treat 
the subject at all or discusses the techniques of changing the law applied in the micro-processes 
of the application of law in this context. However, supporting Luhmann's earlier concept I think 
that a modern legal system is bound to draw on independent law-making above the sphere of the 
application of law, and this is structurally integrated not simply in the state but in those units of 
the establishment where politics in its narrow sense ins localized (parliament, government) and 
the organizational background of which is constituted by the sphere of party policies. This is to 
say that law-making is a border-line area, a "Zwischenbereich". 
 
The same problem also arises concerning the sphere of science. Although science is not built on 
another system of society structurally, like the system of law is on the political subsystem 
through law-making, here too there is a "Zwischenbereich". The university sphere, where partly 
the attitudes and functions of the educational subsystem prevail but where a scientific attitude is 
also present in a decisive majority of university teachers, is typically such a system. The 
different logics of the two spheres are felt every day by the university teacher, who devotes 
some of his day to a sceptical approach to accepted and systematically classified knowledge and 
tries to expose its cardinal points in light of newly discovered facts and truths (thus quashing the 
whole body of knowledge), while at his university lectures and seminary classes he is supposed 
to relay classified knowledge over and above the level of introduction, all the more so as 
students should be able to understand what he is talking about. 
 
This dilemma is eliminated by an organizational separation within the university sphere of the 
units specializing in scientific research and those responsible for instruction. A complete 
separation, however, would lead to a rapid intellectual decline in university teaching, and it 
would also exercise a deleterious effect on the connection between scientific research, organized 
in a chain of closed research institutes, and everyday life (its language, problems, etc.). My only 
concern here is to highlight the fact that in reality there is a "Zwischenbereich" between science 
and teaching, which is systematically eliminated from Luhmann's field of vision by his efforts to 
achieve autopoietic independence. 
 
 
Similarities and differences 
 
 
Luhmann aims at elaborating the autopoietic self-containment of subsystems of society by 
referring to binary codes, or in my usage, a central dual paradigm. This conception has 
stimulated Luhmann's efforts to be concentrated on the reconstruction of cycles within the 
subsystems of society - at least in his essays to date. As we have seen, Luhmann identified their 
implementation in the relationship of acts of payment to each other in economy, in the 
transmission of the validity of scientific truths in the form of a closed chain in science and in the 
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normative force in law. In my disquisitions so far I have made it clear that in many cases this 
could only be made plausible by omitting to reveal certain aspects of reality. It is more 
important to emphassize here that analysis directed at the "basic dircular process" ousts the 
mechanisms institutionalising the dominance of the central dual schemata of the subssystems 
from the area of investigations; those mechanisms which ensure the recruitment of participants 
in continuous specified communications according to a central dual paradigm in the course of 
these communications, the selection of the recruits, the socialization of those remaining, as well 
as their evaluation, rewarding and sanctioning mechanisms. 
 
Contrasting my analyses with Luhmann's autopoietic subsystems, he sees the differentiation of 
the subsystems of society implemented in the development of circular chains of 
communications orientated by specific binary codes, while I identify it in the development of 
enduring structures capable of making dominant the selection according to a specific dual 
paradigm. My analyses have a different focus and this may explain the conclusion I have arrived 
at - as opposed to Luhmann's - that the enduring structures ensuring a high frequency of such 
selections through specific communications can only develop within systems of professional 
institutions. This has a far-reaching effect on the picture of the structure of our society: beside 
the systems of specified professional institutions the rather diffuse area of everyday life has to 
be included. 
 
 
 
5. Georg Lukacs: complexes made up by complexes 
 
Most of the categories and distinctions used in my analyses are foreign to Lukacs's way of 
thinking. Yet my correction concerning Luhmann, which has reduced the subsystems of society 
to systems of professional institutions, has made visible the communications structures of the 
rather diffuse everyday life and so by outlining everyday life and systems of professional 
institutions beyond it we have arrived at a picture of the structure of society which resembles in 
some points that presented in Lukacs's Aesthetics and Ontology. 
 
In his Aesthetics Lukacs describes a constantly changing and renewing everyday life, 
constituting the pedestal of society, from which emerge in the course of development more 
stable systems of ejectivisation (Lukacs, 1965, p. 43). The two clearest forms of the systems of 
objectivisation are solidified in science and art, but, as well, law, the state, the parties, etc. also 
emerge from everyday life as "institution-like" objectivisations. Lukacs's treatment of notions is 
rather loose in comparison with the theories described above. By objectivisation he means 
institutionalisation ensuring endurance, set behavioural patterns and their sequences in his 
works. 
 
The clearest wording of Lukacs's basic structure is as follows: "...die Vorwärtsbewegung der 
Gesellschaft allmächlich Objektivationssysteme herausbildet, die zwar eine betonte 
Unabh[ngigkeit vom Alltagsleben besitzen, jedoch mit ihm in ununterbrochenen, stets reicher 
werdenden Wechselbeziehung stehen, so daß wir unser eigenes Alltagsleben ohne solche 
Objektivationen uns garnicht vorstellen konnten." (Lukacs, 1963, p. 78.) In the absence of 
up-to-date conceptual means, however, Lukacs was unable to carry this excellent basic idea 
through the actual structures of today's modern societies. 
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This obscurity can be clearly identified in the category of the systems of objectivisation, or - 
using a different wording - in objectivisations. This concept includes all enduring societal 
formations from money and state to norms. In his later Ontology, when he discussed more 
generally the formations rising above everyday life, he indicates only very obscurely the 
structures of "complexes": "...they are a special area of human activities which can only exist, 
function and reproduce itself if the social division of labour selects a group of specialized 
people who do the work needed as a result of their special disposition in thinking and activities 
with a degree of consciousness." (Lukacs, 1976, Systematic chapters, p. 229.) 
 
The task would be to arrive precisely at the notional elaboration of "special disposition in 
thinking and activities" and the development of structures ensuring them, but Lukacs never gets 
further than noting the separation of these groups of people. 
 
He got nearest to a conceptual elaboration in his Aesthetics, where he described the 
"unification" within the systems of objectivisation, where crystallization processes were taking 
place. "Eine hohere Objektivation kann nur entstehen, wenn alle ihre durch Widerspiegelung 
gewonnenen und bearbeiteten Gegenst[nde, sowie deren Beziehungen eine der Funktion der 
betreffenden Widerspiegelungsart entsprechende Homogeneisierung erfahren." (Lukacs, 1963, 
p. 180.) If instead of reflection we talk about the selection of information within communication 
and about specific information processing according to the central dual paradigms, which have 
become dominant within the systems of institutions separated in this selection, we will come to 
understand that "unification" coincides precisely with what have been described as the features 
of the systems of professional institutions. My analysis, however, does not focus so much on 
"unification" as on the universal dual paradigms controlling it, mainly the structures of 
recruitment, socialization, evaluation and rewarding which make them dominant (Lukacs refers 
to the separation of "groups of people" in this contexts). 
 
Let me now draw attention to the main differences over and above those already discussed 
especially by comparison with Lukacs's Ontology - at least by enumerating them. 
 
1. Lukacs conceives social existence as a sphere of existence on the basis of physical and 
biological existence and he builds the continuity of social existence on the consciousness of 
man (executing teleological itemizations). I, on the other hand, accept Luhmann's concept of 
composition and visualize sociality as taking shape above the psychic systems organized on the 
basis of consciousness. One element of this sociality's resisting further reduction is 
communication and in my investigations I focus my attention on the enduring structures of this. 
 
2. An addition to this is the reduction of the organization of sociality to three system levels 
(interactional, organizational and social) and the emphasis on the differing proportions of 
formation of organizational systems in everyday communications and within the systems of 
professional institutions. 
 
3. To me changeability and flexibility are characteristic features of  the systems of professional 
institutions and it is through the reflux of the products of  the systems of professional 
institutions that rigid everyday communication can to a certain degree assume the capacity of 
reflexion and flexibility. Everyday life, as it were, only shows mobility on a superifical level. On 
close and persistent examination the everyday life of any one person will reveal much more 
regularity and rigidity than at first sight. (Furthermore this has been thoroughly proved by 
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ethnomethodological research; a multitude of self-evidence control our everyday judgements 
and activities with an instinctive rigidity.) At the same time the independent systems of 
professional institutions present structures which institutionalise permanent changeability, e.g. 
modern law is valid until it is declared invalid, state politics is effective until the next elections, 
etc. 
 
4. To describe social development, Lukacs outlined a predominantly linear picture in which 
development created increasingly typical systems (or complexes) of objectivisation from 
everyday life. He alleviates this by noting that on higher levels the possibility of stagnation and 
regression is becoming more and more common. (Lukacs, 1976, Systematic booklets, p. 374.) 
Here, however, analysis is controlled by the meechanisms of variation, selection and those 
stabilizing the one selected in the case of each formation of social evolution. This being 
underlined, the possibility of achieving a higher level of evolution and especially that of 
stabilizing there becomes much more improbable. 
 
5. Another important difference between my approach and Lukacs's is my concentration on the 
structures stabilizing temporal differentiation within the systems o professional institutions. 
Luhmann's analyses of sense ("Sinn") manifested in sociality have made it possible for us to 
localize within the individual systems of professional institutions entities existing factually and 
those existing suspended on the horizon and to identify the structures which allow a sequential 
change from a socially "possible" existence to a factual one together with a continuous renewal 
of the working "media" of these systems (i.e. their system of selection of communication and 
information processing). 
 
6. Another important difference between Lukacs's argument and mine is that he considered the 
independent individual systems of objectivisation as only being separable "mentally and 
methodologically". "At the same time, however, they do not seem to have ontologically precise 
clearly definable limits." (Lukacs, 1976, Systematic chapters, p. 230.) Although from a different 
conceptual background, this recall Parsons' analytical approach to systems from which I have 
already begged to differ. 
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                                               CHAPTER V 
                                   The integration of sociality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As a starting point leet me restate my premises: in complex societies the fabric of sociality is 
reduced to system levels, and on one system level, societal, an internal split takes place between 
the rather diffuse structures of everyday life and the systems of professional institutions 
separated from each other by intermediate spheres of popularization. The question of integration 
and coordination arises on the system level of society partly between the systems of professional 
institutions and partly in the relationship between everyday life and these systems. 
 
First let me have a look at some effective theoretical wordings of the question of social 
integration and coordination and then I will describe my ideas following on from my premises. 
 
 
 
1. The theoretical descriptions of integration and coordination 
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On this level a number of theories have identified the relevant connections from different 
approaches. From among these perhaps the most important is David Lockwood's experiment, 
where he divided up the inter-relations prevailing here into the concepts of social integration 
and systems integration. In contrast to Parsons' earlier societal integration through norms and 
values and to Dahrendorf and John  Rex's criticisms of this theory Lockwood separated the 
problem of social and systems integration. Social integration refers to value and norm conflicts 
and ways to settle them between the individuals, classes and groups of society while systems 
integration covers the disorders of reproduction of institutions and the success achieved in it 
(Lockwood, 1969, pp. 128-129). At a relatively high degree of social integration, when the 
conflicts between classes and groups do not involve major problems, those of systems 
integration might cause society to face chaos. Lockwood has been inspired by Marx's writings to 
separate the two kinds of integration and he thought Marx considered the self-destructive 
dynamism of capitalism as the failure of systems integration (identifying the former with the 
predicted conflict between the forces and relations of production). This idea has been extended 
by Lockwood and he considered systems integration to be endangered by the divergences 
between the institutions of the various spheres of society (Lockwood, 1969, p. 131). Thus, in his 
study Lockwood thematized the integration of the subsystems of society with the concept of 
systems integration. However, societal integration taking place at the level of norms, values and 
identity-developing symbols is an independent problem. 
 
Etzioni's "Active society" (Etzioni, 1975) also concentrrates on this aspect of integration. 
Although in his analyses the mechanisms of cohesion within the units of society play an 
important role (and according to his classification they include the normative and value bonds), 
in his work he focuses on the controllability of society. 
 
When investigating the integration and the capacity of unified action of society as a whole 
Etzioni separated the control mechanisms and consensus-developing institutions and with the 
previous aspect in mind he adds the problem of the controllability of society to that of 
integration. He notes that in modern societies both mechanisms have to be functioning if 
enduring stability is to be spoken of, yet he thinks that while in East European (Socialist) 
societies the under-development of the consensus-forming channels is typical even though the 
institutions of total societal control have been built up very extensively, Western societies have 
produced highly-developed consensus-forming institutions, but the systems of institutions for 
all-societal control is not properly developed. Etzioni's "active society" would bridge the gap 
caused by disproportionate development on both sides: highly-controlled Socialist societies 
should be improved by consensus-developing mechanisms, while in the other half of today's 
world counter therapy is to be applied - control institutions are to be strengthened to be able to 
cope with the unbridled consensus-developing mechanisms (Etzioni, 1975, pp. 30-35). 
 
Etzioni worked out his theory of "active society" in the 60's, the years of optimism for social 
integration and control, when in Eastern Europe it was very difficult to identify any restriction 
whatsoever on the state in its endeavour to develop society - at the end of the period when 
annual industrial growth exceeded 10 per cent. On the other hand, at that time, crisis 
management in various social spheres through government intervention was invariably the 
practice in Western societies. Etzioni then thought the degree of state activity in Western 
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societies was too low and urged an increase in state intervention with a simultaneous 
strengthening of control mechanisms. 
 
Even though he pays tribute to the "active" states and everwhelming capacity of control of East 
European societies, he makes one important distinction between two possible types of state 
control. He distinguishes between prescriptive control (which takes a share in the web of society 
by providing detailed, direct and specific regulations) and another type of control which gives 
only general guidelines to provide a loose definition of contexts. He considers the first type as 
characteristic of East European societies, but thinks that in a true "active" society, which would 
be a combination of today's Socialist and Western societies, only loose control would prevail 
(Etzioni, 1975, p. 138). 
 
In the 70's and 80's a drastic spiritual change took place in the scientific and ideological 
atmosphere of Western societies, where the controllability of society as a whole by the state - a 
premise that had formerly gained general acceptance - was sharply questioned. No influential 
theory today strives to reinforce state control; new theories of society tend to emphasize instead 
the negative traits of society's being organized by the state. However, the separation of the two 
types of control demarcated by Etzioni plays an important role in the intellectual efforts to 
re-evaluate the roles of state and law. It is especially conspicuous in some new trends in 
sociological systems theory. 
 
It must be mentioned here that in the past few years there have also been shifts on the level of 
general system theory, and this is where the new trends in sociological system theory have 
obtained important momentum in order to reconsider their earlier theorems. The conept of 
autopoiesis previously discussed gives the key to understanding rearrangement, which, in the 
investigation of complex biological systems, underlines the great autonomy of the parts of 
systems functioning within the operational framework of a more general system (Maturana, 
1982, p. 24). Over the past few years this concept has penetrated investigations into system-like 
societal formations which has reinforced the statement of greater autonomy of parts of systems 
in society as a whole, thus leading to this autonomy being demanded more emphatically by the 
social scientists supporting this trend. In a recent study a German sociologist of law, G]nther 
Treubner, one of the front-line champions of the trend of autopoiesis made a general criticism of 
the concept of the "open system" prevailing in the entire general system theory saying that this 
concept lays to great an emphasis on the openness and adaptability of the partial systems, and in 
sociology this has enabled the elaboration of such theories of societal control which consider the 
external control of autonomous partial systems through changes in their environment by means 
of the manipulation of the environment of the adaptive system parts. The subsystems of society, 
however, are not so open and adaptable and such external control leads to the destruction of 
their autonomy (Treubner, 1986, p. 2). 
 
In his recently published paper Claus Offe represents a markedly pessimistic stands far as the 
coordination of the subsystems of society are concerned (Offe, 1986). He admits that the 
creation of modern societies has meant the unfolding of the logic of the various subsystems of 
society. As a result of this a multitude of options, possible alternatives of actions are 
continuously created within the subsystems and decisions in the spheres of economics, law, 
public administration, etc. are made through selection - each subsystem following its own 
rationality. Modernity, says Offe, is essentially identical with openness to options. The 
mechanisms of the independent subsystems now institutionalize permanent change, thus 
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replacing the rigid structures of the past which resisted even slow changes in the life of society 
and occasionally blocked their way. Everything changes, everything is changeable. 
 
The latter of course is not Offe's opinion but that of the "optimists of modernization". On an 
all-societal level, he says, the new structure of society is more rigid than it has ever been. 
Society disposes of thousands of alternatives in its subsystems, but the whole, the result of 
summarisation cannot be changed: "... the question arises whether or not all the talk about 
modern society is some kind of incompetent euphemism, and whether we should instead talk 
more precisely about a society which has created many-sided processes in the sectoral growth of 
options and consequently actually disposes of modern public administration and art, modern 
industry and communiccations networks, modern military and educational systems, but not the 
way society as a whole disposes of its options with the powers to dispose of the conglomeration 
of partial modernities." (Offe, 1986.) It is not only that society cannot be changed in its entirity, 
but even the coordination of partial modernities is causing greater and greater problems. The 
speedy and permanent changes in the partial processes within the independent subsystems will 
uncontrollably influence the partial processes of other subsystems, and in a society composed of 
independent subsystems working as instructed by opposing imperatives no complementary 
institutions can be expected develop within other subsystems to process these external effects or 
to neutralize them. In Offe's view chaos is likely to arise from the all-societal summation of the 
subsystems of society. Something has to be done so that the society which has been wrought by 
the summation of partial modernities into a chaotic entity should not be heading for the gaping 
abyss of modernization. We should call a halt, the production of options within the subsystems 
should be reduced, so also the effects and dependences asserting themselves outside the system. 
This is the essence of Offe's zero option, whose two main elements are: 
1. On an international level at the earrliest possible date we should cease international 
technological competition which imposes the pressure of modernization on countries and 
interdependences should be reduced. e.g. membership of the EEC should be resigned, and he 
quotes the positive features of the manpower market in Austria, Sweden, Switzerland or 
Norway (i.e. the negligible unemployment) as an example to prove the advantages of boycotting 
international interdependences. 
2. On a national level the zero-option can be similarly achieved by reducing social 
interdependences. He is brave enough to suggest that some benefits of the welfare society may 
have to be curtailed: "It should not be left unsaid that even the least material, temporal and 
social self-restriction of the actors will lead to some degree of reduction in the services of the 
welfare society and to renouncing performance." (Offe, 1986.) But this is still a reasonable price 
to pay for the advantages offered by the possibility of avoiding the pressures of further 
modernization. 
 
Helmut Willke is not so pessimistic about the all-societal integration of independent subsystems 
(Willke, 1983). When outlining his ideas he starts from the problems created by the state's 
undertaking societal integration. The general and implicit belief in state intervention, which over 
the past fifty years has characterized the practive even of highly developed Western societies, 
did not take seriously the impenetrability developed by the autonomou operation of the 
subsystems of society. As the state became the chief coordinator of the subsystems of society 
and working out remedies to eliminate the tensions arising in any of them interfered with them 
directly, due to partial success this created more disfunctions than there had been tensions to 
ease. 
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In spite of these problems Willke saw hopeful signs of the possible success of developing 
all-societal integration. He noted tendencies in the progress of neo-corporative systems of 
institutions over the past few decades towards direct cooperation between the representatives of 
the rationality aspects of the subsystems of society rather than coordination by a single-centre 
hierarchic state in ensuring all-societal integration. Let us now have a closer look at Willke's 
ideas. 
From the very beginning Willke saw problems in some subsystems of society as being 
orientated by their own rationality aspects and affecting their environment including the other 
subsystems. The increasing clarity of differentiation makes the subsystems indifferent to the 
negative effects on the environment of their optimal decisions motivated by their own rationality 
aspects. Beyond a certain level of complexity mutual indifference even endangers autonomous 
operation. Willke's solution is that both the subsystems and the environment have to be 
thematized. They are considered to include aspects of the subsystems constituting their 
environment by self-reflexion and thus become motivated to renounce some of the options or 
decision alternatives entailing consequences unbearable for their environment, even if justified 
by their own rationalities. The mutual self-restrictions of the subsystems will thus create the 
all-societal integration. 
 
The societal integration brought about by the state is not suitable to make the subsystems 
produce this kind of "reflexive self-restriction". The subsystems' "mutual acquaintance" and the 
resulting self-restriction will determine the location of their institutionalization in the 
newly-arising neo-corporative gremia. While the literature dealing with neo-corporativism 
mostly discusses the activities and compromises of representatives of the upper organs of 
interest as specific forms of materialized political will, as "quasi" political parties, Willke 
considers them to be representatives of the rationality aspects of the subsystems of society who 
do not strive primarily to coordinate conflicting interests, but different rationality aspects. (For a 
traditional approach to neo-corporative institutions see Alemann-Heinze, 1979; von Alemann, 
1981.) Thus societal integration brought about by a hierarchic state will be replaced by 
cooperative integration based on reflexive self-restriction (a voluntary curtailment of rationality 
aspects). This is what Willke calls the "demystification of state". The narrow scope of the 
present study does not make possible a detailed exposition, but it should be indicated that this 
cooperative integration, not carried out by the state, is supplemented by an elaboration of the 
concept of a new kind of legal system, described by Willke's close collaborator, a sociologist of 
law, Gunther Teubner. In place of the instrumental law of hierarchic state control he put the 
concept of "reflexive law" mediating all-societal cooperative integration (Teubner, 1982, 1986; 
Teubner-Willke, 1984). In contrast to instrumental law, which mediates between the material 
regulations and prohibitions of the state controlling the society and the subsystems of society, 
reflexive law would mainly prescribe rules of procedure for the decision centres within the 
different subsystems of society and the regulation of material aspects within the individual 
subsystems would be executed mainly by the conrol centres there. Besides prescribing the rules 
of procedure and guarantee, reflexive law also aims at balancing the unequal positions of the 
decision-makers within those subsystems with organizational representation. 
 
Behind Willke's "demystified state" and Teubner's concept of "reflexive law" there is a premise 
of general system theory which says that if due to the autonomy of its internal elements and their 
disjunction into further subsystems a system achieves a level of complexity, it can no longer be 
controlled from one point and if it is controlled from one angle, it leads to more dysfunctions 
than it solves problems. In such a system it is only possible to further increase complexity by 
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developing self-government in its internal subsystems and making the various centres of 
self-control co-operate. Through this a hierarchic system transforms into a cooperative system. 
Examining high-complexity technological systems the Hungarian, Tibor Vamos, arrived at the 
same result.(See Vamos, 1983, 1986). 
 
Although Willke and Teubner's ideas mostly relate back to Niklas Luhmann's starting points, 
Luhmann does not accept all-societal coordination through a "demystified state" and reflexive 
law. Luhmann does not think that any subsystem should assume control over independent 
rationalities. He carried his argument through in two directions. If there is harmony between the 
rationalities of the subsystems of society within society as a whole, there is actually no need for 
such controlled coordination. This is so because in certain aspects the subsystems become 
"hypersensitive" after becoming independent. Figuratively speaking they thrust out their 
"antennae" into their social environment and through them sense the changes in their 
environment as constituted by the other subsystems, they themselves control their harmony with 
this environment and finally the coordination of the different rationalities takes place in the form 
of spontaneous arrangement. The situation is different, however, if the society as a whole is to 
react to the environment beyond this society. A spontaneous regulation of differentiated society 
cannot react in any other way. But a reaction is necessitated due to the danger of upsetting the 
biological and ecological balance, by genetic engineering and a number of other pressing 
problems. Luhmann simply indicates that in spite of the dangers involved the expectation of 
such reactions are unfounded; trust in the political and state sphere is illusory because the 
specific political code is "to stay in office or to go into opposition", and this subsystem cannot 
be regarded as generally responsible for all-societal rationality (Luhmann, 1986/b). 
 
 
2. The coordination of the systems of professional institutions 
 
 
With theoretical recognition of the delimitation of everyday life and the systems of professional 
institutions Lockwood's distinction between societal integration and systems integration gains a 
special significance. The inter-relationships he called systems integration are interpreted here as 
the mutual coordination of the differentiated systems of professional institutions (whether done 
by themselves or done to them); correlation through the values and norms represented by 
societal integration is mainly realized in the relationships between everyday life and the systems 
of professional institutions. Let us first dwell on the coordination of the systems of professional 
institutions. 
 
From the very beginning I should call attention to an important supposition of mine on the way 
the system/environment relationship is realized between the systems of professional institutions. 
If a system comes into being, i.e. it emerges from a more general area due to differentiation, this 
entails demarcation and the areas beyond the boundaries will be reduced to environment. The 
theoretical problem arising here is whether the whole environment appears uniformly neutral to 
such a system, from which the system absorbs specific information selected according to its 
internal principles of selection, or whether it maintains closer links with certain parts of the 
environment and appears to be especially sensitive to information coming from those parts. 
 
One question which can be raised here is "Do the subsystems of party policy, science, art or 
religion constitute a uniformly neutral environment for the subsystem of state and politics?" 
 
 
71 
Quite evidently, they do not. Although changes in any of them may exercise an effect on how 
state priorities are defined, shifts in party policy (new party platforms, the changes in the 
balance of power between parties, etc.) are directly connected with the changes in the sphere of 
state. This is institutionalized by the foundation on parties of the election of state gremia 
(parliament, government). Likewise the distance of the subsystem of public adminisstration 
from economy, science or art may also be cited. Today, when every detail of the operation of 
public administration is being legally regulated in order to isolate it hermetically from any direct 
political or ideological interference no sign of equality is evident between the effect on public 
administration of changes in the corpus of law and the effectts of the other subsystems in a 
neutral social environment. There is no need for further enumeration of examples, but I cite my 
conclusion concerning the system/environment relationship with respect to the subsystems of 
society. After their differentiation the subsystems of society effect a closer connection with 
certain subsystems, and in these closer connections can be identified not only bilateral ties but 
also chains linking several subsystems. 
 
Later I will attempt to analyse the chain-like attachments of the subsystems of society as chains 
of innovation on a macro-social level, but here it should be sufficient to note that the individual 
subsystems within the chains exclude some of the decision alternatives considered to be 
unacceptable because of current problems they have to face or because they are contradict their 
internal principles of operation. Thus, for example, mention may be made of the subsequent 
ideological selection of arguments in social sciences, the extraction of certain ideological items 
when party platforms are prepared, the selections executed in party programmes at elections of 
organs and functionaries of state, the infiltration into political and state priorities of the legal 
system with the aim of selection and finally of the selective use of the legal corpus by public 
administration and the system of organisation within the establishment - especially if the legal 
corpus changes too quickly. I have described this chain-like attachment of the subsystems of 
society by drafting a model using the method of ideal typology but in my judgement this model 
can better be backed up empirically than the other where some subsystems surround others as an 
exaggeratedly uniform neutral environment and where the changes in the surrounded 
subsystems simultaneously exercise their effects. 
 
In his works Willke does not refer to this way of attachment, and Luhmann very cleary 
expresses his opposition to such a theory. Despite his theoretical decision I have found analyses 
of the problem in Luhmann's recent writings which make allowances for my interpretation 
(bearing in mind, of course, that this interpretation is supported more by empirical evidence). 
Luhmann indicated several times that the delimitation of a system indicates a refusal to receive 
discretionary influences, but an increased sensitivity to certain effects. Let us have a look at 
some wording which presents special clarity: "Differentiation (Ausdifferenzierung) can be 
interpreted in a general sense (with special reference here to the subsystems of society) as the 
integration of structural restriction entailing the consequence that what has been differentiated 
will become independent from discretionary processes and dependent on definite processes. 
Thus differentiation increases both dependence and independence. It may also be said that the 
system is being constructed in such a way that its sensitivity  in a certain area will increase while 
its sensitivity to external discretionary effects will simultaneously decrease." (Luhmann, 1979, 
p. 140.) Luhmann wrote those lines in 1979, when he was still in the midst of adopting the 
concept of "autopoiesis", but he wrote essentially the same in his 1984 volume. Motivated by 
my empirical experience I interpret this in such a way that the definitive aspect of the 
environment, to which the differentiated system has become hyper-sensitive, is not to be found 
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scattered throughout the environment but organized within certain subsystems. For example, the 
sensitivity of the modern legal system to political programmes (to that of the ruling party in 
particular) increases and decreases (though does not cease to exist altogether) to other influences 
exercised in the personality of the judges; the sensitivity of modern ideologies is increasing to 
party political struggles on one hand and to new arguments and theorems created in social 
sciences on the other but at the same time their ability to respond to changes in the spheres of 
religion, theology and art or in journalism, etc. is decreasing. By interpreting the 
system/environment relationships in such a way on the level of the systems of professional 
institutions we can reconstruct chains of innovation between some systems of institutions in 
which changes within one system of institutions will emerge as information for another and as a 
result, in turn induce changes which stimulate other systems of institutions to undergo further 
internal changes. 
 
In West-European societies such a chain of innovation can be identified between the systems of 
institutions of public administration and law, the sphere of law-making, the spheres of state and 
party policy, the ideological sphere and science. 
 
To set up a model within this chain of innovation the parliamentary and other state elections 
institute innovative waves in two directions in as much as there will be a drastic change in the 
goverment party as a result of the elections. (Which is to say that in contrast to the political 
priorities so far prevailing, a party upholding markedly different priorities will become the 
goverment party.) With a change in the ruling party the political and state sphere will be 
renewed and the new government and parliament with its new majority will then change that 
part of the corpus of law which contradicts the new political priorities; it is through such 
changes in law that this trend of renewal will affect public administration which will, after some 
hesitation, "reprogram" its operation and interpretation and inroduces new therapies into the 
different subsystems of society in order to ease the social tensions that caused the change in the 
ruling party. 
 
Parliamentary elections which have brought about such a drastic change in the goverment party 
also start a wave of renewal in another direction. As a rule the former ruling party and all parties 
experiencing a major loss of votes consider the defeat they suffered at the election of the state 
gremia as a challenge, causing them to carry out "self-examination" and undergo regeneration. 
In the majority of cases the ouvoted party politicians and ideologists within that party renew the 
party in question (its general staff, party program, etc.) at internal party elections. Just as a 
modern state has a built-in mechanism of innovation by being based on elections (see Luhmann, 
1965, 1972), so have modern political parties by being based on internal party elections. Of 
course the renewal of parties is possible without suffering a defeat at parliamentary elections but 
as a general rule it is this which forces parties to introduce drastic changes. On the other hand, 
there will always be parties whicch survive even the biggest loss of votes unchanged, but this 
may entail the danger of simply being compelled to leave the political arena and having to 
survive as a small sect with a few thousandtsh of the votes cast. The changes in the sphere of 
party politics will have repercussions in the ideological sphere. Although in the last few decades 
the guards, developers and reshapers of certain ideologies have not been the political parties 
alone (with their party press, refresher courses, brochures, etc.), as was the case in the first 
decade of the present century, the definitive ideological role of the parties is still strong. Party 
renewal urges them to change the theoretical systems they present to the masses: the ideological 
machinery of the renewed party will exclude, reduce or emphasize certain ideological items 
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(arguments, inter-relations, notions, etc.). On the other hand this ideological renewal will open 
up the ideology in question to arguments, inter-dependences and the knowledge recently 
accumulated in social sciences. Some of the thousands of the competing scientific statements 
and arguments - particularly if they are suitable for the defence of the position of one ideology 
or another or for the refutation of opposing ideologies - will be transformed into ideological 
theorems. This, of course, goes together with a special kind of metamorphosis: they will now be 
emphasized, their validity until refutal - by which they have been characterized in the sphere of 
science - will disappear and in the hands of ardents apologists they will become The Truth. The 
same selective take-over and transformed utilization characterizes the changes from ideological 
theorems into party programs, the change of ruling party programs into legal regulations (let us 
now disregard those cases where quite frequently the change into law takes place too directly) 
and the transformation of legal norms into practice in public administration, etc. 
 
To sum up it may be stated that between the above-mentioned subsystems of society a chain of 
innovation may be recognized, within which the waves of renewal are induced by renewal in the 
sphere of state and politics which emits impulses to elicit changes in two directions: the 
periodically recurring parliamentary and other state elections attach a cyclic character to the 
processes of innovation - if the therapy of the new ruling party is unsuccessful a further change 
in the government party will take place at (some of) the subsequent elections. The new party 
programmes promising success in this will be provided precisely by the resultant renewal of the 
parties formerly defeated which takes place as negative feed-back. This macro-societal chain of 
innovations is model-like and follows a pattern of ideal typology; in certain cases even Western 
societies are characterized by changes involving thousands of deadlock situations and 
explosions.  
But the fact that during the approximately forty years since the second world war they have been 
able to stabilize their highly complex structures based on continuous change may perhaps be 
accounted for by the arrangement into chains of the changes in the subsystems of society. 
 
The cyclic chains of innovation between the systems of professional institutions should also be 
analysed in the temporal dimension.In this context the inter-systematic differentiations occur not 
only in the social and material dimensions, but also realize temporal differentiations. This can 
be seen very clearly between the areas of state politics temporal differentiation is represented by 
state politics embodied in the ruling party, which actually operates, and the coexistence of party 
policies elaborated and suspended on the horizon as alternatives which may intervene 
periodically through the parliamentary election procedures and subsequently become actually 
existing state policy. Off-set in time the complexity of the political and state sphere may 
increase and this complexity becomes even greater as this factually existing duality also operates 
within certain political parties. ┬esides the official management and programme of a party in 
any period, also present are the platforms of minority parties and the minority party factions 
supporting them and these may later develop into official party programmes at periodically 
recurring party congresses and at the elections of the general party staffs. ╞or operating state 
policy the official party programmes of opposition parties also exist as alternatives, but they 
themselves are factually extant in opposition to the minority alternative party programmes 
within the party. 
 
Thus the entire complexity of the political subsystem is organized in a temporally differentiated 
chain. Thus the production of variables offering an assortment of alternatives to government 
policy in operation takes place in opposition parties and, within them, in the minority party 
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factions, temporally differentiated into two phases. 
 
Upholding this approach to the harmony between the systems of institutions exposes the 
shortcomings of a number of theories. In the light of the inter-relations presented Claus Offe's 
idea of the disintegration of subsystems seems to be one-sided. The production of options in 
individual subsystems cannot be identified simply with complete independence but from certain 
aspects development of options within certain subsystems takes place by adopting modified 
options developed in other subsystems, and as we have seen the flow of information and options 
between the subsystems is carried out in easily identifiable chains. 
 
To me, Willke's intermediary concept seems to be more realistic but his reliance on the 
self-restriction of the subsystems of society appears to be one-sided. Self-restriction by virtue of 
the social  environment does exist in the activities and choices of alternatives within the 
subsystems but in my opinion, more important than that is the subsequent selection of 
alternatives, choices of options and decisions elaborated in connected subsystems of society. ╔f 
we come to regard this as fundamental in the coordination of the subsystems' rationalities 
attention is at least in part diverted from the increase in self-restriction to the mechanism which 
connect the subsystems in such a way that the options worked out in one will be transferred into 
another subsystem without a subsequent selection carried out by the other according to its own 
logic. The analysis of reduction in these mechanisms thus becomes important theoretically. 
 
This is the case, for instance, when political priorities become legal regulations through the 
instrumental subjection of the legal system, regardless of the intrinsic logic, stable categories 
and basic institutions of the system of law. 
 
In a functionally differentiated society, however, this is not the situation in a majority of cases. 
Every subsystem of society develops internal mechanisms of selection which make it insensitive 
to some of the option flowing in from the connected subsystems. They sift the options whilst 
absorbing some of them, changing one way or another their internal structure and the priorities 
of their action. This can clearly be seen in the relationship between science and the sphere of 
ideology. ╔deologies mostly draw on science for their arguments, theorems and categories and 
as they aim predominantly at giving a systematic picture of social reality, they can rely primarily 
on social sciences. However, ideologies always remain insensitive to some of the newly-arising 
scientific concepts, arguments and inter-relations. They are always blocked in certain directions 
because of the internal categories they have developed, their taking sides with the interests of 
major groups or layers of society, the short-term strategies of political struggle and the amount 
of tension present at any one time. A large proportion of scientific arguments and scientifically 
possible answers is discarded as "dry-as-dust" scholarly views; especially radical ideologies 
reject them as revealing the "machinations" of the social group opposing them. ╚owever, the 
majority of the undiscarded scientific statements will be incorporated in ideological arguments 
and theorems and will lead to the development of the existing systems of premise. 
 
Similarly, most of the alternatives elaborated in the scientific and technical sphere will be 
eliminated due to its orientation towards production according to the rentability aspects of 
production. In the same way, when science links up with the educational subsystem, scientific 
truths will undergo a thorough selection until they get settled into the subject matter of  
instruction meant for systematic teaching. ╔t we follow this line, it is evident that some of the 
ideological arguments will never be adopted by the programmes of parties working under the 
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pressures of everyday political struggle, the majority of party policies will never become 
government policy and however much politics may in many cases subjugate the law, there is 
always subsequent selection where some politically possible decisions thought to be necessary 
by the ruling party will never pass through the sieve of the system of law. 
 
Thus besides Willke's concept of self-restriction ╔ emphasize subsequent selection. In the case 
of two conflicting principles (when it is possible to interfere with societal structure with a 
conscious decision) ╔ would give preference to subsequent selection: within the subsystems 
activities should, as much as possible, develop orientated by the intrinsic value aspects of the 
sphere in question and should create the widest possible circle of scientifically and economically 
possible and politically possible and necessary, etc. options. In the attached societal subsystems 
the freedom of mechanisms ensuring the possibility of subsequent selection should be increased. 
 
 
 
3. The integration of everyday life and the systems of 
   professional institutions 
 
 
The systems of professional institutions have developed structures independent from the diffuse 
structures of everyday life, which provide specific communications (the production of 
alternatives, processing of information) with in them, but above and beyond the ties between 
then previously outlined they have interdependences with the communication structures of 
everyday life. ╔ have already mentioned the transfer of specific communication products in a 
transformed and popularized from through intermediary spheres serving precisely this purpose. 
This can be interpreted as an increase in the cognitive potential, reflexive capacity and discourse 
rationality of everyday communication, or - in another thematization - as a "perfection of the 
manipulation" of everyday life, the "colonization" of life world. 
 
The transformation of science for everyday life is partly executed by the educational sphere, 
which consists of levels built up over several phases. In the progression from the university 
level towards the lower levels of education, from these competitive, mostly unsystematic 
scientific statements which are valid until refutation, this transformation develops increasingly 
documented, repeatedly systematized closed systems of knowledge reduced to single items of 
truths which show a growing tendency towards providing the participants in lower level 
education with undisputable information by excluding the confusing facts which lead to doubts. 
If, as a rule, the sphere of education transforms scientific knowledge for new generations, the 
products of mass media including journalism will provide the same transformation beyond 
school age, although the mass education of adults and refresher courses of the last few decades 
may render this conclusion rather relative. Finally the ideological sphere, which also has 
connections with party policy and the sphere of state, undergoes such transformation and 
popularization towards the communication of everyday life. 
 
This is to say that the connection between science and everyday life is established an several 
levels but conversely it also means that the various channels and grades may be obstructed, there 
may be shorter or longer interruptions in mediation and consequently detachments and 
disintegration. In order to ensure this mediation is undisturbed, the mechanisms responsible for 
following and transforming new scientific results must be functioning well on the educational 
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levels and there should be forces within mass communication and ideology encouraging 
innovation. An extreme example of such disturbance is if a totalitarian ideology terminates all 
rival ideologies with the help of state power and puts both the mass media and the subject 
matter of instruction under direct ideological control. Even without this, partial blocking may 
occur in some mediating spheres. ┼.g. if the university sphere is completely withdrawn from 
within the logic of market and the rivalry and mobility between universities are reduced even 
further first the university sphere, then science and the attached lower-level educational sphere 
will become more and more detached from the "borders of knowledge". 
 
The same intermediary spheres in part make the transformations and selections for the 
communication of everyday life in the field of art as in the case of science, but here, perhaps 
formalized education plays a more subordinate role in mass communications than the areas of 
popularization and entertainment. On the other hand, in the field of art the group of 
connoisseurs with their specialized knowledge rises above everyday communication. The 
specific products of art do not have to be simplified through popularization for this group to 
understand them - they socialize the rules of their creation and evaluation (just as their 
categories and distinctions) in the way creative artist communities do. ╔n the propagation of 
new approaches, categories, etc. this specialized audience may also play a role. ╚ere, too, 
disintegration may arise due to mediations being blocked and nuddled, which may lead to a 
sect-like existence of the specialized artist communities. The disadvantages of this for everyday 
life are evide 
nt, but the sect-like artist communities may also suffer from a dwindling of their recruitment 
base and in time incidental external factors may account for their replacement. 
 
In the increasingly complex sphere of production also, a mediating sphere towards everyday life 
had to be developed for the thousands of products and services of its system of institutions. If 
the same market logic organizes this system of institutions, its harsh binary code enables the 
man-in-the-street and the communications within the systems of institutions to make direct 
evaluations. Being price-oriented he can pass judgement on the products of this sphere with 
more confidence than on the specific products created by the binary code of science or art for 
example. However, above a certain complexity the system of institutions of the production 
sphere and everyday life would not be able to unite without the sphere of publicity and the 
resultant orientation by market hierarchies. That part of the sphere of art which can do without 
large amounts of material may continue to exist for a time even if it cuts itself off from the 
world, but for the sphere of production this problem signifies the immediate beginning of a 
decline. 
 
When discussing the forms of integration between the communications of the systems of 
professional institutions and those of everyday life mention should be made of the role of 
market and, generally, the system of institutions of market rationality. If in a system of 
professional institutions it becomes possible to harmonize the recruitement/socialization/reward 
structure organized around its central binary code with those structures which evaluate 
according to a specific market built up within the given 
sphere (university market, market of art objects, sports market, etc.), this ensures its 
simultaneous feed-back to everyday life. Market, as it were, always bears a reference to the 
community. I think I should mention here my supposition that if market evaluation joins the 
intrinsic evaluation structure of a system of professional institutions (and the more it does so), 
the more the extension of the spheres of mediation, introduction, publicity and popularization 
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will proceed from the area of the specially organized system of professional institutions towards 
everyday life. This inter-relation is valid in reverse - with reservation. 
 
Besides this connection between the individual systems of institutions and everyday life the role 
of everyday life in the ethical and moral integration of society as a whole is also important. As 
we have seen, Lockwood's category of societal integration contrasted with system integration 
thematizes this and Habermas's "life world" puts this aspects of everyday life in the focus. 
 
We should agree with Habermas when he says that all normal operations of the systems of 
professional institutions are preconditioned by the large-scale socialization of the universal 
moral values reproduced in society as a whole and their self-assertion in communication 
selections. The only problem in his discussions is that he quite rigidly excludes the moral values 
and the resultant forms of solidarity from the systems of professional institutions. 
 
By contrast Richard Münch is perfectly right when he identifies the institutionalization of 
universal moral values in the exchange of goods, and in professional science just as in the 
political sphere, for instance, the large-scale provision of scientific priority, the avoidance of the 
falsification of facts, etc. - the basic preconditions for the normal operation of science - could 
not exist if the general moral norms didn't function. Science based on moral norms recreates 
their predominance (sanctioning the failure to observe them) in the same way as happens in 
everyday life, although at a different level of specificity. The specific communications of the 
system of professional institutions forms part of societal practice in the same way as the rather 
diffuse communications of everyday life and the latter is not to be assigned a prominent position 
in the reproduction of moral values. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(A tudomány fejezet hiányzik!!!) 
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When laying the theoretical foundations I have given a general outline of the system of political 
institutions. In view of the bounds of the central universal dual paradigm prevalent in the 
competitive political systems, I feel tempted to delineate the borders of the system of political 
institutions more narrowly than generally conceived. The dichotomy "taking office"/"going into 
opposition" determines the activities and decisions of the participants of professional politics 
with binary asperity. The "state" as a formation at the level of organizationial systems makes 
this binary structure organizationally very marked by the precise demarcation of the fields of 
activity of ruling parties and opposition parties or political forces throughout all time. On the 
other hand, the organizational system of the state embraces areas independent of the political 
systems proper - this is the situation with the sphere of public administration. This entails no 
problem in as much as following a nominal union  the ruling party allows its politicians only 
strictly controlled access to the determination of the organs of public administration and 
preconditions this upon the mediation of the corpus of law.  
 
Questions of theoretical interest emerge if the "youthfulness" of the existence of the competitive 
political systems is emphasized from a historical perspective. In this case the enduring 
institutionalisation of a specific central dual paradigm has only become marked since the last 
century, as compared to the several centuries' (or going back to the beginnings of the 
Greco-Roman period, several thousands of years') development of science or law, for instance. 
It was English social development that created a system of devices for parliamentarism which in 
turn provided a framework for competitive political logic from the late 1600s for the following 
one and a half centuries. At the Western edge of the Continent it started to take root in the 
mid-1800s and gradually strengthened. By the post-World War I years it had become the 
dominant political structure in most of Europe and remained so for a short period of history. But 
even after that periods of fascism and Stalinism were needed to prevent dictatorial ideas and 
movements which wished to do away with parliamentarism from attracting millions of people 
(See: Beyme, 1973, pp. 46-48). The stable operation of the competitive systems o political 
institutions is the product of the last fifty years even in the majority of Western Europe. This 
also means that in the shaping of the internal mechanisms of the political sphere and in the 
drawing up of the lines of demarcation in respect of the external connections of the political 
sphere the definitive power of the "government/opposition" dual can only assert itself 
insufficiently  in many cases. However, I think that trends of development can be identified both 
in the internal structural composition of politics and in the change taking place in the 
interrelation between politics and the logic of other areas, which can be grasped as a 
consequence of the newly-assumed dominant role of the central dual paradigm. In order to get 
down to this, let me first analyse the tendencies of change with in the political parties, then the 
separation tendencies of politics proper and ideology and finally the devices responsible for both 
the separation and union of politics and public administration. 
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1. Competition and the stabilization of state power 
 
 
 
 
Before discussing in detail the assumption of power by competitive market rationality and its 
structural consequences, let me analyse a more elementary structural change of the political and 
state sphere, within which the binary logic assumed its dominant role. 
 
When dwelling on this problem, let me recall - as a starting point - a phenomenon observed by 
Max Weber early this century, the characteristic separation and the interdependence of those 
engaged in public administration and the strata of politicans. "Simultaneously with the 
assumption of power by a host of trained officcers the figure of the 'political-in-control' emerged 
- although with less palpable intermediary stages ... The class of civil servants had to be divided 
up into two visibly though not organically independent categories, those of 'officers' specialized 
in certain areas and of 'political clerks'. Externally 'political officers' in the strictest sense of the 
word can be recognized by the fact that they can be transferred, dismissed or put on the 
unattached list at any time ..." (Weber, 1956). With this Weber actually described the "splitting 
of the state into two," but this basic idea can be developed in very different directions. ith the 
help of a rather complex set of motions included in the systems theory I have treated the facts 
highlighted by Weber as a kind of supra-state differentiation on the system level of the society, 
implementing the development of systems of organizations, as the separation of the subsystems 
of political and the public administration. How I wish to emphasize the change in the 
stabilization of state power caused by this separation. 
 
In short this can be rotated thus; that with this a type of state power "whose head could be struck 
off" could be institutionalized of the group of politicians representing the summit of state power 
can be removed without destroying the operation of the state machinery, and the group of new 
political leaders can always reprogram the public administration which in practice implements 
the political platforms. 
 
The system of parliamentary devices provides the conditions for the functioning of state power 
stabilized in its divided state: an abstract framework of the law of constitution provides a 
permanent structure for the exercise of power, another condition being the continuity of public 
administration carried out by specialized professionals. At periodically recurring elections the 
ruling party, which has acquired a majority and is to set a program for state power, attaches 
itself to those components while the programs and professional politicians of the minority 
opposition parties will remain "suspended on the horizon". Those political programs and the 
politicians representing them waiting "suspended on the horizon" have important functions even 
in this position. Although they do not participate in Government Offices and other organs of 
public administration, by maintaining seats in parliament they can look closely at the everyday 
activities of ministries through their standing- or investigation committees. Hence they become 
socialized as shadow cabinets "combat-ready" in parliament - at the same time, as a means of 
preventive control, they deter the government in office from abusing the constitutional order and 
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reveal corrupt practices as and where they exist. (Let me add in brackets that in spite of 
everything a lot of corruption and interpenetration can be observed in the everyday.) 
 
This system of devices in parliamentarianism enables a formalized connection between the 
elements of divided state power, but they can also be flexibly disconnected through a change in 
the ruling party. Even more important and, history shows, even more difficult to realize is that 
the machinery of public administration carrying out its activities continuously and in parallel 
should get further and further away from practicing politics directly. The depoliticized public 
administration should be exposed to extensive legal regulation and automatisms set up, making 
the machinery relatively easy to reprogram. A "split up but stabilized" state power only really 
gets established, if the depoliticising and legal reprogramability of public administration reaches 
a certain level. From then on there is every chance that even after a drastic change in the ruling 
party a continuously-operating public administration will really follow the legal programs that 
are to put the new political priorities into practice. To give a striking example, let us imagine an 
efficient army led by a corps of professional generals, a body of professional officers with the 
Minister of Defence in perpetuity above them. A government crisis may sweep him off the 
scene every couple of months, yet in reality he should be able to control the corps of 
professional generals and their ideas concerning the development of the army. After some 
drastic change in government the defence policies of the new government may be diametrically 
opposed to previous practice, and the new Minister of Defence has to reshape the strategic 
considerations of the grim soldiers, as if they were merely a joke. We know that it is not easy, 
and if governments are frequently reshuffled or the holders of important portfolios change too 
often, the situation gives less opportunity to the new Minister to control the power-enforcement 
machinery, for the matter, or other organs of power (20). This is what happened, for example, in 
France which brought superparliamentarism into being at the end of the last century, where the 
actual political control over public administration was mostly transferred from the hands of the 
ministers into the hands of the leaders of the parliamentary standing committees whose personal 
composition proved to be more stable (See: Loevenstein, 1963, pp. 125-128). However, if such 
extreme situations - the too frequent government crises - can be avoided by the political 
administration, the control of the state politicians and a consolidated reprogramming of the 
machinery of public administration can be achieved in the daily operations of the state power. 
 
An important effect of this is that in spite of the changes in the summit of state power the 
continuous operation of the machinery of public administration becomes possible. This is 
because any kind of opposition shown by a repoliticized public administration after the change 
in the summit of state power for political reasons, would make the sifting of the upper portions 
of the machinery of public administration a necessity for the new government politicians, just as 
the establishment of a public administration based on views close to theirs. However, this means 
that after each change in the government a politically motivated shifting should be carried out 
before the new  government program is to be put into practice, or at least the new upper 
bureaucracy should be given some time for learning. ╔f a government like this can stay in office 
for a considerable time, no systemic problem might occur, but if a few years later a new radical 
government should replace the former one, the new government politicians would liquidate the 
higher bureaucracy again and everything would e started all over again. 
 
It is perfectly evident that such a situation would make the institutions of the "split-up" state 
power useless, so in the Western political systems the machinery of public administration 
remains unaffected as a rule, apart from sporadic exceptions after a government reshuffle. In 
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these societies a legal reprogramability and at least partial political neutralization can be 
observed. 
 
his arrangement in the state power takes a very heavy burden off the shoulders of the countries 
of parliamentarianism. This burden can be observed in the East-European societies very well, 
and in contrast to it a successful evolutionary achievement of parliamentarianism can be 
exposed. In the East-European societies the stabilization of state power took place in an entirely 
different way from Western parliamentarianism. In East Europe the stabilization of power takes 
place around a summit of state power strictly determined from a personal point of view, in the 
focus of which an intertwined state and party leadership is to be found. If we observe the 
East-European changes so far, after the party leader representing the supreme power has been 
relieved of his office, we can see that enduring stability can only be established in this 
organization of power if there is an undisputed hierarchy of power between the supreme leader 
and the body of minor leaders. This power summit continues to build up - because it has to do 
so - a chain of personal loyalty in the upper regions of the machinery of enforcement and the 
state and party establishment, and following the sifting procedures up there the selection 
according to loyalty downwards, until at last in all the positions allowing any degree of decision 
of power a personal loyalty to the highest summit of power has been developed. This is when 
the power structure has achieved its state of equilibrium, or in other words, with this the 
political system has managed to stabilize itself. 
 
In the East-European societies the state is known to have assumed a great role in the 
organization of the activities of society, and above a level of development it is able to play this 
role only in an organization deeply articulated both horizontally and vertically. This led to the 
creation of several steps on the ladder of positions allowing decisions of power in the last few 
decades in this area just as in the Western political systems. The greatest problem in this now 
complex system of organization is presented by the change of the person of the highest party 
leader on the summit of power, which does happen after a time for biological reasons, if nothing 
else. This is where the vulnerability and problematic stability of these systems show. The 
highest-ranking new leader's taking office suddenly upsets the equilibrium formerly established, 
especially if he wishes to break away drastically from the political priorities of his predecessor 
or the new conditions force him to do so. Here, however, there is no easily reprogrammable and 
politically neutralized administration available, but one where the earlier leadership had 
performed personal selection quite down to the lowest levels. This structure could be 
represented by a pyramid upside down with the greatest plasticity, which is kept in equilirium 
by the highest-ranking leader and a successful running of the earlier chain of sifting and loyalty 
towards him. With the change of the leader the stability of the whole structure will be upset and 
under the pressure of the stabilization logic of the system the new leader on the top is forced to 
initiate a new chain of sifting to support his own person - and his possible new political 
priorities. He may be sifted at any time, if he proves unable to develop an undisputed hierarchy 
between himself and the members of the body of the lower-ranking leaders, so this makes 
selection a necessity for him as a first step on this level. If he is able to achieve it, the 
participants of the stable summit of power thus arising will sift furthermore the ministers, state 
secretaries, regional state and party leaders in their area, while they in turn will continue the 
sifting downwards on the ladder of hierarchy. After a change of power at the highest summit the 
stabilization logic of th system will raise the development of a new stability, a new monolithic 
structure above all other tasks. All other tasks will receive atention only in subordination to this. 
After this chain of sifting from the aspect of power has been completed successfully and the 
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system has become stabilized, on the basis of established stability pluralistic groups of power 
"tolerant" of each other may be formed again, accompanied by alternative programs, which are 
upheld by certain section of the articulated establishment - and are partially publicized in press 
debates - only to be forwarded towards the highest summit of power, which  performs selection 
among the priorities and alternatives and as a "motionless prime mover" yields the helm partly 
or completely to one group of politicians or another. On the strength of the historical experience 
of the last 40 years, however, such steadfast stability and latent plurality are highly unlikely in 
the East-European political systems. The countries besides Hungary have been able to achieve 
this only to a limited extent. 
 
The parliamentary systems in Western societies stable in their cleavage and complete with their 
ever-changeable summits of power could happily avoid this burden entailed by the change in the 
last few decades. The institutions of the political subsystem allowing a consolidated coexistence 
of government and opposition are embedded in this background. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Binary logic and party development 
 
 
 
 
 
The objective of my investigations does not make a detailed reconstruction of modern party 
development necessary. I would only like to point out a few tendencies of development which 
can be grasped as the consequences of the logic of competitive political systems. As a guiding 
principle the much-analysed process should be kept in view where under the pressure of the 
market logic a modern sphere of production orientated by the signalling systems of formal 
economies organized by the mere notif of profit (stock exchange, marketing, hierarchies of 
brand-marks, etc. (21) Was formed from the production striving to make fixed products with 
means fixed by generations in the course of centuries. That is important here for us is the 
shaking off of all shackles of content, indifference from all sides, but hypersensitivity from one 
aspect: the complex system of the institutions of production orientated on the signalling system 
of the market is extremely sensitive to any event involving a change in the offer or demand 
(Luhmann, 1983. For the analysis of the effects of government/opposition see the most recent 
study of Luhmann 1989) 
 
A development of two directions is seen to have taken place in the highly developed Western 
societies in the last century - as a result of the competition between political forces and 
organizations within the political systems: I consider the loss of content forced out by the binary 
logic of government/opposition analysable primarily on the level of political parties, but as a 
completely new development in the Western political systems, new levels of decision appeared 
to decide issues of content besides the party systems, which have lost their content and adjusted 
themselves to mere competition. What I am hinting at is neocorporativism and deciding on 
certain questions at direct referenda, which have become increasingly important in Western 
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societies in the past few decades. 
 
 
 
 
The loosening of content constraints for political parties 
 
 
 
 
Three stages of development can be distinguished in the modern political development of 
parties, in the course of which political articulation formerly rooted in diffuse social embedment 
has come to the surface. In the wake of analyses by Max eber, Robert Michels and Moisei 
Ostrogorsky the great change that took place round the turn of the century has become 
well-known, i.E. The change from the former "gentleman politicians' parties" (Honoratior 
parties) into organized mass parties (See: Weber, 1956, Michels, 1925, Ostrogorsky, 1902). 
Here I would like to lay the emphasis on another aspect of the change: on the break-away of 
political articulation directly embedded in communication praxis of the intelligentsia, its spread 
to the other layers and classes of the whole society and the foundation of political articulation on 
ideological mediation. The following turning-point of party development is seen to have arisen 
in the years following World War II, one of the frequently emphasized superficial sign of which 
being the tendency of the former ideologically motivated parties of classes transforming into 
"people's" parties. 
 
In the aspect of investigation, which is in the focus of my attention, this appears as the 
crystallization of the binary rationality of competitive political logic. Let us look in this matter at 
depth. 
 
a., "Honoratior" parties. The forms crystallized in the development of the English 
parliamentary system and parties has appeared in the Western part of the Continent by the 
middle of the last century. At that time political articulation, which had gradually been taking 
shape, was present in the circles of the educated bourgeoisie and land-owners. Both in the 
respect of their politicians and communication channels, the political parties patterned after 
English moddels were embedded in the communication of the general intellectual layers and the 
educated landed proprietors. 
 
At that time political parties were only very loose communities of principles. Basically they 
were organized in Parliament as ad hoc concentrations of representatives with identical views, 
which showed enduring unity only under the leadership of charismatic personalities. The 
external connections of parliamentary party formations were constituted by press organs with 
columnists and regular readers clustering around them and forming a steady basis of parties 
(Habermas, 1962, pp. 245-250). From the point of view of our theme, however, it is important 
to underlike that the MPs of all times were primarily priests, jurists, landowners, etc., And they 
got into parliament relying on their friends' or their own wealth or rhetorical capacities, where 
they established parties. This also meant that at that time there were no independent political 
platforms suspended above the general professional communication, there was no layer of 
politicians motivated by specific considerations distinct from the rather diffuse intellectual 
communication praxis. A member of parliamenty was a "gentleman" in the first place, whose 
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motives and principles had been socialized for life, and for him the relevant reference group was 
not constituted by the voters but by those following a similar ideal of life in the same layer. If 
we compare the "honoratior" type of politician to the politicians of later stages, it may be stated 
that this type was motivated by a diffuse, direct and fixed corpus of experience and system of 
incentives. They were diffuse because the politician was motivated by ethical, moral, political, 
national and economic considerations in inseparable unity; they were direct because the 
processing of his experiences had not yet been generalized into comprehensive ideological 
systems of theorems and he had a direct approach to his daily political decisions relying on his 
education he received in his country mansion or schools using the premises he acquired; and 
finally they were fixed because after the politician had assumed his basic premises, judgements 
and patterns of decision at a young age, nothing ever could estrange him from this conviction in 
his life. 
 
b., Organized mass parties. The type of parties described above was gradually destroyed by  
the age of organized mass parties, which became dominant from he turn of the century onwards. 
From our point of view the separation of political communication from the general professional 
communication is important here. Two things should be underlined: after being torn out of his 
embedment in his immediate environment the "gentleman politician" was attached to the staffs 
of the centralized parties, which got under the pressure of party competition more and more 
leaving behind other diffuse motivations. Another big change was represented by the foundation 
of political articulation on generalized and methodized systems of ideological theorems. 
 
This change was primarily initiated by the newly arising Labour arties but following their 
success the traditional "Honoratior" parties were also forced to transform their structures into 
well-organized machineries through the mediation of competition (Habermas, 1962, p. 235) 
 
Besides the trend of development showing the assumption of power by binary logic the attention 
should be called to a characteristic "by-product"", which entailed development in the opposite 
direction for quite some time from the beginning of the century. The non-political activities of 
the organized mass parties are meant here, which were typical of the Europeans parties for a few 
decades. While the mass parties helped the diffuse everyday communication to proceed  towards 
specific political utterances (as regards topics, ways of argumentation and motivations), they 
tried to attract the big massses flooding the area of politics as a result of enfranchisement (22) 
primarily with non-political activities. In the great masses of people no political opinions had 
been shaped as yet, and although the popular party press started hammering in the stands 
developed in the staffs of the mass parties, it was only the votes of the masses there was a need 
for at the elections. In order to gain them, non-political organizing activities and services started 
and proliferated in party circles meant to attract the votes of those attached to the parties. As 
described by Robert Michels, early this century the mass parties escorted their members from 
the cradle to the grave with their sick-relief funds, child care and burial benefits (Michels, 1925, 
p. 383). However, with the establishment of government social policies since the 30s, this 
tendency "anti-formal" from the viewpoint of the binary dichotomy quickly ceased to exist. 
 
c., Competitive popular parties. In the years following the 2nd World War this tendency of 
multi-directional change can be identified in the Western political systems, the nucleus of which 
is constituted by the change in the nature of political parties. The change most analysts found 
conspicuous was the detachment of the formerly class-oriented parties from their basis and the 
development of political platforms which were likely to attract members and voters from the 
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whole society, or at least most layers (See:Mintzel 1984; Habermas, 1962 p. 250). Besides the 
efforts to develop mass support, another characteristic shift from the formerly class-oriented 
parties was the slackening of firm ideological affiliations. This in itself is the resultant of several 
lines of development. Incidentally, the attention should be called  to the sphere of mass 
communication, which had become unfolded by then, the appearance of the colourful world of 
the mass press not attached directly to any party ousting the former closed-up party press, party 
meetings and refresher party schools or seminaries. This change, which meant the elevation of 
inellectual standards at the same time, made the continuous observation and evaluation of the 
political events possible for the greater masses, which could now discard the former ideological 
theorems hammered in their mind. This way of processing information is incompatible with the 
rigidity of the theorems of closed ideological platforms. With this the ideologies did not, of 
course, "die out", as Daniel Bell stated in the late 50s, but came to be borne by more flexible 
carriers, which corresponds to the tendency of competing political parties becoming mass 
parties. 
 
Another reason for the disappearance of closed-up political platforms may be the shocking 
political experience of the dictatorships between the two world wars. Hardly had the 
parliamentary systems got stabilized all over Europe after the 1st World War, the social tensions 
attracteed masses of millions to the side of the platforms aiming at sweeping away the 
establishment, and either through the elections, as in Germany, or utilizing the weakness of the 
shaky state power, as in Italy these ideological views and the corresponding parties assumed 
power. The disclosure of the horrible acts of Stalinism following the late 40s also exercised an 
effect of the quick destruction of principles and parties questioning the judiciousness of the 
parliamentary system. So the existing establishment had no ideological alternative with mass 
support behind it and the ideological premises embodied by the functioning institutions failed to 
receive any additional emphasis later. So in the Western societies the explicit struggles of 
tableau-like closed-up ideologies were mostly relegated into the background from the 50s 
onwards. Behind the concrete historical reasons entailing the transformation into popular parties 
and the slackening of ideological affiliations, however, the power of enforcement of the internal 
interrelation of a competitive party system shouldd also be identified. Going back to what has 
been said about the evolutionary mechanisms, the variations thus arising coincided with the 
development trends of competitive party logic and those parties were selected to become 
dominant parties in the West European societies in the 50s, which showed more readiness to 
obey the necessity dictated by competition, that is to say, they started to orientate themselves 
increasingly according to the formal attraction of votes and were able to push back the more 
formalized class programs and ideological commitments hindering it, successfully. To my mind 
this is the idea supported by the German Social Democratic Party breaking away from its earlier 
character of a class party in 1959 and similarly, the same competitive logic seems to prevail 
behind the partially aborted idea of "Eurocommunism" upheld by Western Communist Parties. 
 
The decrease of the importance of party membership can also befitted in this tendency. The dual 
category "staying in power/going in opposition" exercising its effect with binary toughness does 
no shift today's parties according to how many members they have, but quite independently 
from this, according to the number of ballots they are able to achieve. As early as the beginning 
of the 60s Habermas wrote "... It is advantageous for a party if it has not any memers at all but 
revives for the period of elections with the help of the centralized manoeuvring capacity of an 
advertising agency, with the sole purpose of carrying out a publicity campaign." (Habermas, 
1962, p. 250). This statement is, of course, exaggerated in as much as a certain volume o 
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membership is important from the point of view of the recruitment of the professional 
politicians of a party as a basis of recruitment, but undoubtedly an excessively great party 
membership stands in the way of the party staffs orientated by the pressure of competitive logic 
quite often as a crushing burden. Thus competitive logic exercises its effect to promote the 
cleavage of the professional politicians and the less changeable membership of the parties. (I 
will devote some more attention to this in connection with the structural separation of parties 
and movements.) 
 
The exclusiveness of restructuralization for competition has been increased by the method of 
parties being financed from government budget in the past few decades. This trend took shape 
in the German Federal Republic in the 1967 Party Act, but also in Austria and Italy 
contributions to the financing of the election campaigns of parties were introduced, with a view 
to provide them after the elections. Even if the budgetary contributions do not mean the 
complete financing of the parties, they tend to increase the motivation of parties to concentrate 
merely on attracting votes as mentioned above. According to the 1967 regulations every 
political party got 2.5 Marks for each vote it received, but to the best of my knowledge this sum 
has been raised several times since then. In this way a too intimate attachment to certain interest 
groups (because financial support received from them) may decrease and the acceptance of the 
demands of societies of shared interest does not depend on their financial strength, but on the 
number of associated votes. So the logic of the political market is not distorted by the mediating 
role of money so much, as before the appearance of government financing. The recent 
Flick-affair and a series of other party financing scandals exercise a pressure to achieve the 
financing of the parties being covered from government budget. (On the question of party 
financing see Wolfgang Hoffmann, 1973.) 
 
The binary logic outlined above cannot be identified as being of equal intensity in the different 
Western countries for each individual party. In the case of the parties having the chance of 
becoming ruling parties and attracting a great number of votes restructualization for competition 
and a flexible change of party programs to meet mass priorities exposed in public opinion polls 
can be grasped in their clearest forms. Just as the market logic may expose orientation and 
motivation towards the marketing mechanisms indicating the shifts in offer and demand and 
towards the aspects of rentability assuming a dominant position, the tendency of the special 
binary dichotomy of politics taking power can also be observed in the century-long process of 
deelopment of political parties. To compensate for the emptiness of content thus arising on the 
level of parties, decision levels of correction were set up in the complex Western political 
systems, as I have already mentioned. Now let me discuss these in detail. 
 
 
Political federations and neo-corporationalism 
 
A parallel organizational level of political articulation is represented in the complex Western 
political systems by the organisations of interest groups besides the political parties. These 
organs went through changes of character and function in the last one and a half centuries 
especially in Germany and the areas east of it, where it was a frequent occurence that they had 
been transformed from feudalistic guild societies into political federations of joint interests by 
the late 19th century (Jürgen Weber, 1977, pp. 14-22). Even today several areas of their 
activities can be distinguished and it is only in the case of summit organs representing national 
interests that the upholding of political interests towards the government's decision mechanism 
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means a dominant for of activity. These organs are more embedded in and committed to the 
sphere of certain activities and the associated problems of content than the political parties. The 
summit organs representing shared interests depend on the association of their members 
pursuing their activities on a communal level as regards heir financing funds, their ways of 
electing functionaries and the formulation of internal will. ╚owever, there is some competition 
in the case of federations of interests groups as well, as in most cases several pyramids of 
association compete in a particular industry or in certain sectors of agriculture, etc. But 
competition here does not mean an emptiness of content as in the case of parties struggling or 
taking power, as the layers and problems are clearly identified here. 
 
The analyses pointed out the penetration of summit organizations into the process of 
formulating political will already from the early 50s. "Herrschaft der Verbände?"(The 
domination of associations?) asked the German political scientist Theodor Eschenburg in the 
title of a 1955 article of his (Eschenburg, 1955). Since the late 60s the number of such 
signallizations has been growing and since the 70s the analysis of neo-corporationalism has 
suddenly become a fashionalbe scientific topic, which thematized precisely this. 
 
Depending on the approach neo-corporationalism has been described in very different 
conceptual frameworks in recent years. If somebody decided to ride at the anchor of the axiom 
of the imminent distruction of capitalism in his scientific analyses, they judged this phenomenon 
as the last military position of backtracking monopoly capitalists who were trying to protect 
themselves in despair. A similar approach to neo-corporationalism was used by those who 
emphasized selecivity in the whole circle of topics:the capitalist forces exclude the political 
activities from the public parliamentary sessions, which have become democratic, and relegate 
them to neo-corporational gremia away from public eyes, where they allow only summit 
organizations to enter not inclined to question the structure itself (Kastendiek, 1981). In another 
approach, which is opposite to the one described above, it is the long-standing decrease of social 
tensions in the Western political systems that has led to this tendency (See: Walter-Müller 
Jentsch, 1981). An earlier analysis of mine emphasized the same aspect and presented the 
shared-interest federations' gaining ground as the second change of structure in bourgeois 
democracies (23), which leads to a fundamental reorganization of Western political systems 
after the formation of the mass parties at the turn of the century (Pokol, 1981). 
 
I find this analysis  is still valid as the intensity of interest groups-federations gaining ground is 
in fact decided by how successful the easing of the acute social tensions has been. The 
neo-corporational political articulation appeared to be most prominent in Sweden, Norway and 
the wealthy Switzerland and Austria. There is an important difference, however, in whether the 
easing of the social tensions is achived through a considerable restiction of the market 
rationality in a country, and "social peace" is arrived at in this way, or a low level of tensions 
can be secured without any significant restriction. Austria is an example for the first solution, 
where the postponement of the restructuring of production mechanism since the early 80s with 
the aim of preserving social peace is now threatening with a deep social crisis. In contrast, the 
German Federal Republic has undertaken restructuralization since the early 70s, which brought 
about serious unemployment. And this led to neo-corporationalism being pushed back. 
 
So a spectacular advance of neo-crporationalism or its diminishing are evidently iner-related 
with an opposite change in the social tensions of the given country. Though not so explicitly, 
but all West European countries witnessed the consolidation of political articulation based on 
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organizations of shared interests in the last 40 years, besides the political parties. I think this 
general growth of role can be interpreted as a deeper tendency behind the superficial reasons, 
which can be grasped theoretically as the correction of the effects of competitive party logic. 
 
This growth of role influences the work-days when bills are passed in parliament, the 
government's decision-making, the preparation of bills in the ministries, the relationship 
between government and parliament, as well as the connections between the leaderships of 
parties and those of the summit organizations of interest federations. 
 
Decision-making in parliament has changed from two aspects as a result of increased activities 
from the part of organisations of interests groups. In most Western countries a pre-parliamentary 
stage in the preparation of bills has come into existence, where the opinions of prominent 
interest federations expressed in their recommendations for amendments of bills become 
confronted in formalized chaking procedures. In Austria, for example, this takes place in the 
"Begutachtungsverfahren", in Switzerland in the "Vernehmlassungsverfahren", in Sweden the 
"Remiss-procedure" stands for the same idea, but even the Act regulating the procedural order 
in the ministries of the German Federal Republic prescribes cheking procedures for the bill 
drafts with the important interest groups (for this see: Rödig, 1975). However, it is not only in 
the pre-parliamentary stage that the federations of interests groups can enter the law-making 
procedure, but within parliament too, as the men of interest groups are present in the 
parliamentary standing committees as "experts" while the MPs themselves are often party 
representatives only half-heartedly, because they fulfill some function at an organiisation of an 
interests groups. So if the party does not issue a compulsory view in some question, these MPs 
approach the decision alternatives of a bill draft looking through their interest groups glasses. 
Below the binary logic of political parties, "taking power/staying in opposition" and their 
changing party programs enforced by it and having no fixed content there are delegates of 
interest groups who are more attached to localized problems and definite layers. So on the 
working days of politics the crystallized formal rentability of the political market 
(government/opposition) is extended by meaningful corrections of decisions. 
 
The competitive logic has transformed the relation between the leaderships of the parties and the 
special-interest groups. In the age of class-oriented parties the closed-up ideological tableaus of 
parties restricted the decision-making of parties to a greater degree, and this pervaded the set-up 
mechanisms of the party leaderships as well as the career lines within the party establishment. 
The summits of the party staffs could primarily be conquered by politicians of pronounced 
ideological features. This ideological commitment led to the closed-up nature of parties and 
their steadfast attachment to certain platforms. In this form a political party found its natural 
allies in the distinct lobby groups forming its class base, just as its enemies were easy to identify 
in other lobby groups. The trade unions were generally attached to the workers' parties, while 
the summit organizations of employers, the Chambers of Commerce, etc. Were concentrated 
around the parties of tycoons (J. Weber, 1977, p. 26). 
 
This relationship went through fundamental changes after the competitive party logic had taken 
power. In the course of the parties becoming people's parties the attachment to individual 
interest groups has loosened and they are trying to establish communication with all the 
significant summit organs of these groups. ╧n the other hand, the trade unions and the Boards of 
Industrialists are more prepared to maintain contact with all the relevant political parties. 
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In summation: with this change a party no longer considers it important, decisions of what 
content and what alternatives are supported by the summit organ of an interest group, but it is 
interested in what ballot background can be ensured if the party is prepared to uphold them. 
This means today the parties are less likely to deduce their programs from the abstract decisions 
of content of a fixed system of theorems but devote their attention to bulks of votes and they 
make their selection among the demands and promises to be incorporated in or cancelled from 
their platforms according to their changes. 
 
 
The ways of correction in direct democracies  
  
  
Two important trends of development should be outlined here: one is the increasing significance 
of direct referenda, the other is the strengthening of new types of connections between the 
parties, which are shaking off the shackles of content under the pressure of competition, and the 
movements.  
  
a) While the adoption of direct democracy and plebiscite often meant a means used by 
Caesarian dictators and party leaders to get ahead of the formation of political will in the last 
century and the first half of this century (Michels, 1925, pp. 9-13), these forms have been 
playing an increasingly important role in the framework of consolidated parliamentary systems 
and representative democracies in the past few decades. This tendency has been reinforced by 
the mass media with its variegated and colourful world, the strengthening of the institutions of 
political socialization and the massive attention and interest in political decision. Just the same, 
mention should be made of the new results of technical development, which have made the 
massive referenda technically feasible. On the other hand, today's plebiscites take place to cover 
unambiguously identified prolems in most cases, with the important alternatives being discussed 
and socially incubated  in large circulation papers. By the time the referendum starts, the 
politically actively part of the population has become capable of arriving at a decision. This is 
especially true for decisions of communal character, whose effects can easily be calculated by 
most citizens without any preliminary political activity.  
  
What I find most important in the increasing significance of the referenda is that partly they take 
the burden of decision off the shoulders of the political parties in a number of cases, partly the 
final results of the referenda of all times will act as one of the most essential signallization 
systems for the parties. The results of direct plebiscites give an exact indication to the parties of 
what bulk of votes are made likely by the support of one or another alternative at the next 
elections.  
  
b) The question of social movements is partially interrelated with the increasing significance of 
plebiscites, although this problem is more complex. Quite often the social movements can 
achieve their objectives by forcing out referenda or influencing them. E.g. in the case of 
environmentalist movements this can be observed at a very early stage (See: Langguth, 1984). 
Even beyond this the relationship of the movements and parties on party level is affected by the 
competitive logic assuming power.  
  
As a first step this question may be approached by stating that under the pressure of the 
competitive logic the political parties, which are getting rid of their bonds of content, are 
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orientated according to the topics appearing on the political market, the alternatives and the size 
of the blocks of votes behind them and they "make a mix" of party program promising to be the 
best variation out of these. However, this also means that a competitive party system is unable 
to react to new topics, alternatives or the political tensions signallized by them that have not 
reached a certain degree of "maturity", i.e. their political "incubation" has not been realized. 
(Stoss, 1987 296).This means the disintegration of the society into blocks of votes over the 
alternatives of the solution of the problem. From then on the topic is "marketable" and when the 
mixture of party programss is repeated, it will deserve consideration in the proportion of the 
bulk of votes it ensures. In my judgement the new social movements basically cater for this 
function of "fermentation". This is especially so in the case of the so-called "single-item" 
movements, but such functions can be observed also in a number of alternative social 
movements organized to support more comprehensive platforms.  
  
So in the competitive political systems the social movements have a very special dynamism of 
development. If the newly emerging social problems have not turned up on the political market 
yet, they will ferment spontaneous organization and if the problems appear more extensively, 
they will be consolidated more on the political market through the foundation of associations 
and with the help of the mass media. If the parties perceive a substantial bulk of votes behind 
some new topic, and it does not contradict too much any other topic already taken up (and the 
block of votes behind it), its integration in the program of one or more parties may start. 
However, if the new topic interferes with the opinions and interests of the regular voters of the 
parties in many respects, no party ever is prepared to overthrow the delicate balance of its 
platform. this was the case with the environmentalist demand of the "greens", and finally they 
were only able to get the topic onto the political market by founding a party of their own.  
  
This circumstance may exercise a drastic effect on the movement of the greens. On the one 
hand, they got under the influence of the competitive party logic with this, and they can only 
push through their original demands, if they increase their voter base with the introduction of 
new topics and they strive to grow up to the vote proportions of the other parties. However, this 
political logic tends to replace the "idealists",who have anchored unmovably at questions of 
content fixed earlier. (For the problems of the Green Party in Germany see: Murphy-Roth 1987, 
303-327). On the other hand, the "greens" feel the pressure also because the environmentalist 
topic, which has proved successful and produced a block of millions of votes, may be "stolen" 
by the other parties if they undertake a drastic reshuffling of their party programs (24). So if the 
parties of the greens refuse to extend their platforms in time, they may simply lose the basis of 
their existence in the future. The competitive logic does not spare the one-time creater of the  
topic either. Thus the movements can be interpreted as mediators between the political parties 
orientated by a specified binary logic and everyday life.  
  
  
3. The attachment points of the   system of political institutions 
  
  
In the foregoing I have examined the structural effects of the assumption of a dominant position 
by the quintessential political rationality, that is the binary logic of government/opposition 
within the political sphere. In the development of parties clearly identifiable functional 
interlocking can be perceived between the political interest groups, the direct democratic forms 
and the movements. At the same time this system of institutions, which is becoming 
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independent, is developing new types of connections with the areas ousted from the system. The 
most important thing to do here is the analysis of the demarcations and connections with the 
organizations of public administration, the sphere of law and science. When discussing the 
feedback to the everyday life of society, I have already pointed out the role of the movements 
and special-interest groups. I should add the central motive mechanism of the whole political 
machinery, which may separate the system of political institutions from the everyday life of 
society, but also connects them in a formalized way: through the periodically recurring elections 
of MPs and heads of state, etc. (Luhmann, 1965, p. 176).  
  
a) When laying the theoretical foundations I have already described the internal cleavage of the 
system of government organizations under the effect of the competitive political logic, partly as 
a consequence of public administration being exposed to increasingly hermetic legal regulation, 
and partly because the state, as a system of organizations, joins parts belonging to two 
social-level systems of organizations. This split into two is properly illustrated by certain 
solutions developed in the Western states in the last few decades.  
  
A state organization employs people working according to two different kinds of logic and 
motivation. The public administration officials working professionally in ministries and other 
head offices continuously and the politicians, who keep their eyes on the fluctuations of politics 
and may be removed at any time in a government crisis, are confined together in the same state 
organs. This mutual confinement can be observed primarily in the government offices, but the 
institutions established in the last few decades near the parliament employing several people to 
prepare the bills for the parliamentary procedure, have also brought about this duality (See: 
Keller/Raupack, 1970).  
  
In the ministries the professional politicians and the continuously functioning machinery of 
public administration are connected and separated from each other primarily by the corpus of 
law. Although the politicians of the new ruling party are given the right of disposing of the 
ministerial machinery as ministers and state secretaries, they have an access to this machinery 
only through the corpus of law, which extensively regulates the principles and proportions  to be 
followed in the decision-related selections of the machinery. As regards its foundations, this 
corpus of law is based on acts and the ministers can transplant the new political priorities in the 
activities of the "subordinate" machinery only by changing them. In possession of the 
parliamentary majority this is, of course, possible, but through this mediation the political 
priorities will be translated into legal terms, which results selection and transformation. So the 
attachment of politics to public administration also means its attachment to law. This also 
indicates for us that today's public administration, which is regulated by law, should not be 
excluded from the systems of legal institutions. (Selznick and Nonet also arrived at the same 
conclusion in their 1979 book. See Nonet/Selznick, 1979. p. 132).  
  
However, there is one important difference between the two large systems of organizations 
applying the law, the public administration and the officials of the judiciaryy outside it. Both are 
engaged in the application of the effective legal regulations in the specific cases, but in the case 
of the system of judicial organizations there is no organizational attachment between the layer of 
typical politicians and the judiciary. In contrast to this the overwhelming majority of the 
machinery of public administration is connected with them also organizationally. In order to 
bridge this gap in most Western states there is one continuous (non-political) top position 
uniting the summits of the hierarchies in the public administration machineries of ministries and 
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the ever-changing party politician ministers and the politician state secretaries around them 
maintain contact with the continuously functioning machinery through thi point. For instance, in 
Great-Britain this position in the ministries is represented by that of the "permanent secretary", 
in the German Federal Republic, the position of  the "administrative state secretary" 
(Lowenstein,  1957, p. 162 and Beyme, 1973).  
  
b) The system of political institutions is attached to the sphere of law in a separate procedure; 
the law is protected from direct political influences. This is made possible by the law-making 
mechanisms, which are always disposed of by the dominant politicians of the period and in 
which the political priorities go through a kind of transformation.  
  
The unfolding of the continuously operating law-making mechanisms reached such a degree of 
formalization only in the last few decades, although written law has got into a dominant position 
in the European societies already sine the last century. However, it was only in the last one and a 
half centuries that separate responsible organs were get up and alternatives were regularly 
explored, mostly in the ministries, but since the 2nd World War also in parliament (Rodig, 
1975). In the wake of these trends of development special sections were formed in the central 
organs of the parties to execute the translation of political priorities into legal terms. This has led 
to the present practice in the law-making process where the inter-relations of the section of 
reality to be regulated by law are systematically investigated, the related information is 
collected, the relevant political priorities and alternatives are surveyed, compromises are made 
step-wise and finally, all these come to be expressed in a language compatible with the stable 
institutions, dogmatic rules and interpretation procedures of law. So in the law-making process a 
number of participants orientated on the binary code can e identified: politicians, jurists and 
scientists, and the new legal regulations of the time are created in their complementary 
selections, representing the transformation of political priorities into law, as well as the 
integration of science in social practice. (It should be noted already at this point that in a number 
of cases this ideal state goes through distortions, e.g. law is often too subordinated to political 
priorities. A more detailed account of this will follow in the next chapter.)  
  
c) When the attachment of the system of political institutions is under examination, some issues 
of interest are the ideological sphere and the role of the layer of experts, the "grey zone" 
between science and politics, a question of the last few decades.  
  
The scientific activities are organized at the borders of knowledge, which means refutability, 
unsettled hypotheses, irregularity and the pluralism of scientific opinions and statements. 
Certain systems of institutions in a complex society depend on an ever-increasing amount of 
systematically collected information for their selections in decision-making, but due to its 
hypothetical and unsettled character described above, science which is responsible for providing 
information can only do so after transformations. From the angle of which-ever sphere we look 
at science, mediating areas responsible for transformation will rise to view on all sides, which 
will perform selections among the unfounded, hypothetical, chaotic and pluralistic scientific 
statements according to the central dual paradigm of the given system of institutions to fix and 
classify them in line with the area, to eliminate their hypothetical character and thus make the 
newly transformed scientific information acceptable for the respective activities.  
  
On the other hand this transformation and fixation naturally means a relaxation of th current 
practice, and through this the development of a permanent ability of renewal. So, for instance, 
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the results of basic research, which is not done primarily to meet the needs of utilization, are 
converging on the logic of rentability in the process of applied industrial research approaching 
the system of institutions of production; scientific information gets fixed proceeding downwards 
along the levels of formalized education towards everyday life, it undergoes systematization and 
becomes the only possible truth, but in the same way the back-coupling of science via the press 
and other media continuously takes place.  
  
The results of science, primarily those associated with social sciences are transmitted towards 
the system of political institutions primarily by ideological transformation, but the 
environmental problems having become charges up politically in the past decade the formerly 
neutral technical and scientific statements have also stiffened into ideological platforms. This 
last area of science, however, is mostly attached to politics through the transformation of 
experts' activities beyond ideology.  
  
The system of connections between ideology and politics have been greatly modified in Western 
societies in the past few decades by the assumption of a dominant position by the binary logic 
already described. As it has been indicated, the competitive party logic has induced an 
increasing disposition for doing away with the shackles of content in the formulation of party 
will and in the compilation of party programs the consideration of blocks of votes appeared. 
Under the pressure of the dichotomy of "staying in power/going into opposition" the leaderships 
of parties are forced more and more to optimize the number of votes and this does not allow 
excessively pronounced ideological commitments. In my judgement this tends to entail the same 
gradual separation in the case of ideologies that we have seen in the unavoidable split of 
competitive parties and movements. In the future such tendencies may intensify in the case of 
Western parties that we can observe with the American parties which have always been built 
exclusively on competition in elections, that is a distance of the flexible and colourful 
ideological sphere from the party struggles and its organization in the sphere of press and other 
media. On the other hand the new ideologies will not generally be brought forth by the parties, 
and their role will also decrease in ideological innovation in the future, whereas the repeatedly 
arising and submerging social movements (sometimes bringing about parties) are more likely to 
gain ground.  
  
For the competitive parties, which keep the ideological commitments at a low level, the 
attachment to science is mostly ensured by the ad hoc experts' activities. In the American 
language of political science the term "grey zone" covers those scientific institutions and 
university sections, which are attached to one or another big party and continuously provide the 
decision-related selections founded on a systematic basis of knowledge for the compilation of 
party programs and those of presidential candidates, etc.Likewise, at the West-European 
universities and institutions a mediating layer has been formed whose members regularly 
participate in the decision-making of one or another party as experts, advisers or consultants. 
Although here, in Europe this still happens through emergence from the background of fixed 
ideological dispositions, the experts' activities are primarily concentrated around concrete 
political decisions, where the introduction and transformation of scientific results towards the 
political decisions take place ad hoc, and do not entail stiffening into ideological theorems.  
  
  
4. The recruiting and evaluation mechanisms of politics  
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The delimitation of the system of professional institutions spontaneously developing above the 
organizational system level can only be detected if in an area of activities enduring structures 
under the selection of decisions and communication enforce a definite and central dual category 
of value orientation. The most important dimensions of a system of institutions, where the 
central dual shematism should dominate, are constituted by the mechanisms of evaluation, 
rewarding and sanctioning pushing the communication selections of participants towards the 
central dual shematism, and before them, by the mechanisms of recruitment promoting entrance 
into the system of institution. If in these dimensions a central binary logic has been able to take 
power, this allows a low degree of hierarchies within the given sphere of activities and a 
spontaneous development of order. Moreover, as we have seen in the case of science, it does not 
only make the cut-back of hierarchies possible, but also necessary. If the organized hierarchies 
become dominant in an area like this, the spontaneous and impersonal scientific evaluations and 
rewardings will gradually become suspended and the evaluations will be dependent upon 
"feudal vasal's" service.  
  
In the now autonomous politics the binary logic of government/opposition has created the 
ideological class-oriented parties, then the popular parties orientated on a clearer form of 
competition and according to blocks of votes, or, to use the English expression, the "catch all 
parties" out of the "Honoratior" parties.  
  
One important difference between politics and science should be pointed out in the field of 
evaluation and rewarding. In short it can be summarized by noting that in science the evaluation 
of individual scientists and the reputation hierarchies based on it are more likely to be in the 
focus than those of politicians in politics. In the latter case the evaluation, rewarding and 
sanctioning concern the political organizations and their collective programs more, and the 
individual politicians' activities, charisma, successful statements or scandals affect the 
evaluation of their parties primarily. This is to say that the binary logic has built up its basic 
structures on the level of competitive political organizations within the system of political 
institutions.  
  
Naturally there are cases very occasionally where some politicians with pervasive message have 
been able to forge such independent political reputations (generally in one of the leading 
positions of a former party) which may make them independent characters in political 
competition. Such politicians may count as treasure for ailing parties. They try to attract them in 
the same way as Nobel-laureate scientists are attracted by country universities. However, 
subsequently the "lonely loiterer" can only market his political reputation persistently, if he 
organizes a party around him or puts himself at the lead of an existing party.  
  
Anyway, the future is likely to bring the strengthening of the tendency where the market of 
pervasive political personalities will come to the fore and the parties orientated along the blocks 
of votes can be attached or detached with a charismatic politician, considering the chances of 
rentability. Naturally in this context the fairly developed structure of science shows that this 
requires a number of superficial indicators and mechanisms displaying evaluation and 
reputation, which can be seen even in Western societies only in traces for the time being.  
  
A comparison with science also shows that the evaluation and rewarding of the individual 
participant can never break away completely from the evaluations developed in the relationships 
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between the organizations of the given system of institutions embedding him. Although the 
reputation hierarchies between the individual scientists mostly develop from the evaluation of 
their own scientific publications, they could never function above a level of complexity if a 
journal reputation hierarchy or a hierarchy between universities did not exist already. In the case 
of science, however, it could be achieved  that these hierarchies should be reassessed in the 
shorter or longer run by the accomplishments of scientists. However, in the relationship of the 
inter-party competition and the evaluation of the achievements of individual politicians the 
former still bears a stronger emphasis and my intention has been only to note a shift off the 
centre of gravity or at least a chance for such a shift.  
  
In the recruitment mechanisms of the modern political systems the effect of competitive logic 
can be made out just as clearly, as we have seeen it before in the case of the parties. The 
intellectual or land-owner of the "Honoratior" parties, who was embedded in educated circles, 
was replaced by the figure of the ideologist politician in the age of mass parties. It is especially 
the workers' parties of the beginning of the century, which represented a clear example of 
ideological character, that presented this kind of recruitment and socialization of politicians. In 
seminary classes and later at party schools these politicians learnt a closed-up system of 
ideological theorems and the intellectuals joining them were characterized by an almost 
religious enthusiasm and a very responsive socialization of ideological premises verging on 
religious devotion from the very outset. (See Robert Michels' own career or his comprehensive 
tableau of the mass parties of  the turn of the century; Michels, 1925).  
  
The party leaders appealed to the masses usually exercising visions of the ideological future 
upheld by the party and not so much with the alternatives of the daily political decisions. The 
persons responsible for the technical tasks ahead of the party machinery (the organizerss of 
printing jobs, the treasurers of party funds, etc.) usually did practical jobs and executed the 
technical implementation of the ideological party program to increase the mass effect.  
  
The figure of the professional party politician, which became typical subsequently, was to be 
found primarily in bourgeois parties. In the parliamentary committees the parliamentary party 
representatives were able to watch and check the details of government decisions every day. 
There the politician faced publicity exposed by the debates in parliament and due to the 
correspondent work of the always present newsmen, but the mechanisms of recruitment and the 
factors determining the lines of careers depended on professional capacities. Today's forms of 
television and other media attach a direct effect to each parliamentary contribution: to 
comments on world events or recommendations for the amendments of laws. Tens of thousands 
of votes may be withdrawn or added to the existing number of votes by an unsuccessful public 
appearance of one of the party leaders, or conversely, by his convincing argumentation in front 
of millions of TV viewers.  
  
So the centre of gravity has been shifted from the ideologist party politician to the type of 
politician who follows the fluctuations of th government/opposition logic more flexibly. A 
"pragmatic" party politician is mainly orientated on the daily government decisions and social 
problems, he gathered his knowledge in this circle and on the other hand, with the shifts of the 
relevant blocks of votes he follows the corresponding decision alternatives more flexibly. 
Naturally the advance of the pragmatists to the front can best be observed in the government 
party of the time, while in the opposition parties the weight of the "party dogmatists" with their 
attention concentrated on ideological premises is more pronounced.  
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 This pragmatic type has been reinforced in the past few decades by the fact that party 
recruitment has increasingly drawn on the membership of adjacent organisations of interest 
groups. So the trends of neo-corporationalism already described can be identified not only on 
the level of the competitive parties but also in the recruitment of professional politicians.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                      CHAPTER VIII 
                           The binarity of modern law  
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
In the past two centuries the spheres of activities orientated on aspects of value specialized in 
the most important functions to be fulfilled in society as a whole have become separated in 
European development at a rapidly increasing pacee. In the case of the legal subsystem of 
society it is easy to identify the tendencies that have brought about the specified orientation of 
modern law, its narrowing down to the value aspect lawful/unlawful out of the diffuse 
embedment and orientation on diffuse value aspects. This development - or if we have doubts 
about the final resuls, change - has rearranged the connection of jurisdiction with the political 
sphere, the mechanisms of the enforceement of justice within law, the relations of law and 
everyday life, th superordination of the various levels of legal decisions (law-making, 
constitutional judicature, jurisdiction) and last but not least, the place value of legal dogmatics 
within the system of law. Next I would like to analyse the mechanisms of complex legal 
subsystem from this single aspect: how much the dominance of the value aspect 
lawful/unlawful is felt in the modern legal subsystems; how the activities carried out in this way 
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are related to the moral aspects of justice and the political aspects; what structural problems 
arise from the new connection between law and politics, and finally,  how the union of the legal 
system and the current system of objectives of politics affects the possibilities for forming 
concepts of legal dogmatics.  
  
  
1. Theoretical considerations  
  
  
The essential structural characeristics of modern law can be grasped, if we consider it a 
subsystem besides several other subsystems of society, rising to a more abstract level of 
concept. Approaching a more concrete level, however, a number of structural differences may 
be discovered between the spheres ofactivities considered as a uniform subsystem on a more 
abstract level. Contrasting law, politics and science a few such structural differences can be 
identified very well.  
  
1) One such difference can be seen in the realization of the structural autonomy of those three 
subsystems. While in the case of science and the (Western) political systems the system-like 
differentiation meant the appearance of their structural autonomy at the same time, the modern 
system of law is based more and more on politics in establishing the contents of law, and it is 
detached structurally from everyday life, just like from most subsystems of society. As we will 
see, this tendency is attacked by a great many theories, and we would have to go back several 
centuries in the development of European law and politics, if we were to turn back this tendency 
and preferred to put the law development techniques within law in the place of political 
law-making (25).  
  
So if the actually operating modern systems of law are to be described, the structural 
superordination takes place in a separate procedure, that of law-making, and so the political 
priorities are transferred into the interior of the legal subsystem through a transformation. As we 
will see, this leads to multifarious tensions, but on the other hand the procedure of mediation 
and transformation makes it possible for the central binary code (lawful/unlawful), to acquire an 
almost totally dominant role within the sphere of law collaterally with a more and more 
intensive connection between law and politics. In other words: the procedure of mediation 
makes it possible for law to shut itself off from politics in its microprocesses, while on a macro 
level, in the establishment of legal contents law and politics can be attached more and more 
closely in a specialized procedure (Luhmann, 1972, II., p. 235).  
  
2) Another difference may be pointed out in their mechanisms of evaluation. Each has an 
independent mechanism of evaluation, but their distance from the more diffuse evaluations of 
everyday life can be diametrically different. From this point of view the most autonomous one is 
the evaluation mechanism of science. For the participants of modern professional science only 
the members of their scientific communities count as suitable for evaluation; their scientific 
reputation comes from the publication of their studies in journals edited by scientists; scientific  
prises and academic titles are decided on by follow-scientists (Hagstrom, 1965; Merton, 1973). 
In the case of law the autonomy of the evaluation mechanism according to the dual schematism 
lawful/unlawful is somewhat limited. In the majority of cases it is the citizen having a conflict 
who decides whether to make a legal case out of it thus mobilizing the system of professional 
legal institutions or to avoid the legal procedures. Science may do research in any area and it 
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will be evaluated by the relevant communication of scientists, but at least in civil law it falls in 
the sovereignty of the citizen to commence action (26) (Luhmann, 1981, p. 40). Once he has put 
the machinery of law into motion, the professional appliers of law will draw the case in question 
under the internal evaluation of law, and the selections of decision will be dominated by the 
specific value aspect lawful/unlawful. In the case of politics the operation of the evaluation 
mechanism is even more dependent upon the evaluation of the participants of everyday life. In 
the competitive political systems the professional politicians are orientated by the value dual of 
"staying in power/going into opposition", but above this the citizens make the decisions directly. 
So modern politics has built up a specified and independent evaluation mechanism by being 
based on elections, which are joined by signallization mechanisms of public opinion polls and 
other mechanisms of the kind, but there are always citizens on the other side of the evaluation, 
not professional politicians.  
  
From this it can be seen that under the uniform language of concepts of the subsystems of 
society there are different structural compositions in the individual cases, so the discoveries 
made within one subsystem can be transferred to the research of the other only to a limited 
degree. The advantage of the uniform language of concept lies much more in the fact that in this 
way such aspects that would have remained hidden if the individual subsystems had been 
examined separately, may be contrasted easily and become visible.  
  
3) Having been contrasted the three subsystems under examination will show differences in the 
respect of organizational system formation. In short: the sphere of law is dominated by 
organizational system formation most, while it plays a somewhat smaller role within the 
political subsystem; competition organizes the more comprehensive structures of politics, and 
finally, organization is least important in science. In the latter the optimal situation is if even 
within one organization the individual scientists carry on their activities in a coordinate 
relationship and rivalry and the organizational does not restrict the evaluation and rewarding 
mechanisms of the scientific communities forming spontaneously on a general level. Nearest to 
this model are the American universities, but the patterns used there have spread to most highly 
developed countries (Parsons-Platt, 1973).  
  
So the professional legal sphere is dominated by organizational system formation to a 
considerable degree. From this point of view further differences can be found between the two 
great internal parts of the modern systems of law, the part applying the law of public 
administration and the juridical sphere applying the traditional corpus of law. While public 
administration ultimately means a single hierarchic system of organization where in the gaps of 
legal regulations there are direct relations of sub- and superordination, in the case of the system 
of juridical organizations the only connections made between the individual levels of jural 
decision are the appeal procedures and the complaints ledged at the tribunals of constitution. 
Beyond this on all juridical levels the binary code lawful/unlawful dominant in the general 
sphere of law orientates the jural decisions impersonally and without direct organizational 
hierarchy.  
  
The difference between these two parts of law decreased a lot in Western countries in the last 
hundred years with the establishment of the jurisdiction of public administration and with the 
creation of its guarantees. As a consequences after the action has been commenced by those 
concerned, the decision of the official of public administration who applies law will be 
channelled onto the path of jurisdiction, just as the traditional legal cases and so the 
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organizational hierarchy within public administration cannot distort the impersonal 
"lawful/inlawful" orientation.  
  
4) Among my preliminary theoretical considerations mention should be made of the legal 
quality of certain norms. M.L.A. Hart described the principles and rules the legal character of 
the order of primary norms is preconditioned upon as "secondary rules" (Hart, pp. 89-97). Here I 
would only like to discuss the "rule of adjudication". It will lead to an interesting result if the 
stages of the historical development of the traditional corpus of law (penal law, private law), 
public administration law (which expanded in the last 150 years) and those of the most recent 
constitutional law are contrasted.  
  
In the development of the traditional areas of law first the application mechanism of law 
emerged from the diffuse medium of the world of everyday norms and in connection with 
jurisdiction the effective legal norms got fixed and became specified in the juridical practice. It 
took several centuries of development until the mechanism of conscious law-making rose above 
the juridical application of law, and with this a tri-polar relationship has come into being on 
these areas of law between the law-makers, the jurists applying them in individual cases, and the 
citizens. However, in the case of the law of public administration and constitution, which have 
expanded in the past 150 years, an opposite order can be observed. These corpuses of law 
started to develop in the age of well-established law-making techniques, so from the very start 
they were created by conscious law-making. Nevertheless, in these areas the juridical 
mechanism came to be separated later. The jurisdiction of public administration unfolded in the 
first half of the 20th century after the 19th century beginnings and the jurisdiction of 
constitution got ultimately stabilized in most highly developed societies after the post-war years. 
with this the tri-polar relationship already existing in the traditional areas of law came into being 
also here. Constitutional regulation is no longer merely a collection of principles but individual 
decisions of the tribunal of constitution specify it for the individual situations. The rules of 
public administration are no longer instructions simply forwarding higher objectives towards the 
lower-ranking officials. They are interpreted by the tribunal of public administration with the 
help of comprehensivve principles of legal dogmatics if the citizens concerned take legal 
proceedings.  
  
Going back to Hart's "secondary rules" it seems that the legal quality of the corpus of norms in 
public administration and constitution is brought about by the institutionalization of some form 
of the "rule of adjudication", that is the establishment of the jurisdiction of constitution and 
public administration. It is not in the respect of Western societies that this should be dwelt on, 
because for the last few decades they have existed there in some form, but in the respect of the 
East European countries where no constitutional jurisdiction has been developed and it is only 
now that the jurisdiction of public administration is being restarted. From a theoretical point of 
view these efforts mean that attempts are made to move the constitutional regulations from the 
sphere of ideology and propaganda to the sphere of law, and similarly with this step the rules of 
public administration assume the legal quality that has developed in the traditional areas of law 
(27). In the latter case though, the legal quality has been established in an incomplete form, by 
the possibility of the judicial impugnment of the resolutions  of public administration.  
  
5) Finally, when examining law as a system of professional institutions I should advert to my 
starting point of general social theory amongst my preliminay theoretical remarks. The main 
aspects of such a system of institutions are constituted by the recruitment and socialization 
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mechanisms and the evaluation, rewarding and sanctioning mechanisms of the participants. It is 
in these aspects that the central dual schematism of the given system of professional institutions, 
at present the value aspect lawful/unlawful of the legal system gets into a dominant position in 
the process of structural differentiation. This specific binarity of the modern systems of law are 
to be examined in the mechanisms of legal education and generally those of socialization into 
professional jurists. The specific ways of the prevalence of this binarity should be examined in 
the legislation mechanisms and in the mechanisms of the application of law combined with the 
procedures of appeal. Before that the attachment of the legal system reduced to evaluation 
according to the dichotomy of lawful/unlawful to the evaluation according to morals, justice and 
political considerations is to be outlined.  
  
 
  
  
  
  
2. Justice and th binarity of law 
  
  
When managing legal cases the modern systems of law aim at reducing the subjectivism of 
judges to a minimum by delimiting the corpus of law precisely, giving the exact denotations of 
the concepts of legal dogmatics used in the corpus of law, eliminating the contradictions 
between the sources of law of different levels with the help of constitutional jurisdiction and the 
system of appeal procedures, etc. Even if we admit, in spite of all, that even so a lot of 
contradictions and subjectivism cannot be eliminated, the tendency of juridical decisions 
working with freer and rather diffuse aspects of evaluation typical of the earlier centuries 
gradually narrowing down to the more specific dual paradigm lawful/unlawful defined by the 
effective corpus of law is seen to be decisive.  
  
In the process of such positivization of law the possibilities for judges to evaluate in the 
dimension of justice are decreasing. In as much as the legal regulation relevant in the decision of 
the case delineates the direction of the judicial decision precisely, and that direction is opposite 
to what they and perhaps the majority of the society consider just, they have to choose what the 
regulation supposes to be rightful, and not the just solutions. If they do not do so, at the appeal 
of the opposing party in the suit the higher courts will annual the decision anyway and finally  
the righful running counter the just will overcome.  
  
It was especially after the cruelty of the Nazi jurisdiction that the problem of unjust law became 
the centre of interest and induced criticism of the aspect reduced to lawful/unlawful of the 
jurists of the positivized system of law. At that time the response was the demand of natural law 
over positive law: a legal system in contradiction with the former is ultimately unjust and the 
appliers of law should carry out their activitiess beingaware of this (Hart, 1961, pp. 181-195). 
Since then, in a normalized world, judges have necessarily continued  to be oriented by the 
lawful/unlawful paradigm of the effecive law; they have been forced to do so by the whole 
machinery of the legal system. It seems that modern law itself should be crushed to secure direct 
orientation on justice.  
  
I think this diagnosis is too pessimistic and in the case of positivized law the establishment of a 
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closer connection between "rightful" and "just" should be sought elsewhere than in the direction 
sought by the post-war ideas of natural law. although the aspects of justness have mostly been 
ousted from the law application procedures but parallel with this the processes of law-making 
and the democratic formation of political will unfolded and united in the last hundred years, 
naturally primarily in the highly developed West European countries and the countrais 
following the same model. This is where the evaluations according to morals and justice play a 
more direct role, and the reduction of the general aspect to lawful/unlawful is made acceptable 
by the fact that in the creative process of legislation one of the guiding principles of the 
selections of decision is constituted by the aspects of morals and justness thought to be cardinal 
in the given society. With this background the reduced aspect may be a source of modernization.  
  
The structural make-up of the democratic political systems disposing of law-making gives a 
chance for the introduction of these aspects into the corpus of law, even if there are press reports 
on a number of cases of corruption and other manifestations of the lack of morals every day in 
the Western political systems. But as in these countries the structural incorporation of publicity 
ensures such immoral activities being brought to the surface (28) and now, in the period of 
Glasnost their dimensions can be compared to the maffia-like formations of the non-public 
development of political will in some Easteuropean countries, it may be stated that these amoral 
phenomena represent the inevitable by-products of a democratic political system.  
  
So in my opinion the aspects of justice excluded from the direct application of law can get in the 
law-making process in the democratic political systems with structural guarantees. In acordance 
with the competitive political logic the selections of decision of the political parties, the 
government, the parliamentary politicians and the ministers are orientated with more and more 
specificity on the binary code of staying in power/going into opposition. Any public disclosure 
of the views of a government politician or an opposition party leader on a world event or a draft 
bill under preparation or the alternatives it includes may take away hundreds of thousands of 
votes from his party at the next elections or may add just as many. Likewise the flowing 
argumentations of the politicians and press organs of the opposition parties may make the 
unjustice of the clauses of an effective Act evident for millions of people and if the 
argumentation is echoed by the ideas of millions of citizens of justice, the existence of such an 
act or its presentation as a bill in parliament may contribute greatly to the downfall of a 
government and the  transformation of an earlier majority in parliament into a minority. 
Although it is to be addmitted that due to the general and often contradictory character of the 
ideas of justice a number of solutions considered to be unjust by part of the society may get into 
the corpus of effective law even in the case of a democratic formation of political will, it may be 
claimed  that precisely in the cardinal question which are universal enough  to be classified into 
the corpus of natural law by the followers of this concept, the standard of justice of a given 
society cannot be opposite to the standard of th corpus of effective law. This is why in such 
political systemss the decision selection of the judges and other appliers of law reduced to the 
mere lawful/unlawful dichotomy is acceptable.  
  
It is not the modern legal systems with their effect of reduction to lawful/unlawful that have to 
be destroyedd, but the political systems disposing of law-making, or at least they should be 
reformed into democracies, if an unjust system of law could be stabilized in a society. Probably  
it is easy to verify the statement that in post-war Germany and Italy it was not the revived 
doctrines of natural law that brought back the just systems of law but the circumstance that 
parallel with these doctrines the political systems built on this law were annihilated and a 
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democratic formation of political will built on competition and publicity was created. So it is 
not the positive legal system that should be founded on natural law but the political system, on 
competition.  
  
Besides legislation outside the system of law, which is mostly dominated by politics, a 
mechanism with a more direct influence of the standards of morals and justness developed 
within law. I have the jurisdiction of constitution in mind, which became ultimately stabilized in 
 the modern systems of law after the Second World War after American beginnings in the last 
century. (Britain was the only exception due to her specific development of constitution.)  
  
Besides the specific measures the modern written constitutions contain a great many basic 
principles and regulations most of which embody the most universal moral and justice standards 
of the civilized societies. The constitution created in the new wave of constitutions after the 
Second World War worded these standards especially clearly. (The impact of the revived 
doctrines of natural law can be recognized in the incorporation of these principles in the 
constitution!) Of course these constitutional principles would not mean anything, if parallel with 
them no political structures built on publicity and competition were working and there were not 
tribunals of constitution - as it is amply illustrated by the Stalinist constitutions, which were 
flawless, as far as their layout is concerned.  
  
However, with the incorporation of the standards of morals and justice in the constitution and 
with the build-up of the discourse of constitutional jurisdiction displaying a continuous tendency 
for specificity above  them, these principles undergo a transformation unnoticed and through 
this they converge on the argumentation of legal dogmatics, which developed in the course of 
the centuries. The provision of equality, human dignity, etc. becomes realized in the discourse 
of tribunal of constitution evoked by their infringement in concrete cases. With this the blurred, 
diffuse and over-generalized standards of morals and justice become specific as situations. (29) 
the masses of decisions in cases of constitutional jurisdiction mark out or designate concretely 
what it means to assure equality, what the requirements of the freedom of thought and the 
freedom of press stand for; in the everyday situations attempts are made to find the middle of 
the way in what represents the optimum betwween justness associated with universal equality 
and social justness aiming at equalizing unequal positions which exist nevertheless. (For the 
possible contradiction between "justice" and "social justice" see Hart, 1961, p. 183.)  
  
If for millions of the heterogeneous situations of the complex modern societies the standards of 
general justice cannot be applied directly (Luhmann, 1981, p. 326), because they fail to provide 
directly the instructions of necessary concreteness, with this mediation of constitutional 
jurisdiction it is possible to approach this state. On the other hand, the concrete approach in 
constitutional jurisdiction and the public press discourse over it give explicit guiding principles 
in the selection of draft bills for the later stage of Act preparation.  
  
With this I do not mean  to say that with the institutionalization of the jurisdiction of 
constitution justice has become "positivized" and the Code of "positive" principles of justice can 
be taken out from among the Law Reports, but undoubtedly regular mediation has developed 
between the value dichotomy of "just/unjust" and the mere "lawful/unlawful" binary codes.  
  
Thus in the modern systems of law the points of entry of the aspects and standards of justness 
are transferred structurally. Instead of sending their entire personalities into action the judges are 
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forced by the machinery of law to produce evaluations reduced to the schematism of 
lawful/unlawful, but at the summit of law (jurisdiction of constitution) and beyond law, between 
the systems of law and politics the standards of morals and justice get a structural possibility for 
entry in the intermediary procedure of legislation between the systems of law and politics (30).  
  
Besides this main property such subordinate tendencies of development can also be observed in 
the modern systems of law which continue to assure a place for a more direct observation of the 
standards of justice in the micro-processes of law. The "antiformal tendencies", the role of jury 
trial mentioned by Max Weber early this century can be regarded as such, and also arbitration, 
which has been used increasingly in the past few decades, which cases th rigidity of orientation 
merely by the "lawful/unlawful" dichotomy. (For the alternative solutions of the conflicts of 
everyday life outside law see: Voigt, 1983, pp. 116-196).  
  
I should also touch upon the consequences of the materialization of the law mediating the 
immense role played by the social and welfare state in thee last few decades. Under this trend 
certain parts of law (especially the law of public administration) become a means of politics and 
this change exercises an effect on the dominant role of orientation on the value aspect 
lawful/unlawful. The investigations into the characteristics of instrumental law have proved the 
decrease of the importance of the concepts of legal dogmatics and the words of legal 
regulations, as well as the appearance of an application of law which keeps the function of a 
legal rule or the objectives to be attained in view on the other hand (Voigt, 1980, p. 26). The 
applier of law is orientated on the preamble and the justification of an act, not on the text of an 
act full of obscure and broad concepts and his preoccupation is not the application of law but 
finding out the purposes of the creators of political law and considering them in the individual 
cases (Teubner, 1982, 1984).  
  
Thus the materialization of law really acts against the dominant role of the dual paradigm 
"lawful/unlawful", which we have described as a main trend of development. However, this 
tendency has been reflected upon considerably only in the past ten years, so it is impossible to 
know whether there will be correction mechanisms to solve this problem in the future, and if 
there will be some, what they will be like. The theoretical political trends partly implemented in 
the practice, which have criticised the extensive role of the state, have reduced the pressure 
originated by state politics on the materialization of law recently.  
  
A way out may be the direction of the development of "reflexive law" indicated by Gunther 
Teubner and some improvement may be achieved by the future development of the set of 
internal dogmatics and concepts of law in order to make it suitable for meeting new and 
extensive tasks and reflecting a rather complex social environment. Instead of the extra-juristic, 
vague terms the future appliers of law, the judges wil be given law texts having systematic local 
values and operating with concepts of legal dogmatics. This is the direction of development 
Niklas Luhmann prognosticated and urged in his 1972 Rechtsoziologie, but in his 1974 
"Rechtssystem und Rechtsdogmatik" he assumed a diametrically opposite view turning to the 
depths of law and stating the difficulties of development of the level of legal dogmatics. Since 
the early 80s, as a terminal stage of this change, he has tried to reject the entire law-making  
process in order to make his views congruous and expressed his preference for a judicial 
techniques of developing law (See especially Luhmann, 1983, p. 139 and 1985, p. 9). to achieve 
this, however, I think several hundreds of years' trends of the development of European politics 
and law, which have led to parliamentary and political law-making, ought to be reserved. For 
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this reason I think Luhmann's original ideas are less utopistic and to my mind the way out is in 
the subsequent development of the set of legal dogmatics of the modern systems of law. so 
parliamentary and, generally, political law-making cannot be obliterated and neither can the use 
of certain parts of law as a means serving political purposes. The strain on law by politics and 
the transfer of political objectives into law without any transformation or selection can be 
stopped though. This idea has been given ample support by the dramatic explorations of facts in 
the last few years' special literature on the growing prevalence of the aspects of law and state, 
which have contributed to the transformation of the spiritual atmosphere of Western societies by 
now (See: Voigt, 1980, 1983: Winkler/Gessner, 1983.)  
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